**file-lifecycle-auditor C1 — avatar replace leaks rows + blobs**
`POST /api/v1/me/avatar` overwrote `userProfiles.avatarFileId` without
reading or deleting the previous file id. Every "Replace photo" leaked
one `files` row + one S3 blob, untethered (no client/yacht/company
FK) and invisible to every existing UI sweep.
Now captures the prior id BEFORE the UPDATE, then best-effort
`deleteFile()` on the old row (handles ref-check + blob delete + audit)
after the new id is committed. Failure is logged at warn — a stale
blob shouldn't block the user from setting a new avatar.
**file-lifecycle-auditor M1 — files.client_id missing ON DELETE**
`files.client_id` was the only entity FK on the polymorphic `files`
table that defaulted to `NO ACTION` (yacht_id + company_id were
`SET NULL` per migration 0042). Any future bulk-client-delete that
bypassed `hardDeleteClient`'s explicit FK-nullify pre-step would
FK-violate. Migration `0059_files_client_id_onDelete_setnull.sql`
brings it to parity; the explicit nullify in client-hard-delete is
kept as defense in depth.
Tests 1315/1315.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Matt
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