Closes the five highest-risk findings from docs/audit-comprehensive-2026-05-05.md so the platform is not exposed while the rest of the audit backlog (1 CRIT + 18 HIGH + 32 MED + 23 LOW) is worked through: * CVE-2025-29927 — bump next 15.1.0 → 15.2.9; nginx strips X-Middleware-Subrequest at the edge as defense-in-depth. * Cross-tenant role escalation — POST/PATCH/DELETE on /admin/roles now require super-admin (was: any holder of admin.manage_users). Adds shared `requireSuperAdmin(ctx)` helper. * Silent-403 traps — `documents.edit` and `files.edit` keys added to RolePermissions; seeded role values updated; migration 0041 backfills the new keys on every existing roles+port_role_overrides JSONB. File routes remap the dead `create` action to `upload` / `manage_folders`. * Berth-PDF / brochure register endpoints — reject body.storageKey unless it matches the namespace the matching presign endpoint issued (prevents repointing a tenant's PDF at foreign-port bytes). * Portal auth rate limits — sign-in 5/15min/(ip,email), forgot-password 3/hr/IP, activate/reset/set-password 10/hr/IP. Adds `enforcePublicRateLimit()` for non-`withAuth` routes. Test status unchanged: 1168/1168 vitest, tsc clean. Refs: docs/audit-comprehensive-2026-05-05.md (CRITICAL, HIGH §§1–4) Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
54 lines
1.6 KiB
TypeScript
54 lines
1.6 KiB
TypeScript
import { NextRequest, NextResponse } from 'next/server';
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import { z } from 'zod';
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import { errorResponse } from '@/lib/errors';
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import { PORTAL_COOKIE } from '@/lib/portal/auth';
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import { signIn } from '@/lib/services/portal-auth.service';
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import { enforcePublicRateLimit } from '@/lib/api/route-helpers';
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const bodySchema = z.object({
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email: z.string().email(),
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password: z.string().min(1),
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});
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const SESSION_MAX_AGE_SECONDS = 60 * 60 * 24; // 24h, matches createPortalToken
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export async function POST(req: NextRequest): Promise<NextResponse> {
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let body: unknown;
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try {
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body = await req.json();
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} catch {
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return NextResponse.json({ error: 'Email format is invalid' }, { status: 400 });
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}
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const parsed = bodySchema.safeParse(body);
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if (!parsed.success) {
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return NextResponse.json({ error: 'Email format is invalid' }, { status: 400 });
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}
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// Per-(ip,email) bucket: 5 attempts / 15min. Keyed on email-lowercase so
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// the limiter is per-account-per-IP, not just per-IP — a NATed network
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// shouldn't be able to lock a single victim by burning their bucket.
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const limited = await enforcePublicRateLimit(
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req,
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'portalSignIn',
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parsed.data.email.toLowerCase(),
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);
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if (limited) return limited;
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try {
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const result = await signIn(parsed.data);
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const res = NextResponse.json({ success: true });
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res.cookies.set(PORTAL_COOKIE, result.token, {
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httpOnly: true,
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secure: process.env.NODE_ENV === 'production',
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sameSite: 'lax',
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path: '/',
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maxAge: SESSION_MAX_AGE_SECONDS,
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});
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return res;
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} catch (err) {
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return errorResponse(err);
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}
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}
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