Five-domain audit (security, routes, DB, integrations, UI/UX) ran after
the cf37d09 merge. Critical + high-impact items landed here; deferred
medium/low items indexed in docs/audit-final-deferred.md (now organised
into a "Audit-final v2" section).
Security:
- Storage proxy tokens now bind to op (`'get'` vs `'put'`). A long-lived
download URL minted by `presignDownload` for an emailed brochure can no
longer be replayed against the proxy PUT to overwrite the original
storage object. `verifyProxyToken` requires `expectedOp` and rejects
mismatches; legacy tokens missing `op` fail-closed. Regression tests
added.
- Markdown email merge values are now markdown-escaped (`[`, `]`, `(`,
`)`, `*`, `_`, `\`, backticks, braces) before substitution into the
rep-authored body. A malicious value like `[click here](https://evil)`
stored in `client.fullName` no longer survives `escapeHtml` to render
as a real `<a href>` in the outbound email. Phishing-via-merge-field
closed; regression tests added.
- Middleware now performs an Origin/Referer check on
POST/PUT/PATCH/DELETE to `/api/v1/**`. Defense-in-depth on top of
better-auth's SameSite=Lax cookie. Webhooks/public/auth/portal routes
exempt as they don't carry the session cookie.
Routes:
- Template management routes were calling `withPermission('documents',
'manage', ...)` — but `documents` doesn't have a `manage` action. The
registry has `document_templates.manage`. Every non-superadmin was
getting 403'd on the seven template endpoints. Fixed across the
/admin/templates surface.
- Custom-fields permission resource is hardcoded to `clients` regardless
of which entity (yacht/company/etc.) the values belong to. Documented
as deferred (requires per-entity routes).
DB:
- documentSends: every parent FK (client_id, interest_id, berth_id,
brochure_id, brochure_version_id) now uses ON DELETE SET NULL so the
audit trail outlasts hard-deletes. The denormalized columns
(recipient_email, document_kind, body_markdown, from_address) were
added precisely for this. Migration 0035.
- Polymorphic discriminators on yachts.current_owner_type and
invoices.billing_entity_type now have CHECK constraints — typos like
`'clients'` vs `'client'` were silently inserting unreachable rows
before. Migration 0036.
Integrations:
- Email attachment resolution (`src/lib/email/index.ts`) was importing
MinIO directly instead of `getStorageBackend()`. Filesystem-backend
deployments would have broken every email-with-attachment send. Now
routes through the pluggable abstraction per CLAUDE.md.
- Documenso DOCUMENT_OPENED webhook filter relaxed: v2 may omit
`readStatus` or send lowercase, so an event that was the SIGNAL of an
open was being silently dropped. Now treats any recipient on a
DOCUMENT_OPENED event as opened.
UI/UX:
- Expense detail used to render `receiptFileIds` as opaque UUID badges —
reps couldn't view the receipt they uploaded. Now renders an image
thumbnail (via `/api/v1/files/[id]/preview`) plus a Download link for
PDFs. Closed the "where's my receipt?" loop in the expense flow.
- Expense detail Edit + Archive buttons now `<PermissionGate>` and the
archive mutation surfaces success/error toasts instead of silent 403s.
- Brochures admin: setDefault/archive/create mutations now have onError
toasts (only onSuccess existed before).
- Removed broken bulk-upload link in scan/page (route doesn't exist;
used a raw `<a>` triggering a full reload to a 404).
Test status: 1168/1168 vitest passing. tsc clean.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
161 lines
5.3 KiB
TypeScript
161 lines
5.3 KiB
TypeScript
/**
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* Integration test: GET /api/storage/[token]
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*
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* Exercises the §14.9a critical mitigations on the live route:
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* - HMAC verification: a token signed with the wrong secret is rejected.
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* - Expiry: an expired token is rejected.
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* - Single-use replay: a token used twice (within the replay TTL) is
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* rejected the second time.
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* - Happy path: a valid token streams the file with correct headers.
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*
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* The storage backend itself is mocked to a FilesystemBackend rooted in a
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* tempdir. Redis is mocked to an in-memory map so the test doesn't need
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* a live Redis.
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*/
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import { mkdtemp, rm } from 'node:fs/promises';
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import { tmpdir } from 'node:os';
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import * as path from 'node:path';
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import { afterEach, beforeAll, beforeEach, describe, expect, it, vi } from 'vitest';
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const VALID_KEY = 'a'.repeat(64);
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// Hoisted in-memory Redis. The proxy route uses SET NX EX, so we model
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// just enough behaviour to track keys that have been seen.
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const redisStore = new Map<string, string>();
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vi.mock('@/lib/redis', () => ({
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redis: {
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set: vi.fn(async (key: string, value: string, ..._args: unknown[]) => {
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// _args = ['EX', ttl, 'NX'] in our usage. Honour NX semantics.
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const nxIndex = _args.findIndex((a) => a === 'NX');
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if (nxIndex >= 0 && redisStore.has(key)) return null;
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redisStore.set(key, value);
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return 'OK';
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}),
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},
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}));
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vi.mock('@/lib/logger', () => ({
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logger: { info: vi.fn(), warn: vi.fn(), error: vi.fn(), debug: vi.fn() },
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}));
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beforeAll(() => {
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process.env.EMAIL_CREDENTIAL_KEY = VALID_KEY;
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process.env.BETTER_AUTH_SECRET = 'a'.repeat(64);
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});
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describe('GET /api/storage/[token]', () => {
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let storageRoot: string;
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let backend: import('@/lib/storage/filesystem').FilesystemBackend;
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let getMock: ReturnType<typeof vi.fn>;
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beforeEach(async () => {
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redisStore.clear();
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storageRoot = await mkdtemp(path.join(tmpdir(), 'pn-storage-route-'));
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// Use the real FilesystemBackend so the resolution / realpath logic is
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// genuinely exercised; mock just `getStorageBackend()` to return it.
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const { FilesystemBackend } = await import('@/lib/storage/filesystem');
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backend = await FilesystemBackend.create({
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root: storageRoot,
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proxyHmacSecretEncrypted: null,
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});
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getMock = vi.fn(async () => backend);
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vi.doMock('@/lib/storage', async () => {
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const real = await vi.importActual<typeof import('@/lib/storage')>('@/lib/storage');
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return { ...real, getStorageBackend: getMock };
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});
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});
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afterEach(async () => {
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vi.doUnmock('@/lib/storage');
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await rm(storageRoot, { recursive: true, force: true });
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});
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async function callRoute(token: string) {
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const { GET } = await import('@/app/api/storage/[token]/route');
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return GET(new Request(`http://test/api/storage/${token}`) as never, {
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params: Promise.resolve({ token }),
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});
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}
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it('serves a file with a valid token (happy path)', async () => {
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await backend.put('berths/abc/file.txt', Buffer.from('hello world'), {
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contentType: 'text/plain',
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});
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const presigned = await backend.presignDownload('berths/abc/file.txt', {
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expirySeconds: 60,
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filename: 'file.txt',
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contentType: 'text/plain',
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});
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const token = presigned.url.split('/api/storage/').pop()!;
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const res = await callRoute(token);
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expect(res.status).toBe(200);
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expect(res.headers.get('Content-Type')).toBe('text/plain');
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expect(res.headers.get('X-Content-Type-Options')).toBe('nosniff');
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const text = await res.text();
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expect(text).toBe('hello world');
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});
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it('rejects a token signed with the wrong HMAC secret', async () => {
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await backend.put('berths/abc/file.txt', Buffer.from('hello'), {
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contentType: 'text/plain',
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});
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const { signProxyToken } = await import('@/lib/storage/filesystem');
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const badToken = signProxyToken(
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{
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k: 'berths/abc/file.txt',
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e: Math.floor(Date.now() / 1000) + 60,
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n: 'nonce',
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op: 'get' as const,
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},
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'wrong-secret',
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);
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const res = await callRoute(badToken);
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expect(res.status).toBe(403);
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const body = await res.json();
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expect(body.error).toMatch(/Invalid|expired/i);
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});
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it('rejects an expired token', async () => {
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await backend.put('berths/abc/file.txt', Buffer.from('hello'), {
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contentType: 'text/plain',
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});
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const { signProxyToken } = await import('@/lib/storage/filesystem');
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const expiredToken = signProxyToken(
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{
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k: 'berths/abc/file.txt',
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e: Math.floor(Date.now() / 1000) - 1,
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n: 'nonce',
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op: 'get' as const,
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},
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backend.getHmacSecret(),
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);
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const res = await callRoute(expiredToken);
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expect(res.status).toBe(403);
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});
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it('refuses to replay a token a second time within the TTL', async () => {
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await backend.put('berths/abc/file.txt', Buffer.from('hello'), {
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contentType: 'text/plain',
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});
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const presigned = await backend.presignDownload('berths/abc/file.txt', {
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expirySeconds: 60,
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});
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const token = presigned.url.split('/api/storage/').pop()!;
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const first = await callRoute(token);
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expect(first.status).toBe(200);
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await first.text();
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const second = await callRoute(token);
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expect(second.status).toBe(403);
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const body = await second.json();
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expect(body.error).toMatch(/already used/i);
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});
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});
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