Three findings from a fourth-pass review:
1. MEDIUM — webhook URL SSRF. The validator only enforced HTTPS+URL
parse; it accepted private/loopback/link-local/.internal hosts. The
delivery worker fetched arbitrary URLs and persisted up to 1KB of
response body into webhook_deliveries.response_body, which is then
surfaced via the deliveries listing endpoint — a port admin could
register a webhook to an internal HTTPS endpoint, hit the test
endpoint to force immediate dispatch, and read the response back.
Validator now rejects RFC-1918/loopback/link-local/CGNAT/ULA IPs
(v4 + v6) and .internal/.local/.localhost/.lan/.intranet/.corp
suffixes; the worker re-resolves the hostname at dispatch time and
blocks before fetch (DNS rebinding defense). 21-case unit test
covers the matrix.
2. MEDIUM — POST /api/v1/email/accounts/[id]/sync had no owner check.
Any user with email:view could enqueue an inbox-sync job for any
accountId, which the worker would honour using the foreign user's
decrypted IMAP credentials and advance the account's lastSyncAt
(data-loss risk on the legitimate owner's next sync). Route now
asserts account.userId === ctx.userId before enqueueing, matching
the toggle/disconnect endpoints.
3. MEDIUM — addDocumentWatcher (and the wizard / upload watcher
inserts) didn't validate the watcher's userId belonged to the
document's port. notifyDocumentEvent then emitted a real-time
socket toast + email containing the document title to the foreign
user. New assertWatchersInPort helper verifies each candidate has
a userPortRoles row for the port (super-admin bypass).
818 vitest tests pass.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
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