Multi-tenant branding admin (/admin/branding) was saving 5 settings
that no code read — every port's emails shipped Port Nimara's logo
and color regardless. Now wired end-to-end:
New shared infrastructure:
- src/lib/email/shell.ts — renderShell() + brandingPrimaryColor()
helpers; takes BrandingShell { logoUrl, primaryColor,
emailHeaderHtml, emailFooterHtml }, falls back to Port Nimara
defaults when null.
- src/lib/email/branding-resolver.ts — getBrandingShell(portId)
thin wrapper over getPortBrandingConfig() that returns null on
error / missing portId so senders never break on misconfig.
All 6 transactional templates refactored to use renderShell + the
shared accent color; portName now flows through every template
(crm-invite, portal activation/reset, both inquiries, both
residential templates, notification digest).
All 6 senders pass branding via getBrandingShell:
- portal-auth.service.ts (activation + reset)
- crm-invite.service.ts (resend path; create-invite has no portId
yet so falls through to defaults)
- email worker (inquiry confirmation + sales notification)
- residential-inquiries route (client confirmation + sales alert)
- notification-digest.service.ts (digest)
BrandedAuthShell takes an optional `branding` prop with logoUrl +
appName (parent page server-fetches via getPortBrandingConfig).
Defaults to Port Nimara if omitted, so single-tenant deployments
are unaffected.
1175/1175 vitest passing.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
466 lines
16 KiB
TypeScript
466 lines
16 KiB
TypeScript
import { and, eq, gt, isNull } from 'drizzle-orm';
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import { db } from '@/lib/db';
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import { clients } from '@/lib/db/schema/clients';
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import { ports } from '@/lib/db/schema/ports';
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import { portalAuthTokens, portalUsers } from '@/lib/db/schema/portal';
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import { systemSettings } from '@/lib/db/schema/system';
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import { env } from '@/lib/env';
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import { sendEmail } from '@/lib/email';
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import { activationEmail, resetEmail } from '@/lib/email/templates/portal-auth';
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import { loadSubjectOverride } from '@/lib/email/template-overrides';
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import { getBrandingShell } from '@/lib/email/branding-resolver';
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import {
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CodedError,
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ConflictError,
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NotFoundError,
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UnauthorizedError,
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ValidationError,
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} from '@/lib/errors';
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import { logger } from '@/lib/logger';
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import { createPortalToken } from '@/lib/portal/auth';
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import { hashPassword, hashToken, mintToken, verifyPassword } from '@/lib/portal/passwords';
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import { createAuditLog } from '@/lib/audit';
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const ACTIVATION_TOKEN_TTL_HOURS = 72;
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const RESET_TOKEN_TTL_MINUTES = 30;
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const MIN_PASSWORD_LENGTH = 9;
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const PORTAL_ENABLED_KEY = 'client_portal_enabled';
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/**
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* Per-port toggle for the client portal feature. Default-on so existing
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* deployments behave the way they did before this setting existed.
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*/
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export async function isPortalEnabledForPort(portId: string): Promise<boolean> {
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const row = await db.query.systemSettings.findFirst({
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where: and(eq(systemSettings.key, PORTAL_ENABLED_KEY), eq(systemSettings.portId, portId)),
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});
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if (!row) return true;
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return row.value === true || row.value === 'true';
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}
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// ─── Admin-side: invite a client to the portal ───────────────────────────────
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export async function createPortalUser(args: {
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clientId: string;
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portId: string;
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email: string;
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name?: string;
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createdBy: string;
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}): Promise<{ portalUserId: string }> {
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const normalizedEmail = args.email.toLowerCase().trim();
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const client = await db.query.clients.findFirst({
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where: and(eq(clients.id, args.clientId), eq(clients.portId, args.portId)),
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});
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if (!client) throw new NotFoundError('Client');
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if (!(await isPortalEnabledForPort(args.portId))) {
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throw new ConflictError('Client portal is disabled for this port');
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}
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// Email uniqueness check is enforced at the DB level too, but we do a
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// friendlier preflight so the admin sees a clear conflict error.
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const existing = await db.query.portalUsers.findFirst({
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where: eq(portalUsers.email, normalizedEmail),
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});
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if (existing) {
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throw new ConflictError(`A portal user already exists for ${normalizedEmail}`);
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}
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const [user] = await db
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.insert(portalUsers)
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.values({
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portId: args.portId,
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clientId: args.clientId,
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email: normalizedEmail,
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name: args.name ?? client.fullName,
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createdBy: args.createdBy,
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})
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.returning({ id: portalUsers.id });
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if (!user) {
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throw new CodedError('INSERT_RETURNING_EMPTY', {
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internalMessage: 'Failed to create portal user',
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});
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}
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await issueActivationToken(user.id, normalizedEmail, args.portId);
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void createAuditLog({
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portId: args.portId,
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userId: args.createdBy,
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action: 'portal_invite',
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entityType: 'portal_user',
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entityId: user.id,
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metadata: { clientId: args.clientId, email: normalizedEmail },
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});
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return { portalUserId: user.id };
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}
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async function issueActivationToken(
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portalUserId: string,
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email: string,
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portId: string,
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): Promise<void> {
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const { raw, hash } = mintToken();
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const expiresAt = new Date(Date.now() + ACTIVATION_TOKEN_TTL_HOURS * 3600 * 1000);
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await db.insert(portalAuthTokens).values({
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portalUserId,
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tokenHash: hash,
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type: 'activation',
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expiresAt,
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});
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const port = await db.query.ports.findFirst({ where: eq(ports.id, portId) });
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const portName = port?.name ?? 'Port Nimara';
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const link = `${env.APP_URL}/portal/activate?token=${encodeURIComponent(raw)}`;
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const subjectOverride = await loadSubjectOverride(portId, 'portal_activation');
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const branding = await getBrandingShell(portId);
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const { subject, html, text } = activationEmail(
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{
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portName,
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link,
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ttlHours: ACTIVATION_TOKEN_TTL_HOURS,
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},
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{ subject: subjectOverride, branding },
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);
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try {
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await sendEmail(email, subject, html, undefined, text);
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} catch (err) {
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logger.error({ err, email }, 'Failed to send portal activation email');
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// Re-throw - the admin should know if their invite mail bounced.
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throw err;
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}
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}
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export async function resendActivation(portalUserId: string, portId: string): Promise<void> {
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if (!(await isPortalEnabledForPort(portId))) {
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throw new ConflictError('Client portal is disabled for this port');
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}
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const user = await db.query.portalUsers.findFirst({
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where: and(eq(portalUsers.id, portalUserId), eq(portalUsers.portId, portId)),
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});
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if (!user) throw new NotFoundError('Portal user');
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if (user.passwordHash) {
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throw new ConflictError('Portal user has already activated their account');
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}
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await issueActivationToken(user.id, user.email, user.portId);
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void createAuditLog({
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portId: user.portId,
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userId: null,
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action: 'resend_invite',
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entityType: 'portal_user',
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entityId: user.id,
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metadata: { email: user.email },
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});
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}
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// ─── Self-service password change (logged-in portal user) ───────────────────
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export async function changePortalPassword(args: {
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portalUserId: string;
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currentPassword: string;
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newPassword: string;
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}): Promise<void> {
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if (args.newPassword.length < MIN_PASSWORD_LENGTH) {
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throw new ValidationError(`Password must be at least ${MIN_PASSWORD_LENGTH} characters`);
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}
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const user = await db.query.portalUsers.findFirst({
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where: eq(portalUsers.id, args.portalUserId),
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});
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if (!user || !user.isActive || !user.passwordHash) {
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throw new UnauthorizedError('Account not found');
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}
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const ok = await verifyPassword(args.currentPassword, user.passwordHash);
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if (!ok) {
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void createAuditLog({
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userId: null,
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portId: user.portId,
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action: 'password_change',
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entityType: 'portal_user',
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entityId: user.id,
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metadata: { ok: false, reason: 'wrong_current_password' },
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severity: 'warning',
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source: 'auth',
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});
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throw new UnauthorizedError('Current password is incorrect');
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}
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const passwordHash = await hashPassword(args.newPassword);
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await db
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.update(portalUsers)
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.set({ passwordHash, updatedAt: new Date() })
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.where(eq(portalUsers.id, user.id));
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void createAuditLog({
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userId: null,
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portId: user.portId,
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action: 'password_change',
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entityType: 'portal_user',
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entityId: user.id,
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metadata: { ok: true },
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severity: 'info',
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source: 'auth',
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});
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}
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// ─── Activation: client sets their initial password ──────────────────────────
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export async function activateAccount(rawToken: string, password: string): Promise<void> {
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if (password.length < MIN_PASSWORD_LENGTH) {
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throw new ValidationError(`Password must be at least ${MIN_PASSWORD_LENGTH} characters`);
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}
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const tokenRow = await consumeToken(rawToken, 'activation');
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const portalUser = await db.query.portalUsers.findFirst({
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where: eq(portalUsers.id, tokenRow.portalUserId),
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});
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if (!portalUser) throw new ValidationError('Invalid or expired token');
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if (!(await isPortalEnabledForPort(portalUser.portId))) {
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throw new ValidationError('Client portal is disabled for this port');
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}
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const passwordHash = await hashPassword(password);
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await db
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.update(portalUsers)
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.set({ passwordHash, updatedAt: new Date() })
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.where(eq(portalUsers.id, tokenRow.portalUserId));
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void createAuditLog({
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portId: portalUser.portId,
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userId: null,
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action: 'portal_activate',
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entityType: 'portal_user',
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entityId: portalUser.id,
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});
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}
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// ─── Sign in (email + password) ──────────────────────────────────────────────
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export async function signIn(args: {
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email: string;
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password: string;
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}): Promise<{ token: string; clientId: string; portId: string; email: string }> {
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const normalizedEmail = args.email.toLowerCase().trim();
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// Always do the same amount of work regardless of whether the email
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// exists, so timing doesn't leak account presence.
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const user = await db.query.portalUsers.findFirst({
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where: eq(portalUsers.email, normalizedEmail),
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});
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// Dummy hash with the right shape - used to keep verifyPassword's compute
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// cost identical when the user doesn't exist.
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const dummyHash =
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'0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000:00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000';
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const ok = user?.passwordHash
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? await verifyPassword(args.password, user.passwordHash)
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: (await verifyPassword(args.password, dummyHash), false);
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if (!user || !user.isActive || !user.passwordHash || !ok) {
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void createAuditLog({
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userId: null,
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portId: user?.portId ?? null,
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action: 'login',
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entityType: 'portal_session',
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entityId: user?.id ?? normalizedEmail,
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metadata: { ok: false, attemptedEmail: normalizedEmail, reason: 'invalid_credentials' },
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severity: 'warning',
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source: 'auth',
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});
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throw new UnauthorizedError('Invalid email or password');
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}
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// Disabled-port check happens AFTER the credential check so that a wrong
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// password on a disabled-port account still surfaces "invalid email or
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// password" - we never leak which ports have the portal turned off.
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if (!(await isPortalEnabledForPort(user.portId))) {
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void createAuditLog({
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userId: null,
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portId: user.portId,
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action: 'login',
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entityType: 'portal_session',
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entityId: user.id,
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metadata: { ok: false, attemptedEmail: normalizedEmail, reason: 'portal_disabled' },
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severity: 'warning',
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source: 'auth',
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});
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throw new UnauthorizedError('Invalid email or password');
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}
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const token = await createPortalToken({
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clientId: user.clientId,
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portId: user.portId,
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email: user.email,
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});
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await db.update(portalUsers).set({ lastLoginAt: new Date() }).where(eq(portalUsers.id, user.id));
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void createAuditLog({
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userId: null,
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portId: user.portId,
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action: 'login',
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entityType: 'portal_session',
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entityId: user.id,
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metadata: { ok: true, email: user.email },
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severity: 'info',
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source: 'auth',
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});
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return { token, clientId: user.clientId, portId: user.portId, email: user.email };
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}
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// ─── Forgot password ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
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export async function requestPasswordReset(email: string): Promise<void> {
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const normalizedEmail = email.toLowerCase().trim();
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const user = await db.query.portalUsers.findFirst({
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where: eq(portalUsers.email, normalizedEmail),
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});
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if (!user || !user.isActive) {
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// Silently no-op so unknown emails don't leak through timing or
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// response shape. Caller surfaces "if the email matches an account…".
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logger.debug({ email: normalizedEmail }, 'Password reset for unknown email');
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void createAuditLog({
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userId: null,
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portId: null,
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action: 'portal_password_reset_request',
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entityType: 'portal_user',
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entityId: 'unknown',
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metadata: { email: normalizedEmail, reason: 'unknown_or_inactive' },
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severity: 'warning',
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source: 'auth',
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});
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return;
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}
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// Same silent no-op when the port has the portal disabled - keeps the
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// disabled-state from leaking through the public reset endpoint.
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if (!(await isPortalEnabledForPort(user.portId))) {
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logger.debug({ portId: user.portId }, 'Password reset on disabled-portal port');
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void createAuditLog({
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userId: null,
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portId: user.portId,
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action: 'portal_password_reset_request',
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entityType: 'portal_user',
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entityId: user.id,
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metadata: { email: normalizedEmail, reason: 'portal_disabled' },
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severity: 'warning',
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source: 'auth',
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});
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return;
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}
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const { raw, hash } = mintToken();
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const expiresAt = new Date(Date.now() + RESET_TOKEN_TTL_MINUTES * 60 * 1000);
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await db.insert(portalAuthTokens).values({
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portalUserId: user.id,
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tokenHash: hash,
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type: 'reset',
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expiresAt,
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});
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void createAuditLog({
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portId: user.portId,
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userId: null,
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action: 'portal_password_reset_request',
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entityType: 'portal_user',
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entityId: user.id,
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metadata: { email: user.email },
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});
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const port = await db.query.ports.findFirst({ where: eq(ports.id, user.portId) });
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const portName = port?.name ?? 'Port Nimara';
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const link = `${env.APP_URL}/portal/reset-password?token=${encodeURIComponent(raw)}`;
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const subjectOverride = await loadSubjectOverride(user.portId, 'portal_reset');
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const branding = await getBrandingShell(user.portId);
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const { subject, html, text } = resetEmail(
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{
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portName,
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link,
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ttlMinutes: RESET_TOKEN_TTL_MINUTES,
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},
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{ subject: subjectOverride, branding },
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);
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try {
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await sendEmail(user.email, subject, html, undefined, text);
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} catch (err) {
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logger.error({ err, email: user.email }, 'Failed to send password-reset email');
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// Don't propagate - the public route returns 200 either way.
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}
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}
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export async function resetPassword(rawToken: string, password: string): Promise<void> {
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if (password.length < MIN_PASSWORD_LENGTH) {
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throw new ValidationError(`Password must be at least ${MIN_PASSWORD_LENGTH} characters`);
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}
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const tokenRow = await consumeToken(rawToken, 'reset');
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const portalUser = await db.query.portalUsers.findFirst({
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where: eq(portalUsers.id, tokenRow.portalUserId),
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});
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if (!portalUser) throw new ValidationError('Invalid or expired token');
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if (!(await isPortalEnabledForPort(portalUser.portId))) {
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throw new ValidationError('Client portal is disabled for this port');
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}
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const passwordHash = await hashPassword(password);
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await db
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.update(portalUsers)
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.set({ passwordHash, updatedAt: new Date() })
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.where(eq(portalUsers.id, tokenRow.portalUserId));
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void createAuditLog({
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portId: portalUser.portId,
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userId: null,
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action: 'portal_password_reset',
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entityType: 'portal_user',
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entityId: portalUser.id,
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});
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}
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// ─── Token consumption (shared between activation + reset) ───────────────────
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async function consumeToken(
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rawToken: string,
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type: 'activation' | 'reset',
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): Promise<{ portalUserId: string }> {
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const tokenHash = hashToken(rawToken);
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const now = new Date();
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const row = await db.query.portalAuthTokens.findFirst({
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where: and(
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eq(portalAuthTokens.tokenHash, tokenHash),
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eq(portalAuthTokens.type, type),
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isNull(portalAuthTokens.usedAt),
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gt(portalAuthTokens.expiresAt, now),
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),
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});
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if (!row) {
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void createAuditLog({
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userId: null,
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portId: null,
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action: type === 'reset' ? 'portal_password_reset' : 'portal_activate',
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entityType: 'portal_auth_token',
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entityId: 'invalid',
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metadata: { type, reason: 'invalid_or_expired_token' },
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severity: 'warning',
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source: 'auth',
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});
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throw new ValidationError('Invalid or expired token');
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}
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await db.update(portalAuthTokens).set({ usedAt: now }).where(eq(portalAuthTokens.id, row.id));
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return { portalUserId: row.portalUserId };
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}
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// Activation + reset email templates live in src/lib/email/templates/portal-auth.ts
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