fix(audit-wave-11): dossier sweep — error-ux + webhook + storage + search + maintainability

Final pass over the unaddressed AUDIT-2026-05-12 dossiers, taking the
tractable Critical/High items from each:

error-ux-auditor (5 items)
- C2: 17 toast.error(err.message) sites swept to toastError(err, …) so
  every user-visible failure carries a copy-paste Reference ID
- C3: apiFetch synthesizes a client-side correlation id when a 5xx
  comes back with a non-JSON body (reverse-proxy HTML pages); message
  becomes "The server is unreachable. Please try again." with code
  UPSTREAM_UNREACHABLE
- C4: checkRateLimit fails OPEN when Redis is unavailable so an outage
  no longer 500s login + portal sign-in; logged at warn so monitoring
  catches it
- H2: StorageTimeoutError (name='TimeoutError') replaces the plain
  Error throw in s3.ts withTimeout — error-classifier hints fire now
- H5: errorResponse() adopted across /api/storage/[token],
  /api/public/website-inquiries, and the Documenso webhook body (drops
  the "Invalid secret" reconnaissance string)

outbound-webhook-auditor (5 items)
- C1: signature is now HMAC(secret, `${ts}.${body}`) with the
  timestamp surfaced as X-Webhook-Timestamp so receivers can reject
  replays outside a freshness window
- C3: dead-letter with reason missing_signing_secret when secret is
  null (defence-in-depth against DB tampering / future migration
  mistakes)
- H2: webhooks queue bumped to maxAttempts=8 with 30 s base
  exponential backoff so a 30 s receiver blip during a deploy no
  longer dead-letters every in-flight event; per-queue
  backoffDelayMs added to QUEUE_CONFIGS
- M1: SSRF denylist gains Oracle Cloud metadata 192.0.0.192
- M2: dispatch-time https:// assertion before fetch, so a bad DB edit
  can't slip plaintext through

storage-pathing-auditor (2 items)
- H1: berth-PDF presigned-upload keys now `${portSlug}/berths/…/…`
  with portSlug threaded into backend.presignUpload — engages the
  filesystem-proxy port-binding `p` token verifier
- H2: presignDownloadUrl auto-derives portSlug from the key's first
  segment when callers don't pass it, so all 8 download sites engage
  the `p`-token guard without per-site plumbing

search-auditor (1 item)
- H3: removed dead void wantEmail; void wantPhone; pair plus the
  unused looksLikeEmail helper — the bucket-reorder it was scaffolded
  for was never wired

maintainability-auditor (1 item)
- M2: swept seven abandoned `void <symbol>` markers and their dead
  imports across clients/bulk, interests/bulk, admin/email-templates,
  admin/website-submissions, alert-rules, and notes.service

Deferred to future work (substantial refactors, schema migrations, or
multi-file UI work):
- error-ux M3-M8 (global-error.tsx, per-route loading.tsx coverage,
  ErrorBanner component, /api/ready route, worker DLQ admin surface)
- maintainability C1-C4 (documents/search/notes service splits,
  interest-tabs split — multi-hour refactors)
- currency C1-H5 (mixed-currency dashboard aggregation, FX history
  table, rounding policy) — wait for second non-USD port
- outbound-webhook C2 (deliveries reaper job), H1 (DNS-rebind TOCTOU
  with undici Agent), H3 (circuit-breaker), H5 (presigned-post-policy)
- storage-pathing C2 (orphan reaper), H3-H5 (streaming + content-type
  binding)

Tests: 1315/1315 vitest  ; tsc clean.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
This commit is contained in:
2026-05-13 13:27:32 +02:00
parent 93399ea27e
commit ebdd8408bf
32 changed files with 298 additions and 168 deletions

View File

@@ -270,6 +270,14 @@ Migrate as a focused day's work (~40 × 10-15 min), then promote `react-hooks/se
-**Onboarding + first-run UX** (onboarding-auditor) — Wave 9.8: fixed wrong setting keys in checklist auto-checks (C1), broken `forms` href (C2), compound gate for Documenso EOI readiness (C3), catch-and-log around `ensureSystemRoots` (C4), fresh-port berth empty state (H5), admin-sections-browser description (M4).
-**Type-safety + drizzle leak audit** (types-auditor) — Wave 10.1: `Tx` type exported (C-1), berth-detail `useQuery<any>` replaced with `BerthDetailData` (C-2), parseBody adopted across 7 portal/public routes (C-3), `toAuditJson<T>` helper removed 21 `as unknown as Record<…>` casts (H-5). Drizzle leak check came back clean (no `$inferSelect` crossing the API boundary).
-**Build + deploy + prod readiness** (build-auditor) — Wave 10.2: socket.io + 6 other native deps added to `serverExternalPackages` + COPY-in-Dockerfile (C-3), `NEXT_PUBLIC_APP_URL` validation (H-2), healthcheck PORT templatization (H-5), `NODE_ENV=production` in builder (M9), image-level HEALTHCHECK (M7). CSP `'unsafe-inline'` (H-1) deferred pending nonce middleware infrastructure.
-**Wave 11 — unaddressed-dossier sweep + cross-cutting infra**:
- **BullMQ jobId plumbing** (concurrency C-2): stable per-entity jobIds added across `invoices` (send-invoice, invoice-overdue-notify), `gdpr-export`, `webhook-dispatch`, `expenses`, `webhooks.service`, `notifications`, `inquiry-notifications`, `reports` (generate-report).
- **CSP nonce middleware** (build-auditor H-1): per-request nonce in `src/proxy.ts:buildCspWithNonce` with `'self' 'nonce-<n>' 'strict-dynamic'` in prod; `next.config.ts` fallback header kept for static assets / API JSON.
- **Error UX** (error-ux-auditor): `apiFetch` synthesizes a client-side correlation id for non-JSON 5xx (C3); `checkRateLimit` fails open on Redis outage so auth doesn't lock (C4); `StorageTimeoutError extends Error` with `name='TimeoutError'` for classifier hints (H2); `errorResponse()` adopted across `/api/storage/[token]`, `/api/public/website-inquiries`, Documenso webhook body cleaned (H5); 17 `toast.error(err.message)` sites swept to `toastError(err, …)` (C2).
- **Outbound webhooks** (outbound-webhook-auditor): Stripe-style `HMAC(secret, "${ts}.${body}")` + `X-Webhook-Timestamp` header (C1); dead-letter when secret is null (C3); retry policy `8 attempts × 30s base exponential` (H2); SSRF denylist gains Oracle Cloud `192.0.0.192` (M1); dispatch-time `https://` assertion (M2).
- **Storage-pathing** (storage-pathing-auditor): berth-PDF presigned-upload key prefixed with `${portSlug}/` + `portSlug` passed to `presignUpload` (H1); `presignDownloadUrl` infers the slug from the key's first segment when callers don't pass it explicitly — engages the filesystem-proxy port-binding `p` token verifier across every download site (H2).
- **Search** (search-auditor): dead `void wantEmail; void wantPhone;` + unused `looksLikeEmail` helper removed (H3).
- **Maintainability** (maintainability-auditor M2): swept seven `void <symbol>` abandoned-scaffolding markers and their dead imports across `clients/bulk`, `interests/bulk`, `admin/email-templates`, `admin/website-submissions`, `alert-rules`, and `notes.service`.
### How to use this section

View File

@@ -17,6 +17,7 @@ import {
AlertDialogTitle,
} from '@/components/ui/alert-dialog';
import { apiFetch } from '@/lib/api/client';
import { toastError } from '@/lib/api/toast-error';
import { WebhookForm } from '@/components/admin/webhooks/webhook-form';
import { WebhookDeliveryLog } from '@/components/admin/webhooks/webhook-delivery-log';
import { WebhookSecretDisplay } from '@/components/admin/webhooks/webhook-secret-display';
@@ -61,7 +62,7 @@ export default function WebhooksPage() {
toast.success('Webhook deleted');
void loadWebhooks();
} catch (err) {
toast.error(err instanceof Error ? err.message : 'Failed to delete webhook');
toastError(err, 'Failed to delete webhook');
}
}
@@ -75,7 +76,7 @@ export default function WebhooksPage() {
setNewSecret({ webhookId, secret: result.data.secret, masked: result.data.secretMasked });
void loadWebhooks();
} catch (err) {
toast.error(err instanceof Error ? err.message : 'Failed to regenerate secret');
toastError(err, 'Failed to regenerate secret');
} finally {
setRegenerating(null);
}
@@ -90,7 +91,7 @@ export default function WebhooksPage() {
toast.success(webhook.isActive ? 'Webhook disabled' : 'Webhook enabled');
void loadWebhooks();
} catch (err) {
toast.error(err instanceof Error ? err.message : 'Failed to toggle webhook');
toastError(err, 'Failed to toggle webhook');
}
}

View File

@@ -7,7 +7,13 @@ import { db } from '@/lib/db';
import { ports } from '@/lib/db/schema/ports';
import { websiteSubmissions } from '@/lib/db/schema/website-submissions';
import { env } from '@/lib/env';
import { errorResponse } from '@/lib/errors';
import {
AppError,
errorResponse,
RateLimitError,
UnauthorizedError,
ValidationError,
} from '@/lib/errors';
import { logger } from '@/lib/logger';
import { checkRateLimit, rateLimiters } from '@/lib/rate-limit';
@@ -63,16 +69,15 @@ export async function POST(req: NextRequest) {
// Refuse outright if the CRM hasn't been wired up - safer than letting
// unauthenticated traffic in just because the env var was forgotten.
if (!env.WEBSITE_INTAKE_SECRET) {
return NextResponse.json(
{ error: 'Website intake is not configured on this server.' },
{ status: 503 },
return errorResponse(
new AppError(503, 'Website intake is not configured on this server.', 'NOT_CONFIGURED'),
);
}
// Auth gate - shared secret in header, timing-safe compare.
const secretHeader = req.headers.get('x-webhook-secret');
if (!verifySecret(secretHeader)) {
return NextResponse.json({ error: 'Unauthorized' }, { status: 401 });
return errorResponse(new UnauthorizedError());
}
// Rate limit. All website-side traffic shares the website's egress IP,
@@ -84,10 +89,7 @@ export async function POST(req: NextRequest) {
const rl = await checkRateLimit(ip, rateLimiters.websiteIntake);
if (!rl.allowed) {
const retryAfter = Math.max(1, Math.ceil((rl.resetAt - Date.now()) / 1000));
return NextResponse.json(
{ error: 'Rate limit exceeded' },
{ status: 429, headers: { 'Retry-After': String(retryAfter) } },
);
return errorResponse(new RateLimitError(retryAfter));
}
// Parse + validate body. Reject anything that doesn't conform — the
@@ -97,9 +99,10 @@ export async function POST(req: NextRequest) {
const body = await req.json();
parsed = SubmissionSchema.parse(body);
} catch (err) {
return NextResponse.json(
{ error: 'Invalid payload', details: err instanceof Error ? err.message : 'parse error' },
{ status: 400 },
return errorResponse(
new ValidationError('Invalid payload', [
{ field: 'body', message: err instanceof Error ? err.message : 'parse error' },
]),
);
}
@@ -119,7 +122,7 @@ export async function POST(req: NextRequest) {
{ portSlug: parsed.port_slug, submissionId: parsed.submission_id },
'website-inquiry rejected: unknown port',
);
return NextResponse.json({ error: 'Unknown port' }, { status: 400 });
return errorResponse(new ValidationError('Unknown port'));
}
// Idempotent insert. Two parallel requests carrying the same submission_id

View File

@@ -21,7 +21,13 @@ import { Readable } from 'node:stream';
import { NextRequest, NextResponse } from 'next/server';
import { MAX_FILE_SIZE } from '@/lib/constants/file-validation';
import { errorResponse } from '@/lib/errors';
import {
AppError,
errorResponse,
ForbiddenError,
NotFoundError,
ValidationError,
} from '@/lib/errors';
import { logger } from '@/lib/logger';
import { redis } from '@/lib/redis';
import { FilesystemBackend, getStorageBackend } from '@/lib/storage';
@@ -47,16 +53,13 @@ export async function GET(
const backend = await getStorageBackend();
if (!(backend instanceof FilesystemBackend)) {
return NextResponse.json(
{ error: 'Storage proxy is only available in filesystem mode' },
{ status: 404 },
);
return errorResponse(new NotFoundError('storage proxy'));
}
const result = verifyProxyToken(token, backend.getHmacSecret(), 'get');
if (!result.ok) {
logger.warn({ reason: result.reason }, 'Storage proxy token rejected');
return NextResponse.json({ error: 'Invalid or expired token' }, { status: 403 });
return errorResponse(new ForbiddenError('Invalid or expired token'));
}
const { payload } = result;
@@ -72,7 +75,7 @@ export async function GET(
const setOk = await redis.set(replayKey, '1', 'EX', remainingSeconds, 'NX');
if (setOk !== 'OK') {
logger.warn({ key: payload.k }, 'Storage proxy token replay rejected');
return NextResponse.json({ error: 'Token already used' }, { status: 403 });
return errorResponse(new ForbiddenError('Token already used'));
}
let absolutePath: string;
@@ -80,22 +83,22 @@ export async function GET(
absolutePath = backend.resolveKeyForProxy(payload.k);
} catch (err) {
logger.warn({ err, key: payload.k }, 'Storage proxy key resolution failed');
return NextResponse.json({ error: 'Invalid key' }, { status: 400 });
return errorResponse(new ValidationError('Invalid key'));
}
let size: number;
try {
const stat = await fs.stat(absolutePath);
if (!stat.isFile()) {
return NextResponse.json({ error: 'Not found' }, { status: 404 });
return errorResponse(new NotFoundError('file'));
}
size = stat.size;
} catch (err) {
const code = (err as NodeJS.ErrnoException).code;
if (code === 'ENOENT') {
return NextResponse.json({ error: 'Not found' }, { status: 404 });
return errorResponse(new NotFoundError('file'));
}
throw err;
return errorResponse(err);
}
// Convert the Node Readable into a Web ReadableStream for NextResponse.
@@ -140,16 +143,13 @@ export async function PUT(
const backend = await getStorageBackend();
if (!(backend instanceof FilesystemBackend)) {
return NextResponse.json(
{ error: 'Storage proxy is only available in filesystem mode' },
{ status: 404 },
);
return errorResponse(new NotFoundError('storage proxy'));
}
const result = verifyProxyToken(token, backend.getHmacSecret(), 'put');
if (!result.ok) {
logger.warn({ reason: result.reason }, 'Storage proxy upload token rejected');
return NextResponse.json({ error: 'Invalid or expired token' }, { status: 403 });
return errorResponse(new ForbiddenError('Invalid or expired token'));
}
const { payload } = result;
@@ -164,7 +164,7 @@ export async function PUT(
const setOk = await redis.set(replayKey, '1', 'EX', remainingSeconds, 'NX');
if (setOk !== 'OK') {
logger.warn({ key: payload.k }, 'Storage proxy upload token replay rejected');
return NextResponse.json({ error: 'Token already used' }, { status: 403 });
return errorResponse(new ForbiddenError('Token already used'));
}
// Pre-flight size check via Content-Length so a malicious caller can't
@@ -172,14 +172,17 @@ export async function PUT(
const contentLengthHeader = req.headers.get('content-length');
const contentLength = contentLengthHeader ? Number(contentLengthHeader) : NaN;
if (Number.isFinite(contentLength) && contentLength > MAX_FILE_SIZE) {
return NextResponse.json(
{ error: `File exceeds ${MAX_FILE_SIZE} byte cap (Content-Length: ${contentLength})` },
{ status: 413 },
return errorResponse(
new AppError(
413,
`File exceeds ${MAX_FILE_SIZE} byte cap (Content-Length: ${contentLength})`,
'PAYLOAD_TOO_LARGE',
),
);
}
if (!req.body) {
return NextResponse.json({ error: 'Empty body' }, { status: 400 });
return errorResponse(new ValidationError('Empty body'));
}
// Read the body into a buffer with a hard cap. Filesystem deployments are
@@ -200,9 +203,8 @@ export async function PUT(
} catch {
/* ignore */
}
return NextResponse.json(
{ error: `File exceeds ${MAX_FILE_SIZE} byte cap` },
{ status: 413 },
return errorResponse(
new AppError(413, `File exceeds ${MAX_FILE_SIZE} byte cap`, 'PAYLOAD_TOO_LARGE'),
);
}
chunks.push(Buffer.from(value));
@@ -210,7 +212,7 @@ export async function PUT(
buffer = Buffer.concat(chunks);
} catch (err) {
logger.warn({ err, key: payload.k }, 'Storage proxy upload read failed');
return NextResponse.json({ error: 'Upload read failed' }, { status: 400 });
return errorResponse(new ValidationError('Upload read failed'));
}
// Magic-byte gate: when the token was minted with `c=application/pdf`
@@ -218,9 +220,8 @@ export async function PUT(
// that isn't actually a PDF. Mirrors the post-upload check in
// berth-pdf.service.ts so the two paths behave identically.
if (payload.c === 'application/pdf' && !isPdfMagic(buffer)) {
return NextResponse.json(
{ error: 'Uploaded file failed PDF magic-byte check (does not start with %PDF-).' },
{ status: 400 },
return errorResponse(
new ValidationError('Uploaded file failed PDF magic-byte check (does not start with %PDF-).'),
);
}

View File

@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
import { NextResponse } from 'next/server';
import { eq, inArray } from 'drizzle-orm';
import { inArray } from 'drizzle-orm';
import { z } from 'zod';
import { withAuth, withPermission } from '@/lib/api/helpers';
@@ -87,5 +87,3 @@ export const PUT = withAuth(
}
}),
);
void eq;

View File

@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
import { NextResponse } from 'next/server';
import { and, desc, eq, inArray, lt, sql, type SQL } from 'drizzle-orm';
import { and, desc, eq, inArray, sql, type SQL } from 'drizzle-orm';
import { z } from 'zod';
import { withAuth, withPermission } from '@/lib/api/helpers';
@@ -71,6 +71,3 @@ export const GET = withAuth(
}
}),
);
// Suppress lt unused-import lint
void lt;

View File

@@ -54,13 +54,19 @@ export const postHandler: RouteHandler = async (req, ctx, params) => {
// so a race between two reps just shifts which one wins the version
// slot. The storage key is gen_random_uuid()-namespaced so collisions
// in the storage layer are impossible.
//
// storage-pathing-auditor H1: prefix the port slug so the
// filesystem-proxy port-binding token (`p` field) can be wired and
// the namespace matches `buildStoragePath` (which always leads with
// the port slug).
const sanitized = fileName.replace(/[^a-zA-Z0-9._-]/g, '_').slice(0, 200) || 'berth.pdf';
const storageKey = `berths/${params.id!}/uploads/${crypto.randomUUID()}_${sanitized}`;
const storageKey = `${ctx.portSlug}/berths/${params.id!}/uploads/${crypto.randomUUID()}_${sanitized}`;
const backend = await getStorageBackend();
const presigned = await backend.presignUpload(storageKey, {
contentType: 'application/pdf',
expirySeconds: 900,
portSlug: ctx.portSlug,
});
return NextResponse.json({

View File

@@ -10,7 +10,6 @@ import { clients, clientTags } from '@/lib/db/schema/clients';
import { setClientTags } from '@/lib/services/clients.service';
import {
getClientArchiveDossier,
HIGH_STAKES_STAGES,
type ClientArchiveDossier,
} from '@/lib/services/client-archive-dossier.service';
import {
@@ -21,7 +20,6 @@ import { notifyNextInLine } from '@/lib/services/next-in-line-notify.service';
import { getQueue } from '@/lib/queue';
import { logger } from '@/lib/logger';
import { errorResponse } from '@/lib/errors';
import type { PipelineStage } from '@/lib/constants';
const bulkSchema = z.discriminatedUnion('action', [
z.object({
@@ -221,8 +219,3 @@ export const POST = withAuth(async (req, ctx) => {
return NextResponse.json({ data: { results, summary } });
});
// Suppress unused-import warning when the helper isn't referenced after
// future refactors strip the local archive call.
void HIGH_STAKES_STAGES;
void ({} as PipelineStage);

View File

@@ -1,8 +1,8 @@
import { NextResponse } from 'next/server';
import { z } from 'zod';
import { eq, and, inArray } from 'drizzle-orm';
import { eq, and } from 'drizzle-orm';
import { withAuth, withPermission } from '@/lib/api/helpers';
import { withAuth } from '@/lib/api/helpers';
import { parseBody } from '@/lib/api/route-helpers';
import { db } from '@/lib/db';
import { interests } from '@/lib/db/schema/interests';
@@ -128,8 +128,3 @@ export const POST = withAuth(async (req, ctx) => {
return NextResponse.json({ data: { results, summary } });
});
// Keep a single import alive (linter); used in the Drizzle inArray pattern below
// in case a future caller wants set-based ops instead of per-row loops.
void inArray;
void withPermission;

View File

@@ -139,8 +139,11 @@ async function handleDocumensoWebhook(req: NextRequest): Promise<NextResponse> {
source: 'webhook',
});
}
// Always return 200 (webhook best-practice — don't leak signal).
return NextResponse.json({ ok: false, error: 'Invalid secret' }, { status: 200 });
// Always return 200 (webhook best-practice — don't leak signal). Body
// is intentionally empty/uniform — error-ux-auditor H5 noted the
// literal "Invalid secret" string confirms the endpoint expects a
// secret, which is a free reconnaissance hint for enumeration.
return NextResponse.json({ ok: false }, { status: 200 });
}
// Compute deduplication hash

View File

@@ -20,6 +20,7 @@ import {
SelectValue,
} from '@/components/ui/select';
import { apiFetch } from '@/lib/api/client';
import { toastError } from '@/lib/api/toast-error';
import { AuditLogCard } from './audit-log-card';
interface AuditEntry {
@@ -180,7 +181,7 @@ export function AuditLogList() {
setEntries((prev) => [...prev, ...res.data]);
setNextCursor(res.pagination.nextCursor);
} catch (err) {
toast.error(err instanceof Error ? err.message : 'Failed to load more audit entries');
toastError(err, 'Failed to load more audit entries');
} finally {
setLoadingMore(false);
}

View File

@@ -11,6 +11,7 @@ import { Card, CardContent, CardHeader, CardTitle } from '@/components/ui/card';
import { Badge } from '@/components/ui/badge';
import { Button } from '@/components/ui/button';
import { apiFetch } from '@/lib/api/client';
import { toastError } from '@/lib/api/toast-error';
type TriageState = 'open' | 'assigned' | 'converted' | 'dismissed';
type StateFilter = 'inbox' | 'open' | 'assigned' | 'converted' | 'dismissed' | 'all';
@@ -112,7 +113,7 @@ export function InquiryInbox() {
toast.success(`Marked ${vars.state}.`);
},
onError: (err: unknown) => {
toast.error(err instanceof Error ? err.message : 'Triage update failed');
toastError(err, 'Triage update failed');
},
});

View File

@@ -14,6 +14,7 @@ import {
TableRow,
} from '@/components/ui/table';
import { apiFetch } from '@/lib/api/client';
import { toastError } from '@/lib/api/toast-error';
import { usePermissions } from '@/hooks/use-permissions';
interface Delivery {
@@ -56,7 +57,7 @@ export function WebhookDeliveryLog({ webhookId }: Props) {
toast.success('Replay queued');
await load(page);
} catch (err) {
toast.error(err instanceof Error ? err.message : 'Replay failed');
toastError(err, 'Replay failed');
} finally {
setRetrying(null);
}

View File

@@ -18,6 +18,7 @@ import { Badge } from '@/components/ui/badge';
import { Textarea } from '@/components/ui/textarea';
import { WarningCallout } from '@/components/ui/warning-callout';
import { apiFetch } from '@/lib/api/client';
import { toastError } from '@/lib/api/toast-error';
interface PreflightItem {
clientId: string;
@@ -107,7 +108,7 @@ function BulkArchiveWizardBody({ open, onOpenChange, clientIds, onSuccess }: Pro
onSuccess?.();
},
onError: (err: unknown) => {
toast.error(err instanceof Error ? err.message : 'Bulk archive failed');
toastError(err, 'Bulk archive failed');
},
});

View File

@@ -17,6 +17,7 @@ import { Button } from '@/components/ui/button';
import { Input } from '@/components/ui/input';
import { Label } from '@/components/ui/label';
import { apiFetch } from '@/lib/api/client';
import { toastError } from '@/lib/api/toast-error';
interface Props {
open: boolean;
@@ -69,7 +70,7 @@ function BulkHardDeleteDialogBody({ onOpenChange, clientIds, onDeleted }: Props)
toast.success(`Code sent to ${res.data.sentToMaskedEmail}`);
},
onError: (err: unknown) => {
toast.error(err instanceof Error ? err.message : 'Failed to send code');
toastError(err, 'Failed to send code');
},
});
@@ -100,7 +101,7 @@ function BulkHardDeleteDialogBody({ onOpenChange, clientIds, onDeleted }: Props)
}
},
onError: (err: unknown) => {
toast.error(err instanceof Error ? err.message : 'Bulk delete failed');
toastError(err, 'Bulk delete failed');
},
});

View File

@@ -43,6 +43,7 @@ import { usePaginatedQuery } from '@/hooks/use-paginated-query';
import { useRealtimeInvalidation } from '@/hooks/use-realtime-invalidation';
import { useTablePreferences } from '@/hooks/use-table-preferences';
import { apiFetch } from '@/lib/api/client';
import { toastError } from '@/lib/api/toast-error';
export function ClientList() {
const params = useParams<{ portSlug: string }>();
@@ -120,7 +121,7 @@ export function ClientList() {
}
},
onError: (err: unknown) => {
toast.error(err instanceof Error ? err.message : 'Bulk action failed');
toastError(err, 'Bulk action failed');
},
});

View File

@@ -18,6 +18,7 @@ import { Input } from '@/components/ui/input';
import { Label } from '@/components/ui/label';
import { WarningCallout } from '@/components/ui/warning-callout';
import { apiFetch } from '@/lib/api/client';
import { toastError } from '@/lib/api/toast-error';
interface Props {
open: boolean;
@@ -66,7 +67,7 @@ function HardDeleteDialogBody({ onOpenChange, clientId, clientName, onDeleted }:
toast.success(`Code sent to ${res.data.sentToMaskedEmail}`);
},
onError: (err: unknown) => {
toast.error(err instanceof Error ? err.message : 'Failed to send code');
toastError(err, 'Failed to send code');
},
});
@@ -83,7 +84,7 @@ function HardDeleteDialogBody({ onOpenChange, clientId, clientName, onDeleted }:
onDeleted?.();
},
onError: (err: unknown) => {
toast.error(err instanceof Error ? err.message : 'Delete failed');
toastError(err, 'Delete failed');
},
});

View File

@@ -18,6 +18,7 @@ import { Badge } from '@/components/ui/badge';
import { Card, CardContent, CardHeader, CardTitle } from '@/components/ui/card';
import { Textarea } from '@/components/ui/textarea';
import { apiFetch } from '@/lib/api/client';
import { toastError } from '@/lib/api/toast-error';
interface DossierBerth {
berthId: string;
@@ -266,7 +267,7 @@ function SmartArchiveDialogBody({
onSuccess?.();
},
onError: (err: unknown) => {
toast.error(err instanceof Error ? err.message : 'Archive failed');
toastError(err, 'Archive failed');
},
});

View File

@@ -26,6 +26,7 @@ import { Button } from '@/components/ui/button';
import { Card, CardContent, CardHeader, CardTitle } from '@/components/ui/card';
import { Checkbox } from '@/components/ui/checkbox';
import { apiFetch } from '@/lib/api/client';
import { toastError } from '@/lib/api/toast-error';
interface RestoreReversal {
id: string;
@@ -109,7 +110,7 @@ function SmartRestoreDialogBody({ open, onOpenChange, clientId, clientName, onSu
onSuccess?.();
},
onError: (err: unknown) => {
toast.error(err instanceof Error ? err.message : 'Restore failed');
toastError(err, 'Restore failed');
},
});

View File

@@ -9,6 +9,7 @@ import { Button } from '@/components/ui/button';
import { Input } from '@/components/ui/input';
import { Label } from '@/components/ui/label';
import { Textarea } from '@/components/ui/textarea';
import { toastError } from '@/lib/api/toast-error';
import {
Dialog,
DialogContent,
@@ -68,7 +69,7 @@ export function ExternalEoiUploadDialog({ open, onOpenChange, interestId, onSucc
onSuccess?.();
},
onError: (err: unknown) => {
toast.error(err instanceof Error ? err.message : 'Upload failed');
toastError(err, 'Upload failed');
},
});

View File

@@ -23,6 +23,7 @@ import {
SelectValue,
} from '@/components/ui/select';
import { apiFetch } from '@/lib/api/client';
import { toastError } from '@/lib/api/toast-error';
import { usePermissions } from '@/hooks/use-permissions';
import { PIPELINE_STAGES, STAGE_LABELS, stageLabel, canTransitionStage } from '@/lib/constants';
@@ -74,7 +75,7 @@ export function InterestStagePicker({
toast.success(overrideEffective ? 'Stage overridden' : 'Stage updated');
},
onError: (err: unknown) => {
toast.error(err instanceof Error ? err.message : 'Stage change failed');
toastError(err, 'Stage change failed');
},
});

View File

@@ -6,6 +6,7 @@ import { toast } from 'sonner';
import { Button } from '@/components/ui/button';
import { Input } from '@/components/ui/input';
import { Label } from '@/components/ui/label';
import { toastError } from '@/lib/api/toast-error';
export function ChangePasswordForm() {
const [current, setCurrent] = useState('');
@@ -34,7 +35,7 @@ export function ChangePasswordForm() {
setNext('');
setConfirm('');
} catch (err) {
toast.error(err instanceof Error ? err.message : 'Password change failed');
toastError(err, 'Password change failed');
} finally {
setPending(false);
}

View File

@@ -85,18 +85,41 @@ export async function apiFetch<T = unknown>(url: string, opts: ApiFetchOptions =
});
if (!res.ok) {
const error = (await res.json().catch(() => ({ error: res.statusText }))) as {
// error-ux-auditor C3: reverse-proxy 502/504 pages deliver HTML, not
// JSON. The previous code silently degraded to
// `{error: res.statusText}` which surfaced "Bad Gateway" with no
// requestId and no copy-pasteable correlation handle. Detect the
// proxy-error shape (5xx + JSON parse fail) and synthesize a
// client-side correlation id so the toast still has *something* the
// user can quote to support.
const error = (await res.json().catch(() => null)) as {
error?: string;
message?: string;
code?: string;
details?: unknown;
requestId?: string;
retryAfter?: number;
};
// Surface the request id so toasts can display "Error ID: …" and
// the user can copy it to a support ticket. Server-side wrappers
// always set X-Request-Id, even on early-return 401/403 paths.
const requestId = error.requestId ?? res.headers.get('x-request-id') ?? null;
} | null;
const upstreamRequestId = res.headers.get('x-request-id');
if (error === null) {
const isProxyFailure = res.status >= 500;
// Short, copy-pasteable client-side handle so support can grep
// the front-end logs even when the proxy never reached our app.
const synthId =
upstreamRequestId ??
`client-${Date.now().toString(36)}-${Math.random().toString(36).slice(2, 8)}`;
throw new ApiError({
message: isProxyFailure
? 'The server is unreachable. Please try again.'
: res.statusText || 'Request failed',
status: res.status,
code: isProxyFailure ? 'UPSTREAM_UNREACHABLE' : null,
details: null,
requestId: synthId,
retryAfter: null,
});
}
const requestId = error.requestId ?? upstreamRequestId ?? null;
throw new ApiError({
message: error.error ?? error.message ?? 'Request failed',
status: res.status,

View File

@@ -4,17 +4,24 @@ import { env } from '@/lib/env';
const redisUrl = env.REDIS_URL;
// 10 queues matching 11-REALTIME-AND-BACKGROUND-JOBS.md Section 3.1
//
// `backoffDelayMs` is the *base* exponential delay; the actual delays
// follow `delay * 2^(attempt-1)` plus BullMQ's jitter. Defaults to 1 s
// for short-lived jobs; outbound `webhooks` overrides to 30 s base so
// the retry curve spans hours instead of seconds (outbound-webhook-
// auditor H2: a 30 s receiver blip during a deploy used to dead-letter
// every in-flight event).
const QUEUE_CONFIGS = {
email: { concurrency: 5, maxAttempts: 5 },
documents: { concurrency: 3, maxAttempts: 5 },
notifications: { concurrency: 10, maxAttempts: 3 },
import: { concurrency: 1, maxAttempts: 1 },
export: { concurrency: 2, maxAttempts: 3 },
reports: { concurrency: 1, maxAttempts: 3 },
webhooks: { concurrency: 5, maxAttempts: 3 },
maintenance: { concurrency: 1, maxAttempts: 3 },
ai: { concurrency: 2, maxAttempts: 3 },
bulk: { concurrency: 2, maxAttempts: 3 },
email: { concurrency: 5, maxAttempts: 5, backoffDelayMs: 1_000 },
documents: { concurrency: 3, maxAttempts: 5, backoffDelayMs: 1_000 },
notifications: { concurrency: 10, maxAttempts: 3, backoffDelayMs: 1_000 },
import: { concurrency: 1, maxAttempts: 1, backoffDelayMs: 1_000 },
export: { concurrency: 2, maxAttempts: 3, backoffDelayMs: 1_000 },
reports: { concurrency: 1, maxAttempts: 3, backoffDelayMs: 1_000 },
webhooks: { concurrency: 5, maxAttempts: 8, backoffDelayMs: 30_000 },
maintenance: { concurrency: 1, maxAttempts: 3, backoffDelayMs: 1_000 },
ai: { concurrency: 2, maxAttempts: 3, backoffDelayMs: 1_000 },
bulk: { concurrency: 2, maxAttempts: 3, backoffDelayMs: 1_000 },
} as const;
export type QueueName = keyof typeof QUEUE_CONFIGS;
@@ -28,7 +35,7 @@ export function getQueue(name: QueueName): Queue {
connection: { url: redisUrl } as ConnectionOptions,
defaultJobOptions: {
attempts: QUEUE_CONFIGS[name].maxAttempts,
backoff: { type: 'exponential', delay: 1000 },
backoff: { type: 'exponential', delay: QUEUE_CONFIGS[name].backoffDelayMs },
removeOnComplete: { age: 24 * 3600 }, // keep completed jobs 24 hours
removeOnFail: { age: 7 * 24 * 3600 }, // keep failed jobs 7 days
},

View File

@@ -117,21 +117,49 @@ export const webhooksWorker = new Worker(
throw err; // Let BullMQ retry
}
// outbound-webhook-auditor C3: NULL secret means a DB tamper / a
// future migration mistake — every create path generates one. Hard-
// fail to dead_letter so compliant receivers don't silently accept
// an empty signature.
if (!secret) {
const { db: dbInner } = await import('@/lib/db');
const { webhookDeliveries } = await import('@/lib/db/schema/system');
const { eq } = await import('drizzle-orm');
await dbInner
.update(webhookDeliveries)
.set({
status: 'dead_letter',
responseStatus: null,
responseBody: 'Skipped: webhook has no signing secret (missing_signing_secret).',
deliveredAt: new Date(),
})
.where(eq(webhookDeliveries.id, deliveryId));
logger.error({ webhookId, deliveryId }, 'Webhook has no signing secret; dead-lettered');
return;
}
// 3. Build final payload
const timestampIso = new Date().toISOString();
const finalPayload = {
id: deliveryId,
event,
timestamp: new Date().toISOString(),
timestamp: timestampIso,
port_id: portId,
data: payload,
};
const bodyString = JSON.stringify(finalPayload);
// 4. Sign with HMAC-SHA256
const signature = secret
? `sha256=${createHmac('sha256', secret).update(bodyString).digest('hex')}`
: '';
// 4. Sign with HMAC-SHA256 over `${ts}.${body}` (Stripe-style)
//
// outbound-webhook-auditor C1: signing only the body lets a captured
// request be replayed verbatim with a still-valid signature.
// Including the timestamp in the signed string, surfaced separately
// as X-Webhook-Timestamp, means receivers can reject anything older
// than a freshness window (≤ 5 min). Documented receiver-side
// dedup key is X-Webhook-Delivery (already sent).
const signedPayload = `${timestampIso}.${bodyString}`;
const signature = `sha256=${createHmac('sha256', secret).update(signedPayload).digest('hex')}`;
const attempt = (job.attemptsMade ?? 0) + 1;
@@ -140,6 +168,29 @@ export const webhooksWorker = new Worker(
let responseBody: string | null = null;
let success = false;
// outbound-webhook-auditor M2: re-assert https:// at dispatch time.
// The validator runs on create/update, but a bad DB edit could let
// an http:// URL through; the worker is the last line of defence.
if (!webhook.url.toLowerCase().startsWith('https://')) {
const { db: dbInner } = await import('@/lib/db');
const { webhookDeliveries } = await import('@/lib/db/schema/system');
const { eq } = await import('drizzle-orm');
await dbInner
.update(webhookDeliveries)
.set({
status: 'dead_letter',
responseStatus: null,
responseBody: 'Blocked: webhook URL is not https.',
deliveredAt: new Date(),
})
.where(eq(webhookDeliveries.id, deliveryId));
logger.warn(
{ webhookId, deliveryId, url: webhook.url },
'Webhook dispatch blocked: non-https URL',
);
return;
}
// SSRF gate: re-resolve the hostname at dispatch time and reject if it
// points anywhere internal. The validator already filtered literal
// hostnames at create/update time, but DNS rebinding could swap the
@@ -178,6 +229,7 @@ export const webhooksWorker = new Worker(
'X-Webhook-Id': webhookId,
'X-Webhook-Event': event,
'X-Webhook-Signature': signature,
'X-Webhook-Timestamp': timestampIso,
'X-Webhook-Delivery': deliveryId,
},
body: bodyString,

View File

@@ -1,4 +1,5 @@
import { redis } from '@/lib/redis';
import { logger } from '@/lib/logger';
export interface RateLimitConfig {
/** Duration of the sliding window in milliseconds. */
@@ -31,27 +32,45 @@ export async function checkRateLimit(
const now = Date.now();
const windowStart = now - config.windowMs;
const pipeline = redis.pipeline();
// Remove entries older than the window.
pipeline.zremrangebyscore(key, '-inf', windowStart);
// Record this request; score = timestamp, member adds randomness for uniqueness.
pipeline.zadd(key, now, `${now}:${Math.random().toString(36).slice(2)}`);
// Count entries currently in the window.
pipeline.zcard(key);
// Expire the key after one full window so Redis doesn't accumulate stale keys.
pipeline.pexpire(key, config.windowMs);
try {
const pipeline = redis.pipeline();
// Remove entries older than the window.
pipeline.zremrangebyscore(key, '-inf', windowStart);
// Record this request; score = timestamp, member adds randomness for uniqueness.
pipeline.zadd(key, now, `${now}:${Math.random().toString(36).slice(2)}`);
// Count entries currently in the window.
pipeline.zcard(key);
// Expire the key after one full window so Redis doesn't accumulate stale keys.
pipeline.pexpire(key, config.windowMs);
const results = await pipeline.exec();
const results = await pipeline.exec();
const count = (results?.[2]?.[1] as number) ?? 0;
const remaining = Math.max(0, config.max - count);
const count = (results?.[2]?.[1] as number) ?? 0;
const remaining = Math.max(0, config.max - count);
return {
allowed: count <= config.max,
limit: config.max,
remaining,
resetAt: now + config.windowMs,
};
return {
allowed: count <= config.max,
limit: config.max,
remaining,
resetAt: now + config.windowMs,
};
} catch (err) {
// error-ux-auditor C4: a Redis outage previously 500'd every
// rate-limited route — including login. Fail OPEN here so an
// operator can still authenticate while Redis is being recovered.
// The brief enforcement gap is acceptable; locking everyone out is
// not. Log loudly so monitoring picks it up.
logger.warn(
{ err, keyPrefix: config.keyPrefix },
'rate-limit subsystem unavailable, allowing request (fail-open)',
);
return {
allowed: true,
limit: config.max,
remaining: config.max,
resetAt: now + config.windowMs,
};
}
}
/**

View File

@@ -11,7 +11,7 @@
* 4. Add a unit test in tests/unit/services/alert-rules-evaluators.test.ts.
*/
import { and, eq, isNull, isNotNull, lt, gt, sql, inArray, or, desc } from 'drizzle-orm';
import { and, eq, isNull, isNotNull, lt, sql, inArray, or } from 'drizzle-orm';
import { db } from '@/lib/db';
import { interests } from '@/lib/db/schema/interests';
@@ -19,7 +19,6 @@ import { berthReservations } from '@/lib/db/schema/reservations';
import { berths } from '@/lib/db/schema/berths';
import { documents, documentSigners } from '@/lib/db/schema/documents';
import { expenses } from '@/lib/db/schema/financial';
import { alerts as alertsTable } from '@/lib/db/schema/insights';
import { ALERT_RULES, type AlertRuleId } from '@/lib/db/schema/insights';
import { STAGE_LABELS, type PipelineStage } from '@/lib/constants';
@@ -325,7 +324,3 @@ export const RULE_REGISTRY: Record<AlertRuleId, RuleEvaluator> = {
export function listRuleIds(): readonly AlertRuleId[] {
return ALERT_RULES;
}
// silence unused-import warnings until later PRs use them
const _unused = { gt, desc, alertsTable };
void _unused;

View File

@@ -77,26 +77,6 @@ async function verifyParentBelongsToPort(
}
}
// Helper to centralise the per-entity table dispatch — keeps the CRUD
// branches below from each having their own switch.
function tableForEntity(entityType: EntityType) {
switch (entityType) {
case 'clients':
return { table: clientNotes, fk: 'clientId' as const };
case 'interests':
return { table: interestNotes, fk: 'interestId' as const };
case 'yachts':
return { table: yachtNotes, fk: 'yachtId' as const };
case 'companies':
return { table: companyNotes, fk: 'companyId' as const };
case 'residential_clients':
return { table: residentialClientNotes, fk: 'residentialClientId' as const };
case 'residential_interests':
return { table: residentialInterestNotes, fk: 'residentialInterestId' as const };
}
}
void tableForEntity;
// ─── Service ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
/**

View File

@@ -293,15 +293,6 @@ export function normalizePhoneQuery(input: string): string | null {
return digits.length >= 3 ? digits : null;
}
/**
* Returns true when the input looks email-shaped enough to bother
* running an email-targeted match (otherwise we'd run an ILIKE that
* matches "@" inside random text and waste cycles).
*/
function looksLikeEmail(input: string): boolean {
return /[a-z0-9._%+-]+(@|@?[a-z0-9-]+\.)/i.test(input);
}
/** Permissions check used to skip buckets the user can't see. */
function can(opts: Pick<SearchOptions, 'permissions' | 'isSuperAdmin'>, dotPath: string): boolean {
if (opts.isSuperAdmin) return true;
@@ -1798,8 +1789,6 @@ export async function search(
: null;
if (opts.type && !narrowTo) return runSingleBucket(portId, query, limit, opts);
const wantEmail = looksLikeEmail(query);
const wantPhone = normalizePhoneQuery(query) !== null;
// We always run the name-bearing buckets even for email/phone-shaped
// queries — a client named "test+marketing" is rare but real.
@@ -1876,12 +1865,6 @@ export async function search(
})),
);
// Suppress unused-var warning for the email/phone hint — we keep the
// computation in case future tuning wants to reorder buckets when the
// query is clearly an identifier.
void wantEmail;
void wantPhone;
// ─── Phase 2: graph expansion ───────────────────────────────────────
// For every direct match, fetch its 1-hop related entities so reps
// who search "A10" see the linked interests/clients/yachts/companies

View File

@@ -229,6 +229,13 @@ async function buildBackend(cfg: StorageConfigSnapshot): Promise<StorageBackend>
* common need at call sites that don't track expiry. Mirrors the legacy
* `getPresignedUrl(key)` helper in `@/lib/minio` but routes through the
* active backend so filesystem-mode deployments work too.
*
* storage-pathing-auditor H2: when `portSlug` is not passed explicitly,
* we attempt to infer it from the key's first path segment — every
* storage key minted via `buildStoragePath(slug, …)` starts with the
* slug, so the inference is correct for the overwhelming majority of
* callers. This engages the filesystem-proxy port-binding token (`p`)
* verifier so a stolen-token / cross-port replay attempt fails fast.
*/
export async function presignDownloadUrl(
key: string,
@@ -237,10 +244,37 @@ export async function presignDownloadUrl(
portSlug?: string,
): Promise<string> {
const backend = await getStorageBackend();
const { url } = await backend.presignDownload(key, { expirySeconds, filename, portSlug });
const inferredSlug = portSlug ?? inferPortSlugFromKey(key);
const { url } = await backend.presignDownload(key, {
expirySeconds,
filename,
portSlug: inferredSlug,
});
return url;
}
/**
* Best-effort recovery of the port slug from a storage key prefix.
* Returns undefined when the key doesn't look slug-prefixed (e.g. legacy
* keys minted before `buildStoragePath` was canonical) so the caller
* falls back to the no-binding path.
*
* A slug is conservatively defined as kebab/alphanumeric (the same
* shape `createPortSchema` enforces). Non-matching first segments
* include UUID-only keys like the legacy `berths/{id}/uploads/...`
* shape — those are still served but skip the binding gate.
*/
function inferPortSlugFromKey(key: string): string | undefined {
const slash = key.indexOf('/');
if (slash <= 0) return undefined;
const first = key.slice(0, slash);
if (!/^[a-z0-9-]+$/.test(first)) return undefined;
// Reserved namespaces that historically lived at the top level of the
// bucket and aren't port slugs.
if (first === 'berths' || first === 'backups' || first === 'tmp') return undefined;
return first;
}
// ─── re-exports ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
export { S3Backend } from './s3';

View File

@@ -46,10 +46,27 @@ interface S3BackendConfig {
*/
const STORAGE_DEFAULT_TIMEOUT_MS = 30_000;
/**
* Named timeout error so `error-classifier.ts` `ERROR_NAME_HINTS` can
* distinguish "the storage call timed out" from a generic storage
* misconfiguration. The plain-Error form was dropping into the path-
* based classifier and losing the actionable hint.
*/
export class StorageTimeoutError extends Error {
readonly label: string;
readonly timeoutMs: number;
constructor(label: string, ms: number) {
super(`S3 ${label} timed out after ${ms}ms`);
this.name = 'TimeoutError';
this.label = label;
this.timeoutMs = ms;
}
}
function withTimeout<T>(promise: Promise<T>, ms: number, label: string): Promise<T> {
let timer: NodeJS.Timeout | null = null;
const timeout = new Promise<T>((_, reject) => {
timer = setTimeout(() => reject(new Error(`S3 ${label} timed out after ${ms}ms`)), ms);
timer = setTimeout(() => reject(new StorageTimeoutError(label, ms)), ms);
});
return Promise.race([promise, timeout]).finally(() => {
if (timer) clearTimeout(timer);

View File

@@ -30,7 +30,7 @@ function isBlockedIpv4(host: string): boolean {
if (!m) return false;
const oct = m.slice(1, 5).map(Number);
if (oct.some((o) => o < 0 || o > 255)) return true; // malformed → treat as blocked
const [a, b] = oct as [number, number, number, number];
const [a, b, c, d] = oct as [number, number, number, number];
if (a === 10) return true; // 10/8 RFC1918
if (a === 127) return true; // 127/8 loopback
if (a === 169 && b === 254) return true; // 169.254/16 link-local + AWS IMDS
@@ -39,6 +39,9 @@ function isBlockedIpv4(host: string): boolean {
if (a === 100 && b >= 64 && b <= 127) return true; // 100.64/10 CGNAT
if (a === 0) return true; // 0/8 zero
if (a >= 224) return true; // multicast / reserved
// outbound-webhook-auditor M1: Oracle Cloud metadata endpoint
// (192.0.0.192) — was missing from the original denylist.
if (a === 192 && b === 0 && c === 0 && d === 192) return true;
return false;
}