588f8bc43cdfa628de95b3b3d42dfca8220c56ec
H1: hard-delete-request and bulk-hard-delete-request endpoints had no rate limit; an admin's compromised account could email-bomb the operator's inbox or use the endpoints as a client-id oracle. Added a new `hardDeleteCode` limiter (5 per hour per user). H3: hard-delete error messages distinguished "no code requested" from "wrong code", letting an attacker brute-force the 4-digit space with ~5k attempts (vs the full 10k). Both single + bulk paths now return the same 'Invalid or expired confirmation code' message. H5: invalid Documenso webhook secret submissions are now rate-limited per-IP (10 per 15min) and only audit-logged inside the cap, so a slow enumeration can't fill the audit log silently. Real Documenso traffic won't fail the secret check, so any traffic beyond the cap is brute-force. 1175/1175 vitest passing. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Description
No description provided
Languages
TypeScript
98%
HTML
1.7%
Shell
0.2%
CSS
0.1%