Final pass over the unaddressed AUDIT-2026-05-12 dossiers, taking the
tractable Critical/High items from each:
error-ux-auditor (5 items)
- C2: 17 toast.error(err.message) sites swept to toastError(err, …) so
every user-visible failure carries a copy-paste Reference ID
- C3: apiFetch synthesizes a client-side correlation id when a 5xx
comes back with a non-JSON body (reverse-proxy HTML pages); message
becomes "The server is unreachable. Please try again." with code
UPSTREAM_UNREACHABLE
- C4: checkRateLimit fails OPEN when Redis is unavailable so an outage
no longer 500s login + portal sign-in; logged at warn so monitoring
catches it
- H2: StorageTimeoutError (name='TimeoutError') replaces the plain
Error throw in s3.ts withTimeout — error-classifier hints fire now
- H5: errorResponse() adopted across /api/storage/[token],
/api/public/website-inquiries, and the Documenso webhook body (drops
the "Invalid secret" reconnaissance string)
outbound-webhook-auditor (5 items)
- C1: signature is now HMAC(secret, `${ts}.${body}`) with the
timestamp surfaced as X-Webhook-Timestamp so receivers can reject
replays outside a freshness window
- C3: dead-letter with reason missing_signing_secret when secret is
null (defence-in-depth against DB tampering / future migration
mistakes)
- H2: webhooks queue bumped to maxAttempts=8 with 30 s base
exponential backoff so a 30 s receiver blip during a deploy no
longer dead-letters every in-flight event; per-queue
backoffDelayMs added to QUEUE_CONFIGS
- M1: SSRF denylist gains Oracle Cloud metadata 192.0.0.192
- M2: dispatch-time https:// assertion before fetch, so a bad DB edit
can't slip plaintext through
storage-pathing-auditor (2 items)
- H1: berth-PDF presigned-upload keys now `${portSlug}/berths/…/…`
with portSlug threaded into backend.presignUpload — engages the
filesystem-proxy port-binding `p` token verifier
- H2: presignDownloadUrl auto-derives portSlug from the key's first
segment when callers don't pass it, so all 8 download sites engage
the `p`-token guard without per-site plumbing
search-auditor (1 item)
- H3: removed dead void wantEmail; void wantPhone; pair plus the
unused looksLikeEmail helper — the bucket-reorder it was scaffolded
for was never wired
maintainability-auditor (1 item)
- M2: swept seven abandoned `void <symbol>` markers and their dead
imports across clients/bulk, interests/bulk, admin/email-templates,
admin/website-submissions, alert-rules, and notes.service
Deferred to future work (substantial refactors, schema migrations, or
multi-file UI work):
- error-ux M3-M8 (global-error.tsx, per-route loading.tsx coverage,
ErrorBanner component, /api/ready route, worker DLQ admin surface)
- maintainability C1-C4 (documents/search/notes service splits,
interest-tabs split — multi-hour refactors)
- currency C1-H5 (mixed-currency dashboard aggregation, FX history
table, rounding policy) — wait for second non-USD port
- outbound-webhook C2 (deliveries reaper job), H1 (DNS-rebind TOCTOU
with undici Agent), H3 (circuit-breaker), H5 (presigned-post-policy)
- storage-pathing C2 (orphan reaper), H3-H5 (streaming + content-type
binding)
Tests: 1315/1315 vitest ✅ ; tsc clean.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
H1: hard-delete-request and bulk-hard-delete-request endpoints had no
rate limit; an admin's compromised account could email-bomb the
operator's inbox or use the endpoints as a client-id oracle. Added a
new `hardDeleteCode` limiter (5 per hour per user).
H3: hard-delete error messages distinguished "no code requested" from
"wrong code", letting an attacker brute-force the 4-digit space with
~5k attempts (vs the full 10k). Both single + bulk paths now return
the same 'Invalid or expired confirmation code' message.
H5: invalid Documenso webhook secret submissions are now rate-limited
per-IP (10 per 15min) and only audit-logged inside the cap, so a slow
enumeration can't fill the audit log silently. Real Documenso traffic
won't fail the secret check, so any traffic beyond the cap is
brute-force.
1175/1175 vitest passing.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Closes the five highest-risk findings from
docs/audit-comprehensive-2026-05-05.md so the platform is not exposed
while the rest of the audit backlog (1 CRIT + 18 HIGH + 32 MED + 23 LOW)
is worked through:
* CVE-2025-29927 — bump next 15.1.0 → 15.2.9; nginx strips
X-Middleware-Subrequest at the edge as defense-in-depth.
* Cross-tenant role escalation — POST/PATCH/DELETE on /admin/roles now
require super-admin (was: any holder of admin.manage_users). Adds
shared `requireSuperAdmin(ctx)` helper.
* Silent-403 traps — `documents.edit` and `files.edit` keys added to
RolePermissions; seeded role values updated; migration 0041 backfills
the new keys on every existing roles+port_role_overrides JSONB. File
routes remap the dead `create` action to `upload` / `manage_folders`.
* Berth-PDF / brochure register endpoints — reject body.storageKey
unless it matches the namespace the matching presign endpoint issued
(prevents repointing a tenant's PDF at foreign-port bytes).
* Portal auth rate limits — sign-in 5/15min/(ip,email),
forgot-password 3/hr/IP, activate/reset/set-password 10/hr/IP. Adds
`enforcePublicRateLimit()` for non-`withAuth` routes.
Test status unchanged: 1168/1168 vitest, tsc clean.
Refs: docs/audit-comprehensive-2026-05-05.md (CRITICAL, HIGH §§1–4)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Adds website_submissions table + shared-secret POST endpoint so the
marketing site can dual-write inquiries alongside its NocoDB write.
Race-safe via INSERT ... ON CONFLICT, idempotent on submission_id,
refuses every request when WEBSITE_INTAKE_SECRET is unset. Also
repairs pre-existing 0020/0021/0022 prevId collision (renumbered +
journal re-sorted) so db:generate works again. 11 unit tests.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
- maintenance worker now expires GDPR export bundles (db row + MinIO object)
on the gdpr_exports.expires_at boundary, plus 90-day retention sweep on
ai_usage_ledger; both jobs scheduled daily.
- portId scoping added to listClientRelationships and listClientExports
(defense-in-depth — parent-resource gates already prevent cross-tenant
reads, but service layer should enforce on its own).
- SELECT FOR UPDATE on parent client/company row inside add/update address
transactions to serialize concurrent isPrimary toggles.
- public /interests + /residential-inquiries endpoints swap their
in-memory ipHits maps for the redis sliding-window limiter via the
new rateLimiters.publicForm config (5/hr/IP), so the cap survives
restarts and is shared across worker processes.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Adds three named rate limiters to the existing Redis sliding-window
catalog and a withRateLimit wrapper that composes inside withAuth.
Wires the OCR limiter into the receipt-scan endpoint so a runaway
client can't burn through the AI budget in a tight loop.
- ocr: 10/min/user
- ai: 60/min/user (reserved for future server-side AI surfaces)
- exports: 30/hour/user (reserved for GDPR bundle, PDF, CSV exports)
429 responses include X-RateLimit-* headers and a Retry-After hint.
Tests: 771/771 vitest (was 766) — +5 rate-limit tests covering catalog
shape, sliding window, cross-prefix isolation, cross-user isolation,
and resetAt timestamp.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
