Phase 3b — EOI dialog field overrides:
- New EoiOverridesInput shape (clientEmail / clientPhone / yachtName)
threaded through generate-and-sign validator + both pathways
(in-app pdf-lib fill, Documenso template generate).
- src/lib/services/eoi-overrides.service.ts applies side-effects in one
transaction: useOnlyForThisEoi writes documents.override_* and stops;
setAsDefault demotes the prior primary + promotes (existing contactId)
or inserts + promotes (fresh value); neither flag inserts a non-primary
client_contacts row for future dropdown reuse.
- Document override columns persisted post-insert, with a 1-minute
source_document_id backfill on freshly inserted contact rows.
- eoi-context route returns available.{emails, phones} so the dialog
can render combobox options.
- <OverridableContactField> in eoi-generate-dialog.tsx renders the
combobox + manual input + 2 checkboxes per field with mutually
exclusive intent semantics.
Phase 3c — yacht spawn from EOI dialog:
- YachtForm gains createExtras + onCreated callbacks; the EOI dialog
opens it as a nested Sheet pre-filled with the linked client as owner.
On save the new yacht is stamped source='eoi-generated' and the
interest is PATCHed with the new yachtId so the EOI context reflows.
Phase 3d — promote-to-primary + audit + [EOI] badge:
- POST /api/v1/clients/:id/contacts/:contactId/promote-to-primary
(transactional demote+promote via promoteContactToPrimary).
- src/lib/audit.ts AuditAction type adds eoi_field_override,
promote_to_primary, eoi_spawn_yacht (DB column is free-text).
- ContactsEditor surfaces an [EOI] badge on non-primary rows where
source='eoi-custom-input'.
Phase 4 — worker + TOD picker:
- processOverdueReminders refactored to UPDATE...RETURNING with a
fired_at IS NULL gate so parallel workers can't double-fire. Uses
the idx_reminders_due_unfired partial index from migration 0072.
- /settings gets a "Default reminder time" time-of-day picker; the
value lands in user_profiles.preferences.digestTimeOfDay (validated
HH:MM at the route). <ReminderForm> seeds its dueAt from this
preference via a React-Query me-prefs fetch.
Phase 6 hardening:
- IMAP bounce poller strips whitespace from IMAP_PASS so a copy-paste
of Google Workspace's 16-char App Password formatted as
"abcd efgh ijkl mnop" still authenticates. Workspace activation
procedure documented in MASTER-PLAN §Phase 6 (was previously written
to CLAUDE.md, which was bloat — moved to the plan).
Quality gates: 1374/1374 vitest, tsc clean, lint 0 errors.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
298 lines
10 KiB
TypeScript
298 lines
10 KiB
TypeScript
import { db } from '@/lib/db';
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import { auditLogs } from '@/lib/db/schema';
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import { logger } from '@/lib/logger';
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/**
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* Widen a Drizzle row (or any object) to the shape audit_logs.oldValue /
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* newValue expects. Centralizes the structurally-safe `Record<string,
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* unknown>` cast 20+ services were doing inline via
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* `as unknown as Record<string, unknown>`. Mirrors gdpr-bundle-builder's
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* `toJsonRow` helper (same audit-found motivation).
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*/
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export function toAuditJson<T extends object>(row: T): Record<string, unknown> {
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return row as unknown as Record<string, unknown>;
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}
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export type AuditAction =
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| 'create'
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| 'update'
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| 'delete'
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| 'archive'
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| 'restore'
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| 'merge'
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| 'login'
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| 'logout'
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| 'permission_denied'
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| 'revert'
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| 'revoke_invite'
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| 'resend_invite'
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| 'request_gdpr_export'
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| 'send_gdpr_export'
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| 'password_change'
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| 'portal_invite'
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| 'portal_activate'
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| 'portal_password_reset_request'
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| 'portal_password_reset'
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| 'send'
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| 'view'
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| 'request_hard_delete_code'
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| 'hard_delete'
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// Branding (port logo upload pipeline).
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| 'branding.logo.uploaded'
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| 'branding.logo.archived'
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// System / background events.
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| 'webhook_delivered'
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| 'webhook_failed'
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| 'webhook_dead_letter'
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| 'webhook_retried'
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| 'job_failed'
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| 'cron_run'
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// Berth-rule decision trace: emitted by the rules engine on every
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// evaluateRule() call so admins can debug "why did this fire / not fire"
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// without reading server logs. Distinct from the actual `update` audit
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// row the auto-applied path emits when it mutates berth status.
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| 'rule_evaluated'
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// M-AU04: distinct verbs for outcome-set / outcome-cleared. The pre-fix
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// path used a generic `update` row with `metadata.type = 'outcome_set'`,
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// which the audit filter dropdown couldn't surface as its own bucket
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// and the FTS GENERATED index missed entirely.
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| 'outcome_set'
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| 'outcome_cleared'
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// Phase 3 — EOI override / contact promote / yacht spawn from EOI.
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// The DB column is free-text per migration 0073; these strings just
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// formalise the catalogue so the audit-log filter dropdown can surface
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// them as their own buckets.
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| 'eoi_field_override'
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| 'promote_to_primary'
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| 'eoi_spawn_yacht';
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/**
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* Common shape passed to service functions so they can stamp audit logs and
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* propagate request context. Every authenticated route resolves these from
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* the session + headers; services accept them rather than reaching into
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* Next.js APIs themselves.
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*/
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export interface AuditMeta {
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userId: string;
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portId: string;
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ipAddress: string;
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userAgent: string;
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}
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export type AuditSeverity = 'info' | 'warning' | 'error' | 'critical';
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export type AuditSource = 'user' | 'system' | 'auth' | 'webhook' | 'cron' | 'job';
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export interface AuditLogParams {
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/** Null for system-generated events. */
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userId: string | null;
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/** Null for system-level events not tied to a port. */
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portId: string | null;
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action: AuditAction;
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entityType: string;
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entityId: string;
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fieldChanged?: string;
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oldValue?: Record<string, unknown>;
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newValue?: Record<string, unknown>;
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metadata?: Record<string, unknown>;
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/** Optional. Services that don't have request context (e.g. background
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* jobs, internal helpers) may omit. */
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ipAddress?: string;
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userAgent?: string;
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/** Defaults to 'info'. Bump to 'warning' for permission_denied,
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* 'error' for failed background jobs / webhook DLQ, 'critical' for
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* hard-deletes / security-relevant events. */
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severity?: AuditSeverity;
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/** Defaults to 'user'. Use 'auth' for session lifecycle,
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* 'webhook' for delivery events, 'job' / 'cron' / 'system' for
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* background work. The inspector filters on this column. */
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source?: AuditSource;
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}
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// Lower-cased key fragments. A metadata key is masked if any fragment is
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// contained as a substring after lowercase + snake/kebab normalization.
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// Substring match catches `recipientEmail`, `sent_to_email`, `userEmail`,
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// `attempted_email`, `from_address`, `phone_number`, `passwordHash`, etc.
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const SENSITIVE_KEY_FRAGMENTS = [
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'email',
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'phone',
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'password',
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'token',
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'credentials',
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'secret',
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'api_key',
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'apikey',
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'auth',
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'authorization',
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'cookie',
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'address', // physical/mailing addresses
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'dob',
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'date_of_birth',
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'birthdate',
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'tax_id',
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'taxid',
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'national_id',
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'ssn',
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'passport',
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'iban',
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'card_number',
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'cvv',
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'recipient', // e.g. recipientEmail catches the parent too — preserves intent
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'first_name',
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'last_name',
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'full_name',
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'fullname',
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];
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function isSensitiveKey(key: string): boolean {
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const k = key.toLowerCase().replace(/[-]/g, '_');
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return SENSITIVE_KEY_FRAGMENTS.some((frag) => k.includes(frag));
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}
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function maskString(val: string): string {
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return val.length > 4 ? `${val.slice(0, 2)}***${val.slice(-2)}` : '***';
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}
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function maskValue(value: unknown, depth: number): unknown {
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if (depth > 4) return '[depth-limit]';
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if (value === null || value === undefined) return value;
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if (typeof value === 'string') return maskString(value);
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if (Array.isArray(value)) return value.map((v) => maskValue(v, depth + 1));
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if (typeof value === 'object') {
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// Recurse into nested object — only mask keys that themselves look
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// sensitive. Parents stay traversable.
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return maskObject(value as Record<string, unknown>, depth + 1);
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}
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// Non-string primitives (number/boolean/bigint/symbol) at sensitive keys
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// are passed through unchanged. The original contract was "only mask
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// strings" — a number at an `email` key is a type error upstream and
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// shouldn't be silently replaced with `***`.
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return value;
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}
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function maskObject(data: Record<string, unknown>, depth: number): Record<string, unknown> {
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if (depth > 4) return { _truncated: '[depth-limit]' };
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const masked: Record<string, unknown> = {};
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for (const [key, value] of Object.entries(data)) {
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if (isSensitiveKey(key)) {
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masked[key] = maskValue(value, depth + 1);
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} else if (value && typeof value === 'object' && !Array.isArray(value)) {
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masked[key] = maskObject(value as Record<string, unknown>, depth + 1);
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} else if (Array.isArray(value)) {
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masked[key] = value.map((v) =>
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v && typeof v === 'object' && !Array.isArray(v)
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? maskObject(v as Record<string, unknown>, depth + 1)
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: v,
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);
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} else {
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masked[key] = value;
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}
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}
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return masked;
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}
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/**
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* Masks sensitive field values to prevent PII or secrets from being stored
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* verbatim in the audit log (SECURITY-GUIDELINES.md §5.2).
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*
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* Strings are replaced with a partial mask - first 2 chars + *** + last 2 chars.
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* Walks nested objects/arrays so e.g. `{recipient: {email: "a@b"}}` masks
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* the inner value too.
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*/
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export function maskSensitiveFields(
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data?: Record<string, unknown>,
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): Record<string, unknown> | undefined {
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if (!data) return undefined;
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return maskObject(data, 0);
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}
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/**
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* Computes a field-level diff between two records.
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* Returns one entry per changed field with the old and new values.
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*/
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export function diffFields(
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oldRecord: Record<string, unknown>,
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newRecord: Record<string, unknown>,
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): Array<{ field: string; oldValue: unknown; newValue: unknown }> {
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const changes: Array<{ field: string; oldValue: unknown; newValue: unknown }> = [];
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for (const key of Object.keys(newRecord)) {
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if (JSON.stringify(oldRecord[key]) !== JSON.stringify(newRecord[key])) {
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changes.push({ field: key, oldValue: oldRecord[key], newValue: newRecord[key] });
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}
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}
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return changes;
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}
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/**
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* Inserts an audit log entry into the database.
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*
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* This function NEVER throws - errors are caught and logged so that an audit
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* failure never rolls back or disrupts the parent operation.
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*/
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// Some actions get a default severity bump so callers don't have to
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// remember; explicit `severity` on the call still wins.
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const DEFAULT_SEVERITY_BY_ACTION: Partial<Record<AuditAction, AuditSeverity>> = {
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permission_denied: 'warning',
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hard_delete: 'critical',
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// L-AU01: explicit severities so the row badge in /admin/audit lights
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// up correctly. Without these, security-relevant verbs landed as
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// generic 'info' grey rows next to read events.
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password_change: 'warning',
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portal_invite: 'info',
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portal_activate: 'info',
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portal_password_reset_request: 'warning',
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portal_password_reset: 'warning',
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revoke_invite: 'warning',
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request_gdpr_export: 'info',
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send_gdpr_export: 'info',
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request_hard_delete_code: 'warning',
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outcome_set: 'info',
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outcome_cleared: 'info',
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// Webhook lifecycle defaults to warning when a delivery fails.
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webhook_failed: 'warning',
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webhook_dead_letter: 'error',
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job_failed: 'error',
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};
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const AUTH_ACTIONS = new Set<AuditAction>(['login', 'logout', 'password_change']);
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export async function createAuditLog(params: AuditLogParams): Promise<void> {
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try {
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const severity = params.severity ?? DEFAULT_SEVERITY_BY_ACTION[params.action] ?? 'info';
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const source = params.source ?? (AUTH_ACTIONS.has(params.action) ? 'auth' : 'user');
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await db.insert(auditLogs).values({
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portId: params.portId,
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userId: params.userId,
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action: params.action,
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entityType: params.entityType,
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entityId: params.entityId,
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fieldChanged: params.fieldChanged ?? null,
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oldValue: maskSensitiveFields(params.oldValue) ?? null,
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newValue: maskSensitiveFields(params.newValue) ?? null,
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// Mask metadata too — the audit found portal-auth, crm-invite,
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// hard-delete, and email-accounts services were writing raw emails
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// into this column.
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metadata: maskSensitiveFields(params.metadata) ?? null,
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ipAddress: params.ipAddress ?? null,
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userAgent: params.userAgent ?? null,
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severity,
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source,
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});
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} catch (err) {
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// Strip old/new values from the log to avoid secondary exposure of the data
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// that just failed to persist.
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logger.error(
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{
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err,
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audit: {
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userId: params.userId,
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portId: params.portId,
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action: params.action,
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entityType: params.entityType,
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entityId: params.entityId,
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},
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},
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'Failed to write audit log',
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);
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}
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}
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