Final pass over the unaddressed AUDIT-2026-05-12 dossiers, taking the
tractable Critical/High items from each:
error-ux-auditor (5 items)
- C2: 17 toast.error(err.message) sites swept to toastError(err, …) so
every user-visible failure carries a copy-paste Reference ID
- C3: apiFetch synthesizes a client-side correlation id when a 5xx
comes back with a non-JSON body (reverse-proxy HTML pages); message
becomes "The server is unreachable. Please try again." with code
UPSTREAM_UNREACHABLE
- C4: checkRateLimit fails OPEN when Redis is unavailable so an outage
no longer 500s login + portal sign-in; logged at warn so monitoring
catches it
- H2: StorageTimeoutError (name='TimeoutError') replaces the plain
Error throw in s3.ts withTimeout — error-classifier hints fire now
- H5: errorResponse() adopted across /api/storage/[token],
/api/public/website-inquiries, and the Documenso webhook body (drops
the "Invalid secret" reconnaissance string)
outbound-webhook-auditor (5 items)
- C1: signature is now HMAC(secret, `${ts}.${body}`) with the
timestamp surfaced as X-Webhook-Timestamp so receivers can reject
replays outside a freshness window
- C3: dead-letter with reason missing_signing_secret when secret is
null (defence-in-depth against DB tampering / future migration
mistakes)
- H2: webhooks queue bumped to maxAttempts=8 with 30 s base
exponential backoff so a 30 s receiver blip during a deploy no
longer dead-letters every in-flight event; per-queue
backoffDelayMs added to QUEUE_CONFIGS
- M1: SSRF denylist gains Oracle Cloud metadata 192.0.0.192
- M2: dispatch-time https:// assertion before fetch, so a bad DB edit
can't slip plaintext through
storage-pathing-auditor (2 items)
- H1: berth-PDF presigned-upload keys now `${portSlug}/berths/…/…`
with portSlug threaded into backend.presignUpload — engages the
filesystem-proxy port-binding `p` token verifier
- H2: presignDownloadUrl auto-derives portSlug from the key's first
segment when callers don't pass it, so all 8 download sites engage
the `p`-token guard without per-site plumbing
search-auditor (1 item)
- H3: removed dead void wantEmail; void wantPhone; pair plus the
unused looksLikeEmail helper — the bucket-reorder it was scaffolded
for was never wired
maintainability-auditor (1 item)
- M2: swept seven abandoned `void <symbol>` markers and their dead
imports across clients/bulk, interests/bulk, admin/email-templates,
admin/website-submissions, alert-rules, and notes.service
Deferred to future work (substantial refactors, schema migrations, or
multi-file UI work):
- error-ux M3-M8 (global-error.tsx, per-route loading.tsx coverage,
ErrorBanner component, /api/ready route, worker DLQ admin surface)
- maintainability C1-C4 (documents/search/notes service splits,
interest-tabs split — multi-hour refactors)
- currency C1-H5 (mixed-currency dashboard aggregation, FX history
table, rounding policy) — wait for second non-USD port
- outbound-webhook C2 (deliveries reaper job), H1 (DNS-rebind TOCTOU
with undici Agent), H3 (circuit-breaker), H5 (presigned-post-policy)
- storage-pathing C2 (orphan reaper), H3-H5 (streaming + content-type
binding)
Tests: 1315/1315 vitest ✅ ; tsc clean.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Swap the one outlier (client-interests-tab.tsx) from Vaul Drawer to
Sheet side=right so every detail-preview surface uses the same
primitive. Document the doctrine: Sheet for side panels on both desktop
and mobile; Vaul Drawer reserved for mobile-only bottom-sheet UX
(currently just MoreSheet).
Closes ui/ux M11.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Two adoption candidates from the audit's section-35 package matrix:
1. @next/bundle-analyzer wraps next.config.ts. Run
`ANALYZE=true pnpm build` to get treemaps of client + server bundles.
Companion to the recharts dynamic-import work the audit flagged —
gives us the tool to verify the dashboard chart bundle only ships on
the dashboard surface, not routes that don't render charts. Dev-only
dependency, zero runtime impact.
2. ts-pattern replaces the 13-case event-type switch in the Documenso
webhook with `match(event).with(...).exhaustive()`. The 13 known
event types are codified as a `KnownDocumensoEvent` union with an
`isKnownEvent()` type guard so:
- Unknown events still get the informational catch-all log (so
Documenso 2.x adding a new event doesn't 500).
- The match itself is compile-time exhaustive — adding a new
event to KnownDocumensoEvent without handling it in the
match() fails the build.
This is the bug class the multi-agent audit flagged ("webhook
silently drops new event types"). Same pattern can be rolled out
to the 19-case search dispatcher and the 12-case client-restore
service when those files are next touched.
Verified: tsc clean, vitest 1293/1293 (webhook tests green).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Tier 1.6: S3Backend.put now sets ServerSideEncryption=AES256 — closes
the cleartext-at-rest gap for signed contracts, GDPR exports, pg_dumps.
Tier 3.7: New safeUrl() helper in lib/email/shell.ts. Scheme allow-list
(http/https/mailto/tel/relative only — javascript:/data:/vbscript:/file:
rewritten to about:blank) + HTML-attribute escape. Retrofitted across
all 7 transactional templates (crm-invite, portal-auth, document-signing,
notification-digest, residential-inquiry, admin-email-change).
Tier 4.2: /api/v1/alerts GET now gated on admin.view_audit_log.
Tier 4.3: Documenso webhook handler emits captureErrorEvent on catch.
Admin/errors no longer silent on webhook crashes.
Tier 4.6: Inquiry-funnel email dedup is now case-insensitive
(LOWER(value)) and stores normalized email on insert. Capital-letter
resubmissions no longer spawn duplicate client+yacht+interest rows.
Tier 5.6 + data-model H1: migration 0056 adds FK
user_permission_overrides.user_id → user(id) cascade, same for
user_port_roles.userId, plus partial unique index on
user_email_changes pending rows.
Tier 7.6: @types/node bumped from ^25 to ^20.19.0 — matches the runtime.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
- F1: DOCUMENT_DECLINED handler (v2 Decline vs Reject) — routes to same
handler as DOCUMENT_REJECTED until product refines downstream UX
- Add RECIPIENT_VIEWED / RECIPIENT_SIGNED v2-alias cases with telemetry
logging so we see when v2 deployments emit them
- D1: populate TABLES_WITH_STORAGE_KEYS (files, berth_pdf_versions,
brochure_versions, gdpr_exports) — was an empty list, migrated 0 files
- MinIO putObject/getObject/statObject/removeObject socket timeout wrapper
to prevent worker hangs on TCP blackhole (30s deadline)
- E1: convert test.skip on smoke-setup infra failure to throw new Error
so green-skipped silence becomes a real test failure (Playwright
doesn't expose vitest's expect.fail)
- Regression tests: folderId='' → null transform, applyEntityRestoredSuffix
no-op (never-archived), syncEntityFolderName collision loop past (2)
Note: matching .env.example documentation (D2 — bare DOCUMENSO_API_URL,
DOCUMENSO_API_VERSION, MINIO_AUTO_CREATE_BUCKET, DOCUMENSO_TEMPLATE_ID_EOI,
recipient role id vars) prepared but not committed — pre-commit hook
blocks .env*. Apply manually via the separate .env workflow.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
H1: hard-delete-request and bulk-hard-delete-request endpoints had no
rate limit; an admin's compromised account could email-bomb the
operator's inbox or use the endpoints as a client-id oracle. Added a
new `hardDeleteCode` limiter (5 per hour per user).
H3: hard-delete error messages distinguished "no code requested" from
"wrong code", letting an attacker brute-force the 4-digit space with
~5k attempts (vs the full 10k). Both single + bulk paths now return
the same 'Invalid or expired confirmation code' message.
H5: invalid Documenso webhook secret submissions are now rate-limited
per-IP (10 per 15min) and only audit-logged inside the cap, so a slow
enumeration can't fill the audit log silently. Real Documenso traffic
won't fail the secret check, so any traffic beyond the cap is
brute-force.
1175/1175 vitest passing.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Builds on the audit infra split (severity/source) by emitting events
from every place a security or operations review would want to see:
Sensitive data views (severity=warning):
- GDPR export download URL issued
- Audit log page opened (watch-the-watchers; first page only)
- CSV export of expenses
- Webhook secret regenerated
Authentication abuse (severity=warning, source=auth):
- Portal sign-in: success + failed-credentials + portal-disabled
- Portal password reset: unknown email + portal-disabled + bad token
- Portal activation: bad/expired token
Inbound webhook hardening:
- Documenso webhook with invalid X-Documenso-Secret now writes
webhook_failed instead of being silently logged
Background work (source=cron / job):
- New attachWorkerAudit() helper wires every BullMQ worker to emit
job_failed (severity=error) on .on('failed') and cron_run on
.on('completed') for any job whose name matches the recurring
scheduler list. Applied across all 10 workers.
1175/1175 vitest passing.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Two parallel reviews of the Tier 0–6 work surfaced one CRITICAL
regression and a handful of remaining cross-tenant gaps that the
original audit didn't enumerate. All fixed here:
CRITICAL
* document-reminders.processReminderQueue — the new bulk-fetch
leftJoin to documentTemplates was scoped on `templateType` alone.
Templates of the same type exist in every port; the cartesian
explosion would have fired one Documenso reminder PER matching
template-row per cron tick (a 5-port deploy = 5 reminders to the
same signer per cycle). Added eq(documentTemplates.portId, portId)
to the join.
* All five remaining Documenso webhook handlers (RecipientSigned /
Completed / Opened / Rejected / Cancelled) accept and require an
optional portId now, with a shared resolveWebhookDocument() helper
that refuses to mutate when the lookup is ambiguous across tenants
without a resolved port. Tier 5's port-scoping was applied only to
Expired; the route now forwards the matched portId to every
handler. Tightens the WHERE clauses on subsequent UPDATEs to (id,
portId) for defense-in-depth.
HIGH
* verifyDocumensoSecret rejects when `expected` is empty —
timingSafeEqual(0-bytes, 0-bytes) was returning true, so a dev env
with a blank DOCUMENSO_WEBHOOK_SECRET would accept a request whose
X-Documenso-Secret header was also missing/empty.
listDocumensoWebhookSecrets skips the env entry when blank.
* /api/public/health — the website-intake-secret comparison was a
string `===` (not constant-time). Switched to timingSafeEqual via
Buffer.from().
MEDIUM
* server.ts SIGTERM ordering — Socket.io closes BEFORE the HTTP
drain so long-poll websockets stop holding the server open past
the compose stop_grace_period.
* /api/v1/me PATCH preferences merge — allow-list filter on the
merged JSONB so legacy rows from the old .passthrough() era stop
silently re-shipping their bloat to disk.
Migration fixes (deploy-blocking)
* 0041 referenced `port_role_overrides.permissions` (column is
`permission_overrides`) — overrides are partial JSONB and don't
need backfilling at all (deepMerge resolves edit from the base
role). Removed the override UPDATEs entirely.
* 0042 switched all FK + CHECK adds to NOT VALID + VALIDATE so the
brief table-lock phase is decoupled from the row-scan validation,
giving a cleaner abort-and-restart story if a constraint catches
dirty production data. Added a pre-cleanup UPDATE for
invoices.billing_entity_id = '' rows (backfills from clientName,
falls back to the row id) so the new non-empty CHECK passes on a
dirty table.
Test status: 1175/1175 vitest, tsc clean.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Final audit polish — closes the remaining LOW + MED items the previous
tiers didn't reach:
* Validation hardening: me.preferences uses .strict() + 8KB cap
instead of unbounded .passthrough(); files.uploadFile gains
magic-byte verification (jpeg/png/gif/webp/pdf/doc/xlsx); OCR scan
endpoint enforces 10MB cap + magic-byte check on receipt images;
port logoUrl + me.avatarUrl reject javascript:/data: schemes via
a shared httpUrl refinement.
* Permission gates: document-sends/{brochure,berth-pdf} now require
email.send (was withAuth-only); document-sends/{preview,list} on
email.view; ai/email-draft on email.send; documents/[id]/send
uses send_for_signing (was create); expenses/export/parent-company
flips from hard isSuperAdmin to expenses.export for parity;
admin/users/options gated on reminders.assign_others (was withAuth).
* Envelope hygiene: auth/set-password switches the third {message}
variant to errorResponse + {data: {email}}; ai/email-draft wraps
jobId in {data: {jobId}}.
* UI polish: reports-list.handleDownload surfaces failures via
toastError (was console-only).
* Ops/infra: pin pnpm@10.33.2 across all three Dockerfiles +
packageManager field in package.json; Dockerfile.worker re-orders
user creation BEFORE pnpm install so node_modules / .cache dirs
are worker-owned (fixes tesseract.js + sharp EACCES at first PDF
parse); add Redis-ping HEALTHCHECK to the worker container.
* Public health endpoint: returns full env+appUrl payload only when
the caller presents X-Intake-Secret, otherwise a minimal {status}
so generic uptime monitors still work but anonymous internet
doesn't get deployment fingerprints.
* Per-port Documenso webhook secret: new system_settings key
+ listDocumensoWebhookSecrets() helper. The webhook receiver
iterates every configured per-port secret with timing-safe
comparison + falls back to env, then forwards the resolved portId
into handleDocumentExpired so two ports sharing a documensoId
cannot cross-mutate.
Deferred (handled in dedicated follow-up PRs):
* Tier 5.1 — direct service tests for portal-auth / users /
email-accounts / document-sends / sales-email-config. MED, large
test-writing scope.
* The {ok: true} → {data: null} envelope migration across
alerts/expenses/admin-ocr-settings/storage routes. Mechanical but
needs coordinated client + test updates.
* CSP-nonce migration (drop unsafe-inline) — needs middleware-level
nonce generation that the Next 15 router has to thread through.
* Idempotency-Key header on Documenso createDocument. Requires
schema column on documents to persist the key; deferred so it
doesn't bundle a migration into this commit.
* The 16 better-auth user_id FKs — separate dedicated migration
with care (some columns are NOT NULL today and cascade decisions
matter).
* PermissionGate / Skeleton / EmptyState wraps across 5 admin lists
(auditor-H §§36–37) and the residential-clients filter bar.
Test status: 1175/1175 vitest, tsc clean.
Refs: docs/audit-comprehensive-2026-05-05.md MED §§28,29,30 + LOW §§32–43
+ HIGH §9 (Documenso secrets follow-up).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Five-domain audit (security, routes, DB, integrations, UI/UX) ran after
the cf37d09 merge. Critical + high-impact items landed here; deferred
medium/low items indexed in docs/audit-final-deferred.md (now organised
into a "Audit-final v2" section).
Security:
- Storage proxy tokens now bind to op (`'get'` vs `'put'`). A long-lived
download URL minted by `presignDownload` for an emailed brochure can no
longer be replayed against the proxy PUT to overwrite the original
storage object. `verifyProxyToken` requires `expectedOp` and rejects
mismatches; legacy tokens missing `op` fail-closed. Regression tests
added.
- Markdown email merge values are now markdown-escaped (`[`, `]`, `(`,
`)`, `*`, `_`, `\`, backticks, braces) before substitution into the
rep-authored body. A malicious value like `[click here](https://evil)`
stored in `client.fullName` no longer survives `escapeHtml` to render
as a real `<a href>` in the outbound email. Phishing-via-merge-field
closed; regression tests added.
- Middleware now performs an Origin/Referer check on
POST/PUT/PATCH/DELETE to `/api/v1/**`. Defense-in-depth on top of
better-auth's SameSite=Lax cookie. Webhooks/public/auth/portal routes
exempt as they don't carry the session cookie.
Routes:
- Template management routes were calling `withPermission('documents',
'manage', ...)` — but `documents` doesn't have a `manage` action. The
registry has `document_templates.manage`. Every non-superadmin was
getting 403'd on the seven template endpoints. Fixed across the
/admin/templates surface.
- Custom-fields permission resource is hardcoded to `clients` regardless
of which entity (yacht/company/etc.) the values belong to. Documented
as deferred (requires per-entity routes).
DB:
- documentSends: every parent FK (client_id, interest_id, berth_id,
brochure_id, brochure_version_id) now uses ON DELETE SET NULL so the
audit trail outlasts hard-deletes. The denormalized columns
(recipient_email, document_kind, body_markdown, from_address) were
added precisely for this. Migration 0035.
- Polymorphic discriminators on yachts.current_owner_type and
invoices.billing_entity_type now have CHECK constraints — typos like
`'clients'` vs `'client'` were silently inserting unreachable rows
before. Migration 0036.
Integrations:
- Email attachment resolution (`src/lib/email/index.ts`) was importing
MinIO directly instead of `getStorageBackend()`. Filesystem-backend
deployments would have broken every email-with-attachment send. Now
routes through the pluggable abstraction per CLAUDE.md.
- Documenso DOCUMENT_OPENED webhook filter relaxed: v2 may omit
`readStatus` or send lowercase, so an event that was the SIGNAL of an
open was being silently dropped. Now treats any recipient on a
DOCUMENT_OPENED event as opened.
UI/UX:
- Expense detail used to render `receiptFileIds` as opaque UUID badges —
reps couldn't view the receipt they uploaded. Now renders an image
thumbnail (via `/api/v1/files/[id]/preview`) plus a Download link for
PDFs. Closed the "where's my receipt?" loop in the expense flow.
- Expense detail Edit + Archive buttons now `<PermissionGate>` and the
archive mutation surfaces success/error toasts instead of silent 403s.
- Brochures admin: setDefault/archive/create mutations now have onError
toasts (only onSuccess existed before).
- Removed broken bulk-upload link in scan/page (route doesn't exist;
used a raw `<a>` triggering a full reload to a 404).
Test status: 1168/1168 vitest passing. tsc clean.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Replaces every em-dash and en-dash with regular ASCII hyphens
across comments, JSX strings, and dev-facing logs. Mostly cosmetic
but stops the inconsistent mix that crept in over the last few
months (some files used em-dashes in comments, others didn't,
some used both).
Bundles two small dashboard-layout tweaks that touch a couple of
already-modified files:
- (dashboard)/layout.tsx main padding goes from p-6 to pt-3 px-6
pb-6 so page content sits closer to the topbar.
- Sidebar now receives the ports list it needs for the footer
port switcher.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
- Wire the `DOCUMENT_EXPIRED` webhook event to `handleDocumentExpired`.
Previously the handler existed but was never called, leaving expired
EOIs stuck in `sent` / `partially_signed` forever.
- `sendForSigning` now resolves real port-configured signer emails via
`getPortEoiSigners(portId)` instead of fabricating
`developer@{slug}.com` / `sales@{slug}.com`. The Documenso-template
pathway was already using these; the upload-PDF pathway now matches.
- `handleRecipientSigned` logs a warning when the email match returns
zero rows so a misconfigured signer isn't a silent no-op.
- `handleDocumentCompleted` skips berth-rule re-evaluation when the
interest is already at or past `eoi_signed`, preventing a double-fire
when `DOCUMENT_SIGNED` and `DOCUMENT_COMPLETED` arrive close together.
- EOI generate dialog now invalidates by predicate (any queryKey
starting with `'documents'`) so the Documents tab and hub counts
refresh after generation, instead of missing because the actual
query key shape didn't match the targeted invalidation.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Documenso authenticates outbound webhooks via the X-Documenso-Secret
header carrying the plaintext secret (no HMAC). The previous receiver
verified an HMAC against a non-existent x-documenso-signature header
and switched on parsed.type, neither of which Documenso emits — so
every real delivery was being silently rejected.
- Read X-Documenso-Secret, compare timing-safe to env secret
- Switch on parsed.event with uppercase normalization for both v1.13
(DOCUMENT_SIGNED) and 2.x (lowercase-dotted UI labels) wire formats
- Alias DOCUMENT_RECIPIENT_COMPLETED to DOCUMENT_SIGNED (same
semantics across versions)
- Handle DOCUMENT_OPENED / DOCUMENT_REJECTED / DOCUMENT_CANCELLED in
addition to the existing DOCUMENT_SIGNED + DOCUMENT_COMPLETED paths
- Bypass session middleware for /api/webhooks/* (signature is the auth)
Verified end-to-end against signatures.letsbe.solutions: real
DOCUMENT_RECIPIENT_COMPLETED + DOCUMENT_COMPLETED deliveries now pass
secret verification, dispatch correctly, and the handler updates
state (or warns gracefully when the documensoId is unknown).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
