Bundles the prior session's 50-task fix sweep (Documenso v2 + EOI/signing-
progress redesign + env-to-admin migration + dev-mode banner) with the
2026-05-18 audit fix wave (3 CRITICAL, 14 HIGH, 28 MEDIUM, 6 LOW).
CRITICAL (3):
- C-01 interest-berths INNER JOIN -> LEFT JOIN so hard-deleted berths
no longer silently drop interest links
- C-02 /setup added to PUBLIC_PATHS; fresh-deploy bootstrap loop fixed
- C-03 generic PATCH /interests/[id] no longer accepts pipelineStage —
callers must go through /stage with the override-guard chain
HIGH (14/15):
- H-01 explicit ON DELETE on previously-implicit NO ACTION FKs across
interests/documents/reservations/reminders/invoices (migration 0070)
- H-02 login page reads ?redirect= param with same-origin guard
- H-03 CRM invite token moves to URL fragment so it never lands in
nginx access logs / Referer headers
- H-04 Retry-After header on sign-in-by-identifier 429 (RFC 6585 §4)
- H-05 toggleAccount writes an audit row
- H-06 upsertSetting masks any value whose key ends with _encrypted
- H-07 archiveClient cascade fires per-interest audit rows
- H-08 createSalesTransporter applies SMTP_TIMEOUTS
- H-09 AppShell stable children — viewport flip across breakpoint no
longer destroys in-progress form drafts
- H-10 portal documents page swaps Unicode glyph status icons for
Lucide CheckCircle2/XCircle/Circle + aria-labels
- H-12 list components swap alert(...) for toast.warning(...)
- H-13 5 icon-only buttons gain aria-label
- H-14 parseBody treats empty bodies as {}
- H-15 admin layout renders a 403 panel instead of silent bounce
- H-11 not applicable — mobile-search-overlay IS a mobile bottom-sheet
MEDIUM (28+):
- M-MT01-05 defense-in-depth port_id/parent-id filters on UPDATE/DELETE
WHEREs across custom-fields, notes (all 6 entity types x update +
delete), client-contacts, yacht ownerClient lookup, webhook reads
- M-D01 documents-hub realtime event-name typo (file:created -> uploaded)
- M-EM01 portal-auth emails thread through portId
- M-EM02 sendEmail accepts cc/bcc params
- M-EM04 notification_digest catalog key
- M-IN01 portal presigned download URLs use 4h TTL
- M-IN02 OpenAI client lazy-instantiated
- M-IN04 stale pdfme refs updated to pdf-lib AcroForm
- M-IN05 umami.testConnection returns tagged union
- M-L01 reservations tenure_type unified with berths
- M-L02 report-generators canonicalize stage values
- M-AU01 audit log placeholder copy fixed
- M-AU04 outcome_set / outcome_cleared distinct audit verbs
- M-NEW-2 activity feed entity name+type separator
- M-R01 portal allowlist narrowed + portal_session backstop in proxy
- M-SC02 companies archived partial index
- M-SC04 audit_logs.searchText documented as DB-managed
- M-S01 storage_s3_access_key_encrypted admin field
- M-U01 audit log empty state uses <EmptyState>
- M-U09 invoice delete dialog -> <AlertDialog>
- M-U10 toast.success on ClientForm + InterestForm create/edit
- M-U11 settings-form-card logo preview alt text
- M-U14 mobile topbar title on clients/yachts/interests/berths
- M-U15 Invoices in mobile More-sheet
LOW (6/8):
- L-AU01 severity defaults for security-relevant verbs
- L-AU02 +13 missing actions in admin audit filter
- L-AU03 +7 missing entity types in admin audit filter
- L-AU04 dead listAuditLogs stubbed
- L-D02 CLAUDE.md Owner-wins chain tightened
Bonus — Document detail polish (#67 partial, 3/6 deliverables):
- state-aware action button per signer
- watcher Add UI with display-name resolution
- cleanSignerName cleanup
Prior session work bundled in:
- Documenso v2 webhook + envelope-ID normalization + sequential signing
- SigningProgress UI redesign (avatars, per-signer state, timestamps)
- env->admin settings registry + RegistryDrivenForm + encrypted creds
- Embedded-signing card + Test connection + setup help
- Dev-mode EMAIL_REDIRECT_TO banner
- Pipeline rules admin page
- Sales email config card
- Audit log details Sheet
- EOI tab: Finalising badge, absolute timestamps, sequential indicator
- Notes pipeline_stage_at_creation (migration 0069)
- Documenso numeric ID dual-key webhook (migration 0068)
- Dimensions criterion copy (migration 0067)
Tests: 1374/1374 vitest pass. tsc clean. lint clean.
See docs/AUDIT-FIX-WAVE-2026-05-18.md for the full progress report and
the user-input items still pending.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
281 lines
8.9 KiB
TypeScript
281 lines
8.9 KiB
TypeScript
import { and, desc, eq, gt, isNull } from 'drizzle-orm';
|
|
import postgres from 'postgres';
|
|
|
|
import { auth } from '@/lib/auth';
|
|
import { createAuditLog, type AuditMeta } from '@/lib/audit';
|
|
import { db } from '@/lib/db';
|
|
import { crmUserInvites } from '@/lib/db/schema/crm-invites';
|
|
import { userProfiles } from '@/lib/db/schema/users';
|
|
import { env } from '@/lib/env';
|
|
import { sendEmail } from '@/lib/email';
|
|
import { crmInviteEmail } from '@/lib/email/templates/crm-invite';
|
|
import { resolveSubject } from '@/lib/email/resolve-subject';
|
|
import { getBrandingShell } from '@/lib/email/branding-resolver';
|
|
import { CodedError, ConflictError, NotFoundError, ValidationError } from '@/lib/errors';
|
|
import { hashToken, mintToken } from '@/lib/portal/passwords';
|
|
|
|
const INVITE_TTL_HOURS = 72;
|
|
const MIN_PASSWORD_LENGTH = 9;
|
|
|
|
export async function createCrmInvite(args: {
|
|
email: string;
|
|
name?: string;
|
|
isSuperAdmin?: boolean;
|
|
/**
|
|
* Caller identity. Required when minting a super-admin invitation so the
|
|
* service can fail closed if the caller isn't already a super-admin -
|
|
* defense-in-depth for the route's authorization gate.
|
|
*/
|
|
invitedBy?: { userId: string; isSuperAdmin: boolean };
|
|
}): Promise<{ inviteId: string; link: string }> {
|
|
const email = args.email.toLowerCase().trim();
|
|
const isSuperAdmin = args.isSuperAdmin ?? false;
|
|
|
|
if (isSuperAdmin && !args.invitedBy?.isSuperAdmin) {
|
|
throw new ValidationError('Only super admins can mint super-admin invitations');
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Reject if there's already a better-auth user with this email - they
|
|
// should reset their password instead.
|
|
const sql = postgres(env.DATABASE_URL);
|
|
try {
|
|
const existing = await sql<{ id: string }[]>`
|
|
SELECT id FROM "user" WHERE email = ${email} LIMIT 1
|
|
`;
|
|
if (existing.length > 0) {
|
|
throw new ConflictError(`A CRM user already exists for ${email}`);
|
|
}
|
|
} finally {
|
|
await sql.end();
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
const { raw, hash } = mintToken();
|
|
const expiresAt = new Date(Date.now() + INVITE_TTL_HOURS * 3600 * 1000);
|
|
|
|
const [row] = await db
|
|
.insert(crmUserInvites)
|
|
.values({
|
|
email,
|
|
name: args.name ?? null,
|
|
tokenHash: hash,
|
|
isSuperAdmin,
|
|
expiresAt,
|
|
})
|
|
.returning({ id: crmUserInvites.id });
|
|
|
|
if (!row)
|
|
throw new CodedError('INSERT_RETURNING_EMPTY', {
|
|
internalMessage: 'Failed to create CRM invite',
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
// H-03: token moves to the URL fragment so it never lands in nginx/Caddy
|
|
// access logs (or any HTTP-Referer-leaking middlebox). The fragment is
|
|
// browser-only; the server only sees the path. set-password/page.tsx
|
|
// reads either `#token=` or `?token=` (back-compat for outstanding
|
|
// links). encodeURIComponent guards against `#`/`&` in the token.
|
|
const link = `${env.APP_URL}/set-password#token=${encodeURIComponent(raw)}`;
|
|
const result = await crmInviteEmail({
|
|
link,
|
|
ttlHours: INVITE_TTL_HOURS,
|
|
recipientName: args.name,
|
|
isSuperAdmin,
|
|
});
|
|
// CRM invites are global (no portId at create-invite time). The
|
|
// override resolver returns the fallback when portId is null.
|
|
const subject = await resolveSubject({
|
|
key: 'crm_invite',
|
|
portId: null,
|
|
fallback: result.subject,
|
|
tokens: {
|
|
portName: 'Port Nimara',
|
|
recipientName: args.name ?? '',
|
|
ttlHours: INVITE_TTL_HOURS,
|
|
},
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
await sendEmail(email, subject, result.html, undefined, result.text);
|
|
|
|
return { inviteId: row.id, link };
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
export async function consumeCrmInvite(args: {
|
|
token: string;
|
|
password: string;
|
|
}): Promise<{ userId: string; email: string }> {
|
|
if (args.password.length < MIN_PASSWORD_LENGTH) {
|
|
throw new ValidationError(`Password must be at least ${MIN_PASSWORD_LENGTH} characters`);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
const tokenHash = hashToken(args.token);
|
|
|
|
const invite = await db.query.crmUserInvites.findFirst({
|
|
where: and(
|
|
eq(crmUserInvites.tokenHash, tokenHash),
|
|
isNull(crmUserInvites.usedAt),
|
|
gt(crmUserInvites.expiresAt, new Date()),
|
|
),
|
|
});
|
|
if (!invite) {
|
|
throw new NotFoundError('Invite link is invalid or has expired');
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Create the better-auth user with the chosen password.
|
|
const result = await auth.api.signUpEmail({
|
|
body: {
|
|
email: invite.email,
|
|
password: args.password,
|
|
name: invite.name ?? invite.email.split('@')[0] ?? 'User',
|
|
},
|
|
});
|
|
const userId = result.user.id;
|
|
|
|
// Create the matching user_profiles extension row.
|
|
await db
|
|
.insert(userProfiles)
|
|
.values({
|
|
id: crypto.randomUUID(),
|
|
userId,
|
|
displayName: invite.name ?? invite.email,
|
|
isSuperAdmin: invite.isSuperAdmin,
|
|
isActive: true,
|
|
preferences: {},
|
|
})
|
|
.onConflictDoNothing();
|
|
|
|
await db
|
|
.update(crmUserInvites)
|
|
.set({ usedAt: new Date() })
|
|
.where(eq(crmUserInvites.id, invite.id));
|
|
|
|
return { userId, email: invite.email };
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// ─── Admin operations ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
|
|
|
|
export interface InviteRow {
|
|
id: string;
|
|
email: string;
|
|
name: string | null;
|
|
isSuperAdmin: boolean;
|
|
expiresAt: Date;
|
|
usedAt: Date | null;
|
|
createdAt: Date;
|
|
status: 'pending' | 'accepted' | 'expired';
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
export async function listCrmInvites(): Promise<InviteRow[]> {
|
|
const rows = await db
|
|
.select({
|
|
id: crmUserInvites.id,
|
|
email: crmUserInvites.email,
|
|
name: crmUserInvites.name,
|
|
isSuperAdmin: crmUserInvites.isSuperAdmin,
|
|
expiresAt: crmUserInvites.expiresAt,
|
|
usedAt: crmUserInvites.usedAt,
|
|
createdAt: crmUserInvites.createdAt,
|
|
})
|
|
.from(crmUserInvites)
|
|
.orderBy(desc(crmUserInvites.createdAt))
|
|
.limit(200);
|
|
|
|
const now = Date.now();
|
|
return rows.map((r) => {
|
|
let status: InviteRow['status'];
|
|
if (r.usedAt) status = 'accepted';
|
|
else if (r.expiresAt.getTime() < now) status = 'expired';
|
|
else status = 'pending';
|
|
return { ...r, status };
|
|
});
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
export async function revokeCrmInvite(inviteId: string, meta: AuditMeta): Promise<void> {
|
|
const invite = await db.query.crmUserInvites.findFirst({
|
|
where: eq(crmUserInvites.id, inviteId),
|
|
});
|
|
if (!invite) throw new NotFoundError('Invite');
|
|
if (invite.usedAt) throw new ConflictError('Invite already accepted - cannot revoke');
|
|
|
|
// Force expiration; tokenHash stays in place so any in-flight click fails
|
|
// the `expiresAt > now` check at consume time.
|
|
await db
|
|
.update(crmUserInvites)
|
|
.set({ expiresAt: new Date(0) })
|
|
.where(eq(crmUserInvites.id, inviteId));
|
|
|
|
void createAuditLog({
|
|
userId: meta.userId,
|
|
portId: meta.portId,
|
|
action: 'revoke_invite',
|
|
entityType: 'crm_invite',
|
|
entityId: inviteId,
|
|
metadata: { email: invite.email },
|
|
ipAddress: meta.ipAddress,
|
|
userAgent: meta.userAgent,
|
|
});
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
export async function resendCrmInvite(
|
|
inviteId: string,
|
|
meta: AuditMeta,
|
|
): Promise<{ link: string }> {
|
|
const invite = await db.query.crmUserInvites.findFirst({
|
|
where: eq(crmUserInvites.id, inviteId),
|
|
});
|
|
if (!invite) throw new NotFoundError('Invite');
|
|
if (invite.usedAt) throw new ConflictError('Invite already accepted - nothing to resend');
|
|
|
|
// Mint a fresh token + push expiry forward so the resent link is the only
|
|
// working one. The old token hash is overwritten so prior emails become
|
|
// dead links.
|
|
const { raw, hash } = mintToken();
|
|
const expiresAt = new Date(Date.now() + INVITE_TTL_HOURS * 3600 * 1000);
|
|
|
|
await db
|
|
.update(crmUserInvites)
|
|
.set({ tokenHash: hash, expiresAt })
|
|
.where(eq(crmUserInvites.id, inviteId));
|
|
|
|
// H-03: token moves to the URL fragment so it never lands in nginx/Caddy
|
|
// access logs (or any HTTP-Referer-leaking middlebox). The fragment is
|
|
// browser-only; the server only sees the path. set-password/page.tsx
|
|
// reads either `#token=` or `?token=` (back-compat for outstanding
|
|
// links). encodeURIComponent guards against `#`/`&` in the token.
|
|
const link = `${env.APP_URL}/set-password#token=${encodeURIComponent(raw)}`;
|
|
const branding = await getBrandingShell(meta.portId);
|
|
const result = await crmInviteEmail(
|
|
{
|
|
link,
|
|
ttlHours: INVITE_TTL_HOURS,
|
|
recipientName: invite.name ?? undefined,
|
|
isSuperAdmin: invite.isSuperAdmin,
|
|
},
|
|
{ branding },
|
|
);
|
|
// Resend uses the dedicated portal_invite_resend key so admins can
|
|
// word the resend differently from the original.
|
|
const subject = await resolveSubject({
|
|
key: 'portal_invite_resend',
|
|
portId: meta.portId ?? null,
|
|
fallback: result.subject,
|
|
tokens: {
|
|
portName: 'Port Nimara',
|
|
recipientName: invite.name ?? '',
|
|
ttlHours: INVITE_TTL_HOURS,
|
|
},
|
|
});
|
|
await sendEmail(invite.email, subject, result.html, undefined, result.text, meta.portId);
|
|
|
|
void createAuditLog({
|
|
userId: meta.userId,
|
|
portId: meta.portId,
|
|
action: 'resend_invite',
|
|
entityType: 'crm_invite',
|
|
entityId: inviteId,
|
|
metadata: { email: invite.email },
|
|
ipAddress: meta.ipAddress,
|
|
userAgent: meta.userAgent,
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
return { link };
|
|
}
|