Tier 1.6: S3Backend.put now sets ServerSideEncryption=AES256 — closes the cleartext-at-rest gap for signed contracts, GDPR exports, pg_dumps. Tier 3.7: New safeUrl() helper in lib/email/shell.ts. Scheme allow-list (http/https/mailto/tel/relative only — javascript:/data:/vbscript:/file: rewritten to about:blank) + HTML-attribute escape. Retrofitted across all 7 transactional templates (crm-invite, portal-auth, document-signing, notification-digest, residential-inquiry, admin-email-change). Tier 4.2: /api/v1/alerts GET now gated on admin.view_audit_log. Tier 4.3: Documenso webhook handler emits captureErrorEvent on catch. Admin/errors no longer silent on webhook crashes. Tier 4.6: Inquiry-funnel email dedup is now case-insensitive (LOWER(value)) and stores normalized email on insert. Capital-letter resubmissions no longer spawn duplicate client+yacht+interest rows. Tier 5.6 + data-model H1: migration 0056 adds FK user_permission_overrides.user_id → user(id) cascade, same for user_port_roles.userId, plus partial unique index on user_email_changes pending rows. Tier 7.6: @types/node bumped from ^25 to ^20.19.0 — matches the runtime. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
280 lines
10 KiB
TypeScript
280 lines
10 KiB
TypeScript
import { NextRequest, NextResponse } from 'next/server';
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import { createHash } from 'crypto';
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import { db } from '@/lib/db';
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import { verifyDocumensoSecret } from '@/lib/services/documenso-webhook';
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import { listDocumensoWebhookSecrets } from '@/lib/services/port-config';
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import {
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handleRecipientSigned,
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handleDocumentCompleted,
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handleDocumentExpired,
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handleDocumentOpened,
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handleDocumentRejected,
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handleDocumentCancelled,
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} from '@/lib/services/documents.service';
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import { logger } from '@/lib/logger';
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import { createAuditLog } from '@/lib/audit';
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import { checkRateLimit, rateLimiters } from '@/lib/rate-limit';
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import { captureErrorEvent } from '@/lib/services/error-events.service';
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// BR-024: Dedup via signatureHash unique index on documentEvents
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// Always return 200 from webhook (webhook best practice)
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// Documenso emits Prisma enum names on the wire (e.g. "DOCUMENT_SIGNED").
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// The UI displays them as lowercase-dotted ("document.signed") but the JSON
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// body uses the enum value as-is. Normalize both forms in case 2.x ever flips.
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function canonicalizeEvent(event: string): string {
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return event.toUpperCase().replace(/\./g, '_');
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}
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type DocumensoRecipient = {
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email: string;
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signingStatus?: string;
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readStatus?: string;
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signedAt?: string | null;
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};
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type DocumensoWebhookBody = {
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event: string;
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payload: {
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id: number | string;
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recipients?: DocumensoRecipient[];
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};
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};
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export async function POST(req: NextRequest): Promise<NextResponse> {
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let rawBody: string;
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try {
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rawBody = await req.text();
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} catch {
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return NextResponse.json({ ok: false }, { status: 200 });
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}
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// Documenso v1.13 + 2.x send the secret in plaintext via X-Documenso-Secret.
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// Resolve the matching port by trying each configured per-port secret
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// (plus the global env fallback) with timing-safe comparison. The
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// resolved portId, when non-null, is threaded into handleDocumentExpired
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// so two ports sharing a documensoId can't cross-mutate (auditor-D §22).
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const providedSecret = req.headers.get('x-documenso-secret') ?? '';
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const secrets = await listDocumensoWebhookSecrets();
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let matchedPortId: string | null = null;
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let matched = false;
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for (const entry of secrets) {
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if (verifyDocumensoSecret(providedSecret, entry.secret)) {
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matched = true;
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matchedPortId = entry.portId;
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break;
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}
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}
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if (!matched) {
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const callerIp =
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req.headers.get('x-forwarded-for')?.split(',')[0]?.trim() ??
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req.headers.get('x-real-ip') ??
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'unknown';
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// Rate-limit per IP. Real Documenso traffic won't fail the secret
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// check, so any traffic here is enumeration / brute-force; we cap
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// it sharply to keep audit-log volume bounded too.
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const rl = await checkRateLimit(callerIp, rateLimiters.webhookBadSecret);
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logger.warn(
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{ providedLen: providedSecret.length, ip: callerIp, allowed: rl.allowed },
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'Invalid Documenso webhook secret',
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);
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if (rl.allowed) {
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void createAuditLog({
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userId: null,
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portId: null,
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action: 'webhook_failed',
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entityType: 'webhook_inbound',
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entityId: 'documenso',
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metadata: {
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reason: 'invalid_secret',
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providedLen: providedSecret.length,
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},
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ipAddress: callerIp,
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userAgent: req.headers.get('user-agent') ?? '',
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severity: 'warning',
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source: 'webhook',
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});
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}
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// Always return 200 (webhook best-practice — don't leak signal).
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return NextResponse.json({ ok: false, error: 'Invalid secret' }, { status: 200 });
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}
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// Compute deduplication hash
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const signatureHash = createHash('sha256').update(rawBody).digest('hex');
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let parsed: DocumensoWebhookBody;
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try {
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parsed = JSON.parse(rawBody) as DocumensoWebhookBody;
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} catch {
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logger.warn('Failed to parse Documenso webhook payload');
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return NextResponse.json({ ok: false }, { status: 200 });
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}
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// Replay guard: if any event with this hash already exists, skip.
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try {
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const existing = await db.query.documentEvents.findFirst({
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where: (de, { eq }) => eq(de.signatureHash, signatureHash),
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});
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if (existing) {
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logger.info({ signatureHash }, 'Duplicate Documenso webhook - skipping');
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return NextResponse.json({ ok: true }, { status: 200 });
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}
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} catch (err) {
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logger.error({ err }, 'Failed to check duplicate webhook');
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}
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const event = canonicalizeEvent(parsed.event);
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const documensoId = String(parsed.payload?.id ?? '');
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const recipients = parsed.payload?.recipients ?? [];
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if (!documensoId) {
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logger.warn({ event }, 'Documenso webhook missing payload.id');
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return NextResponse.json({ ok: true }, { status: 200 });
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}
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// Every handler accepts an optional `portId` and refuses to mutate when
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// the lookup is ambiguous across multiple ports without one. Forward
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// the secret-resolved portId everywhere — not just the expired path —
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// so signed/completed/opened/rejected/cancelled events can't flip a
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// foreign-tenant document via documensoId reuse.
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const portScope = matchedPortId ? { portId: matchedPortId } : {};
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try {
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switch (event) {
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case 'DOCUMENT_SIGNED':
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case 'DOCUMENT_RECIPIENT_COMPLETED':
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case 'RECIPIENT_SIGNED': {
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// v1.13 fires DOCUMENT_SIGNED per recipient sign;
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// 2.x fires DOCUMENT_RECIPIENT_COMPLETED for the same semantics.
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// Some 2.x deployments emit RECIPIENT_SIGNED as a v2-flavoured alias —
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// log when we see it (telemetry) and route to the same handler so v2
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// deployments don't silently drop per-recipient signs.
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if (event === 'RECIPIENT_SIGNED') {
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logger.info(
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{ event, documensoId },
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'Documenso v2 RECIPIENT_SIGNED received — routing to recipient-signed handler',
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);
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}
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const signedRecipients = recipients.filter(
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(r) => r.signingStatus === 'SIGNED' || Boolean(r.signedAt),
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);
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for (const r of signedRecipients) {
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await handleRecipientSigned({
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documentId: documensoId,
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recipientEmail: r.email,
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signatureHash: `${signatureHash}:signed:${r.email}`,
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...portScope,
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});
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}
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break;
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}
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case 'DOCUMENT_OPENED':
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case 'RECIPIENT_VIEWED': {
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// Documenso v1 sends `readStatus: 'OPENED'`; v2 has used both
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// upper and lower case across releases and may omit the field
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// entirely (the event itself signals the open). Treat the event
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// as the signal: dispatch a per-recipient open for every
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// recipient on the document so v2 deployments stop silently
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// dropping opens.
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//
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// RECIPIENT_VIEWED is the v2-flavoured alias for the same semantics
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// — log when we see it (telemetry) and route to the same handler.
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if (event === 'RECIPIENT_VIEWED') {
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logger.info(
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{ event, documensoId },
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'Documenso v2 RECIPIENT_VIEWED received — routing to document-opened handler',
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);
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}
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const openedRecipients = recipients.filter(
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(r) => !r.readStatus || String(r.readStatus).toUpperCase() === 'OPENED',
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);
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for (const r of openedRecipients) {
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await handleDocumentOpened({
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documentId: documensoId,
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recipientEmail: r.email,
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signatureHash: `${signatureHash}:opened:${r.email}`,
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...portScope,
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});
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}
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break;
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}
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case 'DOCUMENT_COMPLETED':
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await handleDocumentCompleted({ documentId: documensoId, ...portScope });
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break;
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case 'DOCUMENT_REJECTED':
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case 'DOCUMENT_DECLINED': {
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// Documenso v2 distinguishes Decline (recipient refuses to sign) from
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// Reject (admin cancels). Both currently map to the same "rejected"
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// terminal state in our domain — `handleDocumentRejected` records who
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// refused and freezes the workflow. Product may later refine
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// downstream UX (different audit tags / notifications), but the
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// storage shape is identical for now so they share a handler.
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const rejecting = recipients.find(
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(r) => r.signingStatus === 'REJECTED' || r.signingStatus === 'DECLINED',
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);
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await handleDocumentRejected({
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documentId: documensoId,
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recipientEmail: rejecting?.email,
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signatureHash,
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...portScope,
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});
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break;
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}
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case 'DOCUMENT_CANCELLED':
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await handleDocumentCancelled({ documentId: documensoId, signatureHash, ...portScope });
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break;
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case 'DOCUMENT_EXPIRED':
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await handleDocumentExpired({ documentId: documensoId, ...portScope });
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break;
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case 'DOCUMENT_REMINDER_SENT':
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// Documenso auto-reminded a recipient. We don't mutate state — the
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// reminder is informational. Structured log line is enough for
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// telemetry without polluting the audit_logs table on every
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// auto-reminder Documenso sends across all ports.
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logger.info(
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{
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documensoId,
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recipients: recipients.map((r) => r.email),
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...portScope,
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},
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'Documenso auto-reminder sent',
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);
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break;
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case 'DOCUMENT_CREATED':
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case 'DOCUMENT_SENT':
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// Created + sent are informational — we initiated these from our
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// side so the state is already authoritative in our DB. Log for
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// forward-compat / out-of-band-creation telemetry.
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logger.info({ event, documensoId, ...portScope }, 'Documenso lifecycle event');
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break;
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default:
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logger.info({ event }, 'Unhandled Documenso webhook event type');
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}
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} catch (err) {
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logger.error({ err, event }, 'Error processing Documenso webhook');
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// The audit caught that webhook handlers were the only API surface
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// bypassing the platform-error pipeline — admin/errors was silent on
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// Documenso webhook crashes. Pipe them in so they surface alongside
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// every other 5xx.
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void captureErrorEvent({
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statusCode: 500,
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error: err,
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metadata: { source: 'webhook', provider: 'documenso', event },
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});
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}
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return NextResponse.json({ ok: true }, { status: 200 });
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}
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