Files
pn-new-crm/scripts/audit-permissions.ts
Matt dd25ccfb53 fix(tenancies-audit): resolve findings from 7-agent system-wide rename audit
MUST-FIX:
- src/app/api/v1/admin/users/[id]/permission-overrides/route.ts:70 — the
  PUT allowlist still gated `reservations: {view,create,activate,cancel}`.
  Stale: would reject valid `tenancies.{view,manage,cancel}` writes and
  silently accept ghost `reservations.*` writes that never land. Replaced.
- src/lib/services/alert-rules.ts:68 — `reservation.no_agreement` alert
  emitted `entityType: 'reservation'`. Every other tenancy-related
  audit/socket/dashboard label is `'berth_tenancy'`. Inconsistent dedupe
  + activity-feed label miss.
- tests/e2e/exhaustive/08-portal.spec.ts:6 — hardcoded /portal/my-reservations
  navigates to a 404 every run.
- tests/e2e/exhaustive/03-reservations.spec.ts — entire spec renamed to
  03-tenancies.spec.ts; tab + button locators updated to match renamed UI.

SHOULD-FIX (consistency):
- src/components/clients/client-detail.tsx — useRealtimeInvalidation only
  caught 3 of the 4 berth_tenancy:* events; added the `:created` listener.
- src/lib/services/client-merge.service.ts — MergeResult.movedRows.reservations
  + snapshot.reservations + local loserReservations / movedReservations
  renamed to tenancies / loserTenancies / movedTenancies. No external
  consumers grep-confirmed.
- src/lib/services/gdpr-bundle-builder.ts — GdprBundle.reservations field
  renamed to .tenancies; user-facing HTML section "Reservations" → "Tenancies";
  local reservationRows → tenancyRows.
- 6 UI copy strings: gdpr-export-button, bulk-archive-wizard,
  bulk-hard-delete-dialog, hard-delete-dialog, admin-sections-browser ×2,
  admin/import/page, won-status-panel — all "reservations" prose updated
  to "tenancies" (occupancy-record sense).
- tests/integration/api/tenancies.test.ts — handler import aliases
  `createReservationHandler` etc renamed to `createTenancyHandler` etc.
- tests/unit/services/berth-tenancies.test.ts — local helper makeReservation
  → makeTenancyLocal (avoids shadow of the renamed factory).
- scripts/audit-permissions.ts — stale allowlist entry for
  /berth-reservations/[id]/route.ts removed (path no longer exists).
- docs/runbooks/permission-audit.md — stale row for same path removed.
- docs/tenancies-design.md — fixed factual error
  ("tenancies.service.ts" → "berth-tenancies.service.ts").

Verified: tsc clean, 1493/1493 vitest.

Dev-server note: the running `next dev` process started before P2 and
shows Turbopack cached compile errors against the renamed schema files.
Source is correct (./tenancies); restart `next dev` to clear the cache.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-05-25 16:03:14 +02:00

185 lines
6.2 KiB
TypeScript

/**
* Permission-matrix audit.
*
* Walks every src/app/api/v1/** /route.ts file and reports each exported HTTP
* handler (GET/POST/PUT/PATCH/DELETE) that is *not* wrapped in withPermission().
* Internal v1 routes should be permission-gated; routes that intentionally use
* withAuth() alone (e.g. user-self endpoints) can be allow-listed below.
*
* Run:
* pnpm tsx scripts/audit-permissions.ts
*
* Exit code:
* 0 — every handler is permission-gated or in the allow-list
* 1 — at least one handler is missing both a withPermission wrapper and an
* allow-list entry. CI should fail.
*/
import { readdir, readFile } from 'node:fs/promises';
import { join, relative } from 'node:path';
const ROOT = join(process.cwd(), 'src/app/api/v1');
const HTTP_METHODS = ['GET', 'POST', 'PUT', 'PATCH', 'DELETE'] as const;
/**
* Routes intentionally exempt from withPermission. Each entry should explain
* why — typically because the route operates on the caller's own resources
* (no port-level permission semantics) or is admin-only and gated by
* isSuperAdmin inside the handler.
*/
const ALLOW_LIST: ReadonlyArray<{ pattern: RegExp; reason: string }> = [
// Self / admin / public
{ pattern: /\/me\/route\.ts$/, reason: 'Self-endpoint — auth is sufficient.' },
{ pattern: /\/admin\//, reason: 'Admin-only — gated by isSuperAdmin inside handler.' },
{
pattern: /\/notifications\//,
reason: 'User-scoped notifications — caller is the resource owner.',
},
{ pattern: /\/socket\//, reason: 'Socket auth handshake.' },
{ pattern: /\/health\//, reason: 'Public health check.' },
{ pattern: /\/users\/me\//, reason: 'User-self preferences — caller is the resource owner.' },
{ pattern: /\/saved-views\//, reason: 'User-self saved views — caller is the resource owner.' },
{
pattern: /\/settings\/feature-flag\//,
reason: 'Public read of feature-flag bool — no PII; auth is sufficient.',
},
// Cross-cutting / port-scoped reference data
{ pattern: /\/tags\//, reason: 'Tags are cross-cutting reference data; port-scoped via auth.' },
{
pattern: /\/currency\/(convert|rates)\/route\.ts$/,
reason: 'Currency reference data; port-scoped, no PII.',
},
{
pattern: /\/currency\/rates\/refresh\//,
reason: 'TODO: gate with admin:manage_settings — currently allow-listed.',
},
{
pattern: /\/search\//,
reason: 'Port-scoped search — results filtered by auth context (resources have own perms).',
},
// Alerts surface in topbar/dashboard for every signed-in user; per-port not per-resource.
{ pattern: /\/alerts\//, reason: 'Alerts are user-scoped; port-filtered via auth context.' },
// Internally gated by isSuperAdmin
{
pattern: /\/expenses\/export\/parent-company\//,
reason: 'Internally gated by isSuperAdmin inside the handler.',
},
// Pending dedicated permissions
{
pattern: /\/ai\//,
reason: 'TODO: needs ai:* permission catalog entry. Currently allow-listed.',
},
{
pattern: /\/custom-fields\/\[entityId\]\//,
reason: 'TODO: needs custom_fields:* permission. PUT path internally validated.',
},
];
interface Finding {
file: string;
method: string;
reason: 'no-withPermission' | 'no-withAuth' | 'allow-listed';
allowReason?: string;
}
async function* walk(dir: string): AsyncGenerator<string> {
for (const entry of await readdir(dir, { withFileTypes: true })) {
const path = join(dir, entry.name);
if (entry.isDirectory()) yield* walk(path);
else if (entry.isFile() && entry.name === 'route.ts') yield path;
}
}
function isAllowListed(file: string): { allowed: boolean; reason?: string } {
for (const { pattern, reason } of ALLOW_LIST) {
if (pattern.test(file)) return { allowed: true, reason };
}
return { allowed: false };
}
async function auditFile(file: string): Promise<Finding[]> {
const src = await readFile(file, 'utf-8');
const findings: Finding[] = [];
for (const method of HTTP_METHODS) {
// Match: export const GET = withAuth(...
const declRe = new RegExp(`export\\s+const\\s+${method}\\s*=\\s*(.+?);`, 's');
const m = declRe.exec(src);
if (!m) continue;
const block = m[1] ?? '';
const hasAuth = /withAuth\s*\(/.test(block);
const hasPerm = /withPermission\s*\(/.test(block);
const allow = isAllowListed(file);
if (!hasAuth) {
findings.push({ file, method, reason: 'no-withAuth' });
continue;
}
if (!hasPerm) {
if (allow.allowed) {
findings.push({ file, method, reason: 'allow-listed', allowReason: allow.reason });
} else {
findings.push({ file, method, reason: 'no-withPermission' });
}
}
}
return findings;
}
async function main() {
const files: string[] = [];
for await (const f of walk(ROOT)) files.push(f);
files.sort();
const all: Finding[] = [];
for (const f of files) all.push(...(await auditFile(f)));
const violations = all.filter(
(f) => f.reason === 'no-withPermission' || f.reason === 'no-withAuth',
);
const allowListed = all.filter((f) => f.reason === 'allow-listed');
// Markdown report
const lines: string[] = [];
lines.push('# Permission Matrix Audit');
lines.push('');
lines.push(`Scanned ${files.length} route files under \`src/app/api/v1/\`.`);
lines.push('');
if (violations.length === 0) {
lines.push('**No violations.** Every internal v1 handler is permission-gated.');
} else {
lines.push(`**${violations.length} violation(s):**`);
lines.push('');
lines.push('| File | Method | Issue |');
lines.push('| --- | --- | --- |');
for (const v of violations) {
const rel = relative(process.cwd(), v.file);
lines.push(`| \`${rel}\` | ${v.method} | ${v.reason} |`);
}
}
lines.push('');
lines.push(
`**Allow-listed:** ${allowListed.length} handler(s) intentionally skip \`withPermission\`.`,
);
if (allowListed.length > 0) {
lines.push('');
lines.push('| File | Method | Reason |');
lines.push('| --- | --- | --- |');
for (const a of allowListed) {
const rel = relative(process.cwd(), a.file);
lines.push(`| \`${rel}\` | ${a.method} | ${a.allowReason} |`);
}
}
process.stdout.write(lines.join('\n') + '\n');
process.exit(violations.length > 0 ? 1 : 0);
}
main().catch((err) => {
console.error(err);
process.exit(2);
});