Files
pn-new-crm/src/lib/services/portal-auth.service.ts
Matt Ciaccio 05babe57a0 feat(branding): wire per-port branding through every transactional email + auth shell (R2-H15)
Multi-tenant branding admin (/admin/branding) was saving 5 settings
that no code read — every port's emails shipped Port Nimara's logo
and color regardless. Now wired end-to-end:

New shared infrastructure:
- src/lib/email/shell.ts — renderShell() + brandingPrimaryColor()
  helpers; takes BrandingShell { logoUrl, primaryColor,
  emailHeaderHtml, emailFooterHtml }, falls back to Port Nimara
  defaults when null.
- src/lib/email/branding-resolver.ts — getBrandingShell(portId)
  thin wrapper over getPortBrandingConfig() that returns null on
  error / missing portId so senders never break on misconfig.

All 6 transactional templates refactored to use renderShell + the
shared accent color; portName now flows through every template
(crm-invite, portal activation/reset, both inquiries, both
residential templates, notification digest).

All 6 senders pass branding via getBrandingShell:
- portal-auth.service.ts (activation + reset)
- crm-invite.service.ts (resend path; create-invite has no portId
  yet so falls through to defaults)
- email worker (inquiry confirmation + sales notification)
- residential-inquiries route (client confirmation + sales alert)
- notification-digest.service.ts (digest)

BrandedAuthShell takes an optional `branding` prop with logoUrl +
appName (parent page server-fetches via getPortBrandingConfig).
Defaults to Port Nimara if omitted, so single-tenant deployments
are unaffected.

1175/1175 vitest passing.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-05-07 00:00:45 +02:00

466 lines
16 KiB
TypeScript

import { and, eq, gt, isNull } from 'drizzle-orm';
import { db } from '@/lib/db';
import { clients } from '@/lib/db/schema/clients';
import { ports } from '@/lib/db/schema/ports';
import { portalAuthTokens, portalUsers } from '@/lib/db/schema/portal';
import { systemSettings } from '@/lib/db/schema/system';
import { env } from '@/lib/env';
import { sendEmail } from '@/lib/email';
import { activationEmail, resetEmail } from '@/lib/email/templates/portal-auth';
import { loadSubjectOverride } from '@/lib/email/template-overrides';
import { getBrandingShell } from '@/lib/email/branding-resolver';
import {
CodedError,
ConflictError,
NotFoundError,
UnauthorizedError,
ValidationError,
} from '@/lib/errors';
import { logger } from '@/lib/logger';
import { createPortalToken } from '@/lib/portal/auth';
import { hashPassword, hashToken, mintToken, verifyPassword } from '@/lib/portal/passwords';
import { createAuditLog } from '@/lib/audit';
const ACTIVATION_TOKEN_TTL_HOURS = 72;
const RESET_TOKEN_TTL_MINUTES = 30;
const MIN_PASSWORD_LENGTH = 9;
const PORTAL_ENABLED_KEY = 'client_portal_enabled';
/**
* Per-port toggle for the client portal feature. Default-on so existing
* deployments behave the way they did before this setting existed.
*/
export async function isPortalEnabledForPort(portId: string): Promise<boolean> {
const row = await db.query.systemSettings.findFirst({
where: and(eq(systemSettings.key, PORTAL_ENABLED_KEY), eq(systemSettings.portId, portId)),
});
if (!row) return true;
return row.value === true || row.value === 'true';
}
// ─── Admin-side: invite a client to the portal ───────────────────────────────
export async function createPortalUser(args: {
clientId: string;
portId: string;
email: string;
name?: string;
createdBy: string;
}): Promise<{ portalUserId: string }> {
const normalizedEmail = args.email.toLowerCase().trim();
const client = await db.query.clients.findFirst({
where: and(eq(clients.id, args.clientId), eq(clients.portId, args.portId)),
});
if (!client) throw new NotFoundError('Client');
if (!(await isPortalEnabledForPort(args.portId))) {
throw new ConflictError('Client portal is disabled for this port');
}
// Email uniqueness check is enforced at the DB level too, but we do a
// friendlier preflight so the admin sees a clear conflict error.
const existing = await db.query.portalUsers.findFirst({
where: eq(portalUsers.email, normalizedEmail),
});
if (existing) {
throw new ConflictError(`A portal user already exists for ${normalizedEmail}`);
}
const [user] = await db
.insert(portalUsers)
.values({
portId: args.portId,
clientId: args.clientId,
email: normalizedEmail,
name: args.name ?? client.fullName,
createdBy: args.createdBy,
})
.returning({ id: portalUsers.id });
if (!user) {
throw new CodedError('INSERT_RETURNING_EMPTY', {
internalMessage: 'Failed to create portal user',
});
}
await issueActivationToken(user.id, normalizedEmail, args.portId);
void createAuditLog({
portId: args.portId,
userId: args.createdBy,
action: 'portal_invite',
entityType: 'portal_user',
entityId: user.id,
metadata: { clientId: args.clientId, email: normalizedEmail },
});
return { portalUserId: user.id };
}
async function issueActivationToken(
portalUserId: string,
email: string,
portId: string,
): Promise<void> {
const { raw, hash } = mintToken();
const expiresAt = new Date(Date.now() + ACTIVATION_TOKEN_TTL_HOURS * 3600 * 1000);
await db.insert(portalAuthTokens).values({
portalUserId,
tokenHash: hash,
type: 'activation',
expiresAt,
});
const port = await db.query.ports.findFirst({ where: eq(ports.id, portId) });
const portName = port?.name ?? 'Port Nimara';
const link = `${env.APP_URL}/portal/activate?token=${encodeURIComponent(raw)}`;
const subjectOverride = await loadSubjectOverride(portId, 'portal_activation');
const branding = await getBrandingShell(portId);
const { subject, html, text } = activationEmail(
{
portName,
link,
ttlHours: ACTIVATION_TOKEN_TTL_HOURS,
},
{ subject: subjectOverride, branding },
);
try {
await sendEmail(email, subject, html, undefined, text);
} catch (err) {
logger.error({ err, email }, 'Failed to send portal activation email');
// Re-throw - the admin should know if their invite mail bounced.
throw err;
}
}
export async function resendActivation(portalUserId: string, portId: string): Promise<void> {
if (!(await isPortalEnabledForPort(portId))) {
throw new ConflictError('Client portal is disabled for this port');
}
const user = await db.query.portalUsers.findFirst({
where: and(eq(portalUsers.id, portalUserId), eq(portalUsers.portId, portId)),
});
if (!user) throw new NotFoundError('Portal user');
if (user.passwordHash) {
throw new ConflictError('Portal user has already activated their account');
}
await issueActivationToken(user.id, user.email, user.portId);
void createAuditLog({
portId: user.portId,
userId: null,
action: 'resend_invite',
entityType: 'portal_user',
entityId: user.id,
metadata: { email: user.email },
});
}
// ─── Self-service password change (logged-in portal user) ───────────────────
export async function changePortalPassword(args: {
portalUserId: string;
currentPassword: string;
newPassword: string;
}): Promise<void> {
if (args.newPassword.length < MIN_PASSWORD_LENGTH) {
throw new ValidationError(`Password must be at least ${MIN_PASSWORD_LENGTH} characters`);
}
const user = await db.query.portalUsers.findFirst({
where: eq(portalUsers.id, args.portalUserId),
});
if (!user || !user.isActive || !user.passwordHash) {
throw new UnauthorizedError('Account not found');
}
const ok = await verifyPassword(args.currentPassword, user.passwordHash);
if (!ok) {
void createAuditLog({
userId: null,
portId: user.portId,
action: 'password_change',
entityType: 'portal_user',
entityId: user.id,
metadata: { ok: false, reason: 'wrong_current_password' },
severity: 'warning',
source: 'auth',
});
throw new UnauthorizedError('Current password is incorrect');
}
const passwordHash = await hashPassword(args.newPassword);
await db
.update(portalUsers)
.set({ passwordHash, updatedAt: new Date() })
.where(eq(portalUsers.id, user.id));
void createAuditLog({
userId: null,
portId: user.portId,
action: 'password_change',
entityType: 'portal_user',
entityId: user.id,
metadata: { ok: true },
severity: 'info',
source: 'auth',
});
}
// ─── Activation: client sets their initial password ──────────────────────────
export async function activateAccount(rawToken: string, password: string): Promise<void> {
if (password.length < MIN_PASSWORD_LENGTH) {
throw new ValidationError(`Password must be at least ${MIN_PASSWORD_LENGTH} characters`);
}
const tokenRow = await consumeToken(rawToken, 'activation');
const portalUser = await db.query.portalUsers.findFirst({
where: eq(portalUsers.id, tokenRow.portalUserId),
});
if (!portalUser) throw new ValidationError('Invalid or expired token');
if (!(await isPortalEnabledForPort(portalUser.portId))) {
throw new ValidationError('Client portal is disabled for this port');
}
const passwordHash = await hashPassword(password);
await db
.update(portalUsers)
.set({ passwordHash, updatedAt: new Date() })
.where(eq(portalUsers.id, tokenRow.portalUserId));
void createAuditLog({
portId: portalUser.portId,
userId: null,
action: 'portal_activate',
entityType: 'portal_user',
entityId: portalUser.id,
});
}
// ─── Sign in (email + password) ──────────────────────────────────────────────
export async function signIn(args: {
email: string;
password: string;
}): Promise<{ token: string; clientId: string; portId: string; email: string }> {
const normalizedEmail = args.email.toLowerCase().trim();
// Always do the same amount of work regardless of whether the email
// exists, so timing doesn't leak account presence.
const user = await db.query.portalUsers.findFirst({
where: eq(portalUsers.email, normalizedEmail),
});
// Dummy hash with the right shape - used to keep verifyPassword's compute
// cost identical when the user doesn't exist.
const dummyHash =
'0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000:00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000';
const ok = user?.passwordHash
? await verifyPassword(args.password, user.passwordHash)
: (await verifyPassword(args.password, dummyHash), false);
if (!user || !user.isActive || !user.passwordHash || !ok) {
void createAuditLog({
userId: null,
portId: user?.portId ?? null,
action: 'login',
entityType: 'portal_session',
entityId: user?.id ?? normalizedEmail,
metadata: { ok: false, attemptedEmail: normalizedEmail, reason: 'invalid_credentials' },
severity: 'warning',
source: 'auth',
});
throw new UnauthorizedError('Invalid email or password');
}
// Disabled-port check happens AFTER the credential check so that a wrong
// password on a disabled-port account still surfaces "invalid email or
// password" - we never leak which ports have the portal turned off.
if (!(await isPortalEnabledForPort(user.portId))) {
void createAuditLog({
userId: null,
portId: user.portId,
action: 'login',
entityType: 'portal_session',
entityId: user.id,
metadata: { ok: false, attemptedEmail: normalizedEmail, reason: 'portal_disabled' },
severity: 'warning',
source: 'auth',
});
throw new UnauthorizedError('Invalid email or password');
}
const token = await createPortalToken({
clientId: user.clientId,
portId: user.portId,
email: user.email,
});
await db.update(portalUsers).set({ lastLoginAt: new Date() }).where(eq(portalUsers.id, user.id));
void createAuditLog({
userId: null,
portId: user.portId,
action: 'login',
entityType: 'portal_session',
entityId: user.id,
metadata: { ok: true, email: user.email },
severity: 'info',
source: 'auth',
});
return { token, clientId: user.clientId, portId: user.portId, email: user.email };
}
// ─── Forgot password ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
export async function requestPasswordReset(email: string): Promise<void> {
const normalizedEmail = email.toLowerCase().trim();
const user = await db.query.portalUsers.findFirst({
where: eq(portalUsers.email, normalizedEmail),
});
if (!user || !user.isActive) {
// Silently no-op so unknown emails don't leak through timing or
// response shape. Caller surfaces "if the email matches an account…".
logger.debug({ email: normalizedEmail }, 'Password reset for unknown email');
void createAuditLog({
userId: null,
portId: null,
action: 'portal_password_reset_request',
entityType: 'portal_user',
entityId: 'unknown',
metadata: { email: normalizedEmail, reason: 'unknown_or_inactive' },
severity: 'warning',
source: 'auth',
});
return;
}
// Same silent no-op when the port has the portal disabled - keeps the
// disabled-state from leaking through the public reset endpoint.
if (!(await isPortalEnabledForPort(user.portId))) {
logger.debug({ portId: user.portId }, 'Password reset on disabled-portal port');
void createAuditLog({
userId: null,
portId: user.portId,
action: 'portal_password_reset_request',
entityType: 'portal_user',
entityId: user.id,
metadata: { email: normalizedEmail, reason: 'portal_disabled' },
severity: 'warning',
source: 'auth',
});
return;
}
const { raw, hash } = mintToken();
const expiresAt = new Date(Date.now() + RESET_TOKEN_TTL_MINUTES * 60 * 1000);
await db.insert(portalAuthTokens).values({
portalUserId: user.id,
tokenHash: hash,
type: 'reset',
expiresAt,
});
void createAuditLog({
portId: user.portId,
userId: null,
action: 'portal_password_reset_request',
entityType: 'portal_user',
entityId: user.id,
metadata: { email: user.email },
});
const port = await db.query.ports.findFirst({ where: eq(ports.id, user.portId) });
const portName = port?.name ?? 'Port Nimara';
const link = `${env.APP_URL}/portal/reset-password?token=${encodeURIComponent(raw)}`;
const subjectOverride = await loadSubjectOverride(user.portId, 'portal_reset');
const branding = await getBrandingShell(user.portId);
const { subject, html, text } = resetEmail(
{
portName,
link,
ttlMinutes: RESET_TOKEN_TTL_MINUTES,
},
{ subject: subjectOverride, branding },
);
try {
await sendEmail(user.email, subject, html, undefined, text);
} catch (err) {
logger.error({ err, email: user.email }, 'Failed to send password-reset email');
// Don't propagate - the public route returns 200 either way.
}
}
export async function resetPassword(rawToken: string, password: string): Promise<void> {
if (password.length < MIN_PASSWORD_LENGTH) {
throw new ValidationError(`Password must be at least ${MIN_PASSWORD_LENGTH} characters`);
}
const tokenRow = await consumeToken(rawToken, 'reset');
const portalUser = await db.query.portalUsers.findFirst({
where: eq(portalUsers.id, tokenRow.portalUserId),
});
if (!portalUser) throw new ValidationError('Invalid or expired token');
if (!(await isPortalEnabledForPort(portalUser.portId))) {
throw new ValidationError('Client portal is disabled for this port');
}
const passwordHash = await hashPassword(password);
await db
.update(portalUsers)
.set({ passwordHash, updatedAt: new Date() })
.where(eq(portalUsers.id, tokenRow.portalUserId));
void createAuditLog({
portId: portalUser.portId,
userId: null,
action: 'portal_password_reset',
entityType: 'portal_user',
entityId: portalUser.id,
});
}
// ─── Token consumption (shared between activation + reset) ───────────────────
async function consumeToken(
rawToken: string,
type: 'activation' | 'reset',
): Promise<{ portalUserId: string }> {
const tokenHash = hashToken(rawToken);
const now = new Date();
const row = await db.query.portalAuthTokens.findFirst({
where: and(
eq(portalAuthTokens.tokenHash, tokenHash),
eq(portalAuthTokens.type, type),
isNull(portalAuthTokens.usedAt),
gt(portalAuthTokens.expiresAt, now),
),
});
if (!row) {
void createAuditLog({
userId: null,
portId: null,
action: type === 'reset' ? 'portal_password_reset' : 'portal_activate',
entityType: 'portal_auth_token',
entityId: 'invalid',
metadata: { type, reason: 'invalid_or_expired_token' },
severity: 'warning',
source: 'auth',
});
throw new ValidationError('Invalid or expired token');
}
await db.update(portalAuthTokens).set({ usedAt: now }).where(eq(portalAuthTokens.id, row.id));
return { portalUserId: row.portalUserId };
}
// Activation + reset email templates live in src/lib/email/templates/portal-auth.ts