Bundles the prior autonomous-session output that was sitting unstaged: - Em-dash sweep across src/ + tests/ (en-dash/em-dash to hyphen, ~2280 instances) - country-flag-icons rollout (CountryFlag component, replaces emoji glyphs that never rendered on Windows; lazy-loads the 3x2 SVG index as a single chunk after the per-subpath dynamic-import approach silently failed in webpack) - Admin IA Phase 1+2: 7-domain regroup, 41 to 38 pages, /admin/berths index, redirects (ocr to ai, reports to dashboard, invitations to users), docs/admin-ia-proposal.md - Per-template email tester (registry + endpoint + UI on Email admin page) - Cancel-document mode picker (delete-from-Documenso vs keep-for-audit) - Dashboard PDF report: 25 widgets, SVG charts, date-range picker, 11 resolvers - Customize-widgets per-region sortables at xl+ (charts/rails/feed); single flat sortable below xl when the layout stacks; per-viewport saved orders - Audit doc updates capturing each shipped item - Lint fixes: react-compiler immutability in DonutChart (reduce instead of let-reassign), set-state-in-effect disables in CountryFlag and UploadForSigning preview-bytes effect, unused 'confirm' destructures in interest contract + reservation tabs, unescaped apostrophe in test-template card copy
189 lines
7.9 KiB
TypeScript
189 lines
7.9 KiB
TypeScript
/**
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* Security: AES-256-GCM Encryption Properties
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*
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* Verifies the security properties of @/lib/utils/encryption:
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* - Ciphertext never contains plaintext
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* - Random IVs produce different ciphertexts for identical plaintexts
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* - Tampered ciphertext or auth tag throws (GCM authentication)
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* - Decryption round-trips correctly
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* - Missing / malformed key is rejected at runtime
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*
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* Note: tests/unit/encryption.test.ts covers basic round-trip and IV
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* randomness. This file focuses on the *security boundary* properties
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* (plaintext non-exposure, authenticated encryption, key validation).
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*
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* SECURITY-GUIDELINES.md: credentials_enc uses AES-256-GCM.
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*/
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import { beforeAll, describe, expect, it } from 'vitest';
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const VALID_KEY = 'a'.repeat(64); // 64 hex chars = 32 bytes
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beforeAll(() => {
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process.env.EMAIL_CREDENTIAL_KEY = VALID_KEY;
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});
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// ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
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describe('AES-256-GCM - plaintext non-exposure', () => {
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it('encrypted output does not contain the plaintext', async () => {
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const { encrypt } = await import('@/lib/utils/encryption');
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const plaintext = 'my-secret-password';
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const encrypted = encrypt(plaintext);
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expect(encrypted).not.toContain(plaintext);
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});
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it('encrypted output does not contain plaintext even for short values', async () => {
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const { encrypt } = await import('@/lib/utils/encryption');
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// Pick a 2-char plaintext using *non-hex* characters so the assertion can't
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// false-positive: random hex bytes routinely contain pairs like 'ab' or 'cd'
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// by chance (~1 in 256 byte positions). Using 'XY' (neither is a hex digit)
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// means a passing assertion actually proves the plaintext didn't leak.
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const plaintext = 'XY';
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const encrypted = encrypt(plaintext);
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expect(encrypted).not.toContain(plaintext);
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});
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it('encrypted output is a JSON object with iv, tag, data fields', async () => {
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const { encrypt } = await import('@/lib/utils/encryption');
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const encrypted = encrypt('test-payload');
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const parsed = JSON.parse(encrypted) as Record<string, unknown>;
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expect(typeof parsed.iv).toBe('string');
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expect(typeof parsed.tag).toBe('string');
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expect(typeof parsed.data).toBe('string');
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});
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it('IV is 12 bytes (24 hex chars)', async () => {
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const { encrypt } = await import('@/lib/utils/encryption');
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const parsed = JSON.parse(encrypt('hello')) as { iv: string };
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expect(parsed.iv).toHaveLength(24); // 12 bytes × 2 hex chars/byte
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});
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it('GCM auth tag is 16 bytes (32 hex chars)', async () => {
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const { encrypt } = await import('@/lib/utils/encryption');
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const parsed = JSON.parse(encrypt('hello')) as { tag: string };
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expect(parsed.tag).toHaveLength(32); // 16 bytes × 2 hex chars/byte
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});
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});
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describe('AES-256-GCM - IV randomness (semantic security)', () => {
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it('different plaintexts produce different ciphertexts', async () => {
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const { encrypt } = await import('@/lib/utils/encryption');
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const enc1 = encrypt('password1');
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const enc2 = encrypt('password2');
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expect(enc1).not.toBe(enc2);
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});
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it('same plaintext produces different ciphertexts (random IV)', async () => {
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const { encrypt } = await import('@/lib/utils/encryption');
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const enc1 = encrypt('same-password');
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const enc2 = encrypt('same-password');
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// IVs differ, so ciphertexts differ - prevents ciphertext comparison attacks
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expect(enc1).not.toBe(enc2);
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});
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it('IVs are unique across repeated encryptions of identical plaintext', async () => {
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const { encrypt } = await import('@/lib/utils/encryption');
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const ivs = Array.from({ length: 10 }, () => {
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const parsed = JSON.parse(encrypt('repeated')) as { iv: string };
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return parsed.iv;
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});
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const uniqueIvs = new Set(ivs);
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// All 10 IVs must be unique (birthday probability is negligible for 12-byte random)
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expect(uniqueIvs.size).toBe(10);
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});
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});
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describe('AES-256-GCM - authenticated encryption (tamper detection)', () => {
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it('tampered data field throws on decrypt', async () => {
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const { encrypt, decrypt } = await import('@/lib/utils/encryption');
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const encrypted = encrypt('test');
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const parsed = JSON.parse(encrypted) as { iv: string; tag: string; data: string };
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// Flip the first byte of ciphertext
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const flipped = parsed.data.slice(0, 2) === 'ff' ? '00' : 'ff';
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parsed.data = flipped + parsed.data.slice(2);
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expect(() => decrypt(JSON.stringify(parsed))).toThrow();
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});
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it('tampered auth tag throws on decrypt', async () => {
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const { encrypt, decrypt } = await import('@/lib/utils/encryption');
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const encrypted = encrypt('test-auth-tag');
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const parsed = JSON.parse(encrypted) as { iv: string; tag: string; data: string };
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// Corrupt the auth tag
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const flipped = parsed.tag.slice(0, 2) === 'ff' ? '00' : 'ff';
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parsed.tag = flipped + parsed.tag.slice(2);
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expect(() => decrypt(JSON.stringify(parsed))).toThrow();
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});
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it('tampered IV throws on decrypt', async () => {
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const { encrypt, decrypt } = await import('@/lib/utils/encryption');
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const encrypted = encrypt('test-iv-tamper');
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const parsed = JSON.parse(encrypted) as { iv: string; tag: string; data: string };
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// Replace IV with a different random 12-byte value
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parsed.iv = 'b'.repeat(24);
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expect(() => decrypt(JSON.stringify(parsed))).toThrow();
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});
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it('completely different ciphertext throws on decrypt', async () => {
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const { decrypt } = await import('@/lib/utils/encryption');
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const fake = JSON.stringify({
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iv: 'c'.repeat(24),
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tag: 'd'.repeat(32),
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data: 'e'.repeat(32),
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});
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expect(() => decrypt(fake)).toThrow();
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});
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});
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describe('AES-256-GCM - decryption correctness', () => {
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it('decrypt recovers original plaintext', async () => {
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const { encrypt, decrypt } = await import('@/lib/utils/encryption');
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const plaintext = 'my-secret-credentials';
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const encrypted = encrypt(plaintext);
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const decrypted = decrypt(encrypted);
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expect(decrypted).toBe(plaintext);
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});
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it('round-trips an empty string', async () => {
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const { encrypt, decrypt } = await import('@/lib/utils/encryption');
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expect(decrypt(encrypt(''))).toBe('');
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});
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it('round-trips unicode and emoji', async () => {
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const { encrypt, decrypt } = await import('@/lib/utils/encryption');
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const unicode = 'γεια σου 🚢 日本語';
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expect(decrypt(encrypt(unicode))).toBe(unicode);
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});
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it('round-trips a long credential string', async () => {
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const { encrypt, decrypt } = await import('@/lib/utils/encryption');
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const longCred = 'smtp_password=' + 'x'.repeat(256);
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expect(decrypt(encrypt(longCred))).toBe(longCred);
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});
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});
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describe('AES-256-GCM - key validation', () => {
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it('throws when EMAIL_CREDENTIAL_KEY is not set', async () => {
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const { encrypt } = await import('@/lib/utils/encryption');
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const saved = process.env.EMAIL_CREDENTIAL_KEY;
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delete process.env.EMAIL_CREDENTIAL_KEY;
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expect(() => encrypt('test')).toThrow('EMAIL_CREDENTIAL_KEY');
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process.env.EMAIL_CREDENTIAL_KEY = saved;
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});
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it('throws when EMAIL_CREDENTIAL_KEY is too short', async () => {
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const { encrypt } = await import('@/lib/utils/encryption');
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const saved = process.env.EMAIL_CREDENTIAL_KEY;
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process.env.EMAIL_CREDENTIAL_KEY = 'tooshort';
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expect(() => encrypt('test')).toThrow('EMAIL_CREDENTIAL_KEY');
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process.env.EMAIL_CREDENTIAL_KEY = saved;
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});
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it('throws when EMAIL_CREDENTIAL_KEY is too long', async () => {
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const { encrypt } = await import('@/lib/utils/encryption');
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const saved = process.env.EMAIL_CREDENTIAL_KEY;
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process.env.EMAIL_CREDENTIAL_KEY = 'a'.repeat(65);
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expect(() => encrypt('test')).toThrow('EMAIL_CREDENTIAL_KEY');
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process.env.EMAIL_CREDENTIAL_KEY = saved;
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});
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});
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