Files
pn-new-crm/src/lib/portal/auth.ts
Matt 221ae5784e chore(autonomous-session): consolidate uncommitted work from prior session
Bundles the prior autonomous-session output that was sitting unstaged:

- Em-dash sweep across src/ + tests/ (en-dash/em-dash to hyphen, ~2280 instances)
- country-flag-icons rollout (CountryFlag component, replaces emoji glyphs that
  never rendered on Windows; lazy-loads the 3x2 SVG index as a single chunk
  after the per-subpath dynamic-import approach silently failed in webpack)
- Admin IA Phase 1+2: 7-domain regroup, 41 to 38 pages, /admin/berths index,
  redirects (ocr to ai, reports to dashboard, invitations to users),
  docs/admin-ia-proposal.md
- Per-template email tester (registry + endpoint + UI on Email admin page)
- Cancel-document mode picker (delete-from-Documenso vs keep-for-audit)
- Dashboard PDF report: 25 widgets, SVG charts, date-range picker, 11 resolvers
- Customize-widgets per-region sortables at xl+ (charts/rails/feed); single
  flat sortable below xl when the layout stacks; per-viewport saved orders
- Audit doc updates capturing each shipped item
- Lint fixes: react-compiler immutability in DonutChart (reduce instead of
  let-reassign), set-state-in-effect disables in CountryFlag and
  UploadForSigning preview-bytes effect, unused 'confirm' destructures in
  interest contract + reservation tabs, unescaped apostrophe in test-template
  card copy
2026-05-23 00:52:59 +02:00

73 lines
2.6 KiB
TypeScript

import { SignJWT, jwtVerify } from 'jose';
import { cookies } from 'next/headers';
import { eq } from 'drizzle-orm';
import { db } from '@/lib/db';
import { portalUsers } from '@/lib/db/schema/portal';
const PORTAL_SECRET = new TextEncoder().encode(process.env.BETTER_AUTH_SECRET);
export const PORTAL_COOKIE = 'portal_session';
// BREAKING CHANGE (intentional): tokens issued before this change lack aud/iss
// and will be rejected by verifyPortalToken. Portal tokens are 24h-lived so
// existing sessions will be invalidated on deploy. Users simply re-login.
const PORTAL_AUD = 'portal';
const PORTAL_ISS = 'pn-crm';
export interface PortalSession {
clientId: string;
portId: string;
email: string;
/** Portal user id - needed by verifyPortalToken to fetch
* passwordChangedAt for the iat-vs-watermark check. Mirrors what
* `portalUsers.id` resolves to. */
portalUserId: string;
}
export async function createPortalToken(session: PortalSession): Promise<string> {
return new SignJWT(session as unknown as Record<string, unknown>)
.setProtectedHeader({ alg: 'HS256' })
.setAudience(PORTAL_AUD)
.setIssuer(PORTAL_ISS)
.setExpirationTime('24h')
.setIssuedAt()
.sign(PORTAL_SECRET);
}
export async function verifyPortalToken(token: string): Promise<PortalSession | null> {
try {
const { payload } = await jwtVerify(token, PORTAL_SECRET, {
audience: PORTAL_AUD,
issuer: PORTAL_ISS,
});
const session = payload as unknown as PortalSession & { iat?: number };
// auth-flow-auditor C1 (portal half): reject tokens issued before
// the user's last password change so a stolen cookie stops working
// after the legitimate owner does the forgot-password dance. The
// portalUserId claim is required for the lookup; tokens issued by
// the pre-C1 codepath lack it and are rejected on that grounds
// alone (forces re-login post-deploy, 24h max delay).
if (!session.portalUserId || !session.iat) return null;
const user = await db.query.portalUsers.findFirst({
where: eq(portalUsers.id, session.portalUserId),
columns: { passwordChangedAt: true, isActive: true },
});
if (!user || !user.isActive) return null;
const iatSeconds = session.iat;
const watermarkSeconds = Math.floor(user.passwordChangedAt.getTime() / 1000);
if (iatSeconds < watermarkSeconds) return null;
return session;
} catch {
return null;
}
}
export async function getPortalSession(): Promise<PortalSession | null> {
const cookieStore = await cookies();
const token = cookieStore.get(PORTAL_COOKIE)?.value;
if (!token) return null;
return verifyPortalToken(token);
}