Files
pn-new-crm/src/lib/services/alerts.service.ts
Matt Ciaccio 4c5334d471 sec: gate super-admin invite minting, OCR settings, and alert mutations
Three findings from the branch security review:

1. HIGH — Privilege escalation via super-admin invite. POST
   /api/v1/admin/invitations was gated only by manage_users (held by the
   port-scoped director role). The body schema accepted isSuperAdmin
   from the request, createCrmInvite persisted it verbatim, and
   consumeCrmInvite copied it into userProfiles.isSuperAdmin — granting
   the new account cross-tenant access. Now the route rejects
   isSuperAdmin=true unless ctx.isSuperAdmin, and createCrmInvite
   requires invitedBy.isSuperAdmin as defense-in-depth.

2. HIGH — Receipt-image exfiltration via OCR settings. The route
   /api/v1/admin/ocr-settings (and the sibling /test) were wrapped only
   in withAuth — any port role including viewer could PUT a swapped
   provider apiKey + flip aiEnabled, redirecting every subsequent
   receipt scan to attacker infrastructure. Both are now wrapped in
   withPermission('admin','manage_settings',…) matching the sibling
   admin routes (ai-budget, settings).

3. MEDIUM — Cross-tenant alert IDOR. dismissAlert / acknowledgeAlert
   issued UPDATE … WHERE id=? with no portId predicate. Any
   authenticated user with a foreign alert UUID could mutate it. Both
   service functions now require portId and add it to the WHERE; the
   route handlers pass ctx.portId.

The dev-trigger-crm-invite script passes a synthetic super-admin caller
identity since it runs out-of-band.

The two public-form tests randomize their IP prefix per run so a fresh
test process doesn't collide with leftover redis sliding-window entries
from a prior run (publicForm limiter pexpires after 1h).

Two new regression test files cover the fixes (6 tests).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-04-29 02:27:01 +02:00

144 lines
4.3 KiB
TypeScript

/**
* Phase B alert framework — service layer.
*
* This is the skeleton: types, function shapes, and behaviour stubs. The
* actual rule evaluators live in `alert-rules.ts` (PR2). The cron
* dispatcher will compose this service with that catalogue.
*/
import { and, eq, isNull, sql } from 'drizzle-orm';
import { createHash } from 'crypto';
import { db } from '@/lib/db';
import { alerts, type Alert, type AlertSeverity, type AlertRuleId } from '@/lib/db/schema/insights';
import { emitToRoom } from '@/lib/socket/server';
export interface AlertCandidate {
ruleId: AlertRuleId;
severity: AlertSeverity;
title: string;
body?: string;
link: string;
entityType?: string;
entityId?: string;
metadata?: Record<string, unknown>;
}
/**
* Stable identity hash so re-evaluations of the same condition upsert
* onto the same row (via `idx_alerts_fingerprint_open`).
*/
export function fingerprintFor(
c: Pick<AlertCandidate, 'ruleId' | 'entityType' | 'entityId'>,
): string {
return createHash('sha1')
.update(`${c.ruleId}|${c.entityType ?? ''}|${c.entityId ?? ''}`)
.digest('hex');
}
/**
* Apply a batch of rule outputs against the open-alert table:
* - upsert open alerts (rule still firing)
* - resolve any open alert in scope whose fingerprint isn't in this batch
*/
export async function reconcileAlertsForPort(
portId: string,
ruleId: AlertRuleId,
candidates: AlertCandidate[],
): Promise<void> {
// Insert new / leave existing — only one open row per fingerprint
// thanks to the partial unique index. Track newly inserted rows so we
// can emit `alert:created` to the port room.
for (const c of candidates) {
const fingerprint = fingerprintFor(c);
const inserted = await db
.insert(alerts)
.values({
portId,
ruleId: c.ruleId,
severity: c.severity,
title: c.title,
body: c.body,
link: c.link,
entityType: c.entityType,
entityId: c.entityId,
fingerprint,
metadata: c.metadata ?? {},
})
.onConflictDoNothing()
.returning({ id: alerts.id });
if (inserted[0]) {
emitToRoom(`port:${portId}`, 'alert:created', {
alertId: inserted[0].id,
portId,
ruleId: c.ruleId,
severity: c.severity,
title: c.title,
link: c.link,
});
}
}
// Auto-resolve open alerts for this rule whose fingerprint disappeared.
const liveFingerprints = new Set(candidates.map((c) => fingerprintFor(c)));
const open = await db.query.alerts.findMany({
where: and(eq(alerts.portId, portId), eq(alerts.ruleId, ruleId), isNull(alerts.resolvedAt)),
});
const stale = open.filter((a) => !liveFingerprints.has(a.fingerprint));
for (const a of stale) {
await db
.update(alerts)
.set({ resolvedAt: sql`now()` })
.where(eq(alerts.id, a.id));
emitToRoom(`port:${portId}`, 'alert:resolved', {
alertId: a.id,
portId,
ruleId,
});
}
}
export async function dismissAlert(alertId: string, portId: string, userId: string): Promise<void> {
// Tenant scope: the WHERE on portId means a foreign-tenant alert UUID
// returns zero rows rather than mutating someone else's alert.
const [row] = await db
.update(alerts)
.set({ dismissedAt: sql`now()`, dismissedBy: userId })
.where(and(eq(alerts.id, alertId), eq(alerts.portId, portId)))
.returning({ id: alerts.id, portId: alerts.portId });
if (row) {
emitToRoom(`port:${row.portId}`, 'alert:dismissed', { alertId: row.id, portId: row.portId });
}
}
export async function acknowledgeAlert(
alertId: string,
portId: string,
userId: string,
): Promise<void> {
await db
.update(alerts)
.set({ acknowledgedAt: sql`now()`, acknowledgedBy: userId })
.where(and(eq(alerts.id, alertId), eq(alerts.portId, portId)));
}
export interface ListAlertsOptions {
severity?: AlertSeverity[];
includeDismissed?: boolean;
includeResolved?: boolean;
}
export async function listAlertsForPort(
portId: string,
options: ListAlertsOptions = {},
): Promise<Alert[]> {
const conditions = [eq(alerts.portId, portId)];
if (!options.includeResolved) conditions.push(isNull(alerts.resolvedAt));
if (!options.includeDismissed) conditions.push(isNull(alerts.dismissedAt));
return db.query.alerts.findMany({
where: and(...conditions),
orderBy: (a, { desc }) => [desc(a.firedAt)],
limit: 100,
});
}