Bundles the prior session's 50-task fix sweep (Documenso v2 + EOI/signing-
progress redesign + env-to-admin migration + dev-mode banner) with the
2026-05-18 audit fix wave (3 CRITICAL, 14 HIGH, 28 MEDIUM, 6 LOW).
CRITICAL (3):
- C-01 interest-berths INNER JOIN -> LEFT JOIN so hard-deleted berths
no longer silently drop interest links
- C-02 /setup added to PUBLIC_PATHS; fresh-deploy bootstrap loop fixed
- C-03 generic PATCH /interests/[id] no longer accepts pipelineStage —
callers must go through /stage with the override-guard chain
HIGH (14/15):
- H-01 explicit ON DELETE on previously-implicit NO ACTION FKs across
interests/documents/reservations/reminders/invoices (migration 0070)
- H-02 login page reads ?redirect= param with same-origin guard
- H-03 CRM invite token moves to URL fragment so it never lands in
nginx access logs / Referer headers
- H-04 Retry-After header on sign-in-by-identifier 429 (RFC 6585 §4)
- H-05 toggleAccount writes an audit row
- H-06 upsertSetting masks any value whose key ends with _encrypted
- H-07 archiveClient cascade fires per-interest audit rows
- H-08 createSalesTransporter applies SMTP_TIMEOUTS
- H-09 AppShell stable children — viewport flip across breakpoint no
longer destroys in-progress form drafts
- H-10 portal documents page swaps Unicode glyph status icons for
Lucide CheckCircle2/XCircle/Circle + aria-labels
- H-12 list components swap alert(...) for toast.warning(...)
- H-13 5 icon-only buttons gain aria-label
- H-14 parseBody treats empty bodies as {}
- H-15 admin layout renders a 403 panel instead of silent bounce
- H-11 not applicable — mobile-search-overlay IS a mobile bottom-sheet
MEDIUM (28+):
- M-MT01-05 defense-in-depth port_id/parent-id filters on UPDATE/DELETE
WHEREs across custom-fields, notes (all 6 entity types x update +
delete), client-contacts, yacht ownerClient lookup, webhook reads
- M-D01 documents-hub realtime event-name typo (file:created -> uploaded)
- M-EM01 portal-auth emails thread through portId
- M-EM02 sendEmail accepts cc/bcc params
- M-EM04 notification_digest catalog key
- M-IN01 portal presigned download URLs use 4h TTL
- M-IN02 OpenAI client lazy-instantiated
- M-IN04 stale pdfme refs updated to pdf-lib AcroForm
- M-IN05 umami.testConnection returns tagged union
- M-L01 reservations tenure_type unified with berths
- M-L02 report-generators canonicalize stage values
- M-AU01 audit log placeholder copy fixed
- M-AU04 outcome_set / outcome_cleared distinct audit verbs
- M-NEW-2 activity feed entity name+type separator
- M-R01 portal allowlist narrowed + portal_session backstop in proxy
- M-SC02 companies archived partial index
- M-SC04 audit_logs.searchText documented as DB-managed
- M-S01 storage_s3_access_key_encrypted admin field
- M-U01 audit log empty state uses <EmptyState>
- M-U09 invoice delete dialog -> <AlertDialog>
- M-U10 toast.success on ClientForm + InterestForm create/edit
- M-U11 settings-form-card logo preview alt text
- M-U14 mobile topbar title on clients/yachts/interests/berths
- M-U15 Invoices in mobile More-sheet
LOW (6/8):
- L-AU01 severity defaults for security-relevant verbs
- L-AU02 +13 missing actions in admin audit filter
- L-AU03 +7 missing entity types in admin audit filter
- L-AU04 dead listAuditLogs stubbed
- L-D02 CLAUDE.md Owner-wins chain tightened
Bonus — Document detail polish (#67 partial, 3/6 deliverables):
- state-aware action button per signer
- watcher Add UI with display-name resolution
- cleanSignerName cleanup
Prior session work bundled in:
- Documenso v2 webhook + envelope-ID normalization + sequential signing
- SigningProgress UI redesign (avatars, per-signer state, timestamps)
- env->admin settings registry + RegistryDrivenForm + encrypted creds
- Embedded-signing card + Test connection + setup help
- Dev-mode EMAIL_REDIRECT_TO banner
- Pipeline rules admin page
- Sales email config card
- Audit log details Sheet
- EOI tab: Finalising badge, absolute timestamps, sequential indicator
- Notes pipeline_stage_at_creation (migration 0069)
- Documenso numeric ID dual-key webhook (migration 0068)
- Dimensions criterion copy (migration 0067)
Tests: 1374/1374 vitest pass. tsc clean. lint clean.
See docs/AUDIT-FIX-WAVE-2026-05-18.md for the full progress report and
the user-input items still pending.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
398 lines
12 KiB
TypeScript
398 lines
12 KiB
TypeScript
import { randomBytes } from 'node:crypto';
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import { and, desc, eq, count } from 'drizzle-orm';
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import { db } from '@/lib/db';
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import { webhooks, webhookDeliveries } from '@/lib/db/schema/system';
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import { createAuditLog, type AuditMeta } from '@/lib/audit';
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import { encrypt, decrypt } from '@/lib/utils/encryption';
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import { NotFoundError } from '@/lib/errors';
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import { getQueue } from '@/lib/queue';
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import type {
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CreateWebhookInput,
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UpdateWebhookInput,
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ListDeliveriesInput,
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} from '@/lib/validators/webhooks';
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import type { WebhookEvent } from '@/lib/services/webhook-event-map';
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// ─── Types ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
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// ─── Helpers ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
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/** Generates a 32-byte hex secret for signing webhook payloads. */
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function generateSecret(): string {
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return randomBytes(32).toString('hex');
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}
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/**
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* Returns a masked representation of the plaintext secret.
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* Shows the first 5 and last 3 characters: `wh_ab...xyz`
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*/
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function maskSecret(plaintext: string): string {
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if (plaintext.length < 10) return '***';
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return `${plaintext.slice(0, 5)}...${plaintext.slice(-3)}`;
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}
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// ─── Create ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
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export async function createWebhook(
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portId: string,
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userId: string,
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data: CreateWebhookInput,
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meta: AuditMeta,
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) {
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const plaintextSecret = generateSecret();
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const encryptedSecret = encrypt(plaintextSecret);
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const [webhook] = await db
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.insert(webhooks)
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.values({
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portId,
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name: data.name,
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url: data.url,
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secret: encryptedSecret,
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events: data.events,
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isActive: data.isActive,
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createdBy: userId,
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})
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.returning();
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void createAuditLog({
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userId: meta.userId,
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portId,
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action: 'create',
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entityType: 'webhook',
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entityId: webhook!.id,
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newValue: { name: data.name, url: data.url, events: data.events },
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ipAddress: meta.ipAddress,
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userAgent: meta.userAgent,
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});
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// Return with plaintext secret - shown ONCE only on creation
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return {
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...webhook!,
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secret: plaintextSecret,
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secretMasked: maskSecret(plaintextSecret),
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};
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}
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// ─── List ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
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export async function listWebhooks(portId: string) {
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const rows = await db
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.select()
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.from(webhooks)
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.where(eq(webhooks.portId, portId))
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.orderBy(desc(webhooks.createdAt));
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return rows.map((w) => {
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let secretMasked = '***';
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if (w.secret) {
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try {
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const plaintext = decrypt(w.secret);
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secretMasked = maskSecret(plaintext);
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} catch {
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secretMasked = '***';
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}
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}
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return { ...w, secret: undefined, secretMasked };
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});
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}
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// ─── Get Single ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
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export async function getWebhook(portId: string, webhookId: string) {
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// M-MT05: portId in the WHERE so the row never leaves the DB if it
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// belongs to a different tenant — the prior JS-side .portId !== portId
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// check fired AFTER the row was already loaded, which a future timing-
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// or audit-side-channel could exploit.
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const webhook = await db.query.webhooks.findFirst({
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where: and(eq(webhooks.id, webhookId), eq(webhooks.portId, portId)),
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});
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if (!webhook) {
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throw new NotFoundError('Webhook');
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}
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let secretMasked = '***';
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if (webhook.secret) {
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try {
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const plaintext = decrypt(webhook.secret);
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secretMasked = maskSecret(plaintext);
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} catch {
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secretMasked = '***';
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}
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}
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return { ...webhook, secret: undefined, secretMasked };
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}
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// ─── Update ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
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export async function updateWebhook(
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portId: string,
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webhookId: string,
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data: UpdateWebhookInput,
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meta: AuditMeta,
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) {
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// M-MT05: portId in WHERE — same reasoning as getWebhook.
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const existing = await db.query.webhooks.findFirst({
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where: and(eq(webhooks.id, webhookId), eq(webhooks.portId, portId)),
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});
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if (!existing) {
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throw new NotFoundError('Webhook');
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}
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const [updated] = await db
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.update(webhooks)
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.set({ ...data, updatedAt: new Date() })
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.where(and(eq(webhooks.id, webhookId), eq(webhooks.portId, portId)))
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.returning();
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void createAuditLog({
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userId: meta.userId,
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portId,
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action: 'update',
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entityType: 'webhook',
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entityId: webhookId,
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oldValue: {
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name: existing.name,
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url: existing.url,
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events: existing.events,
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isActive: existing.isActive,
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},
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newValue: data as Record<string, unknown>,
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ipAddress: meta.ipAddress,
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userAgent: meta.userAgent,
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});
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return { ...updated!, secret: undefined };
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}
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// ─── Delete ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
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export async function deleteWebhook(portId: string, webhookId: string, meta: AuditMeta) {
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// M-MT05: portId in WHERE — same reasoning as getWebhook.
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const existing = await db.query.webhooks.findFirst({
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where: and(eq(webhooks.id, webhookId), eq(webhooks.portId, portId)),
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});
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if (!existing) {
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throw new NotFoundError('Webhook');
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}
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// CASCADE deletes webhook_deliveries
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await db.delete(webhooks).where(and(eq(webhooks.id, webhookId), eq(webhooks.portId, portId)));
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void createAuditLog({
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userId: meta.userId,
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portId,
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action: 'delete',
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entityType: 'webhook',
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entityId: webhookId,
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oldValue: { name: existing.name, url: existing.url },
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ipAddress: meta.ipAddress,
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userAgent: meta.userAgent,
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});
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}
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// ─── Regenerate Secret ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
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export async function regenerateSecret(portId: string, webhookId: string, meta: AuditMeta) {
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const existing = await db.query.webhooks.findFirst({
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where: eq(webhooks.id, webhookId),
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});
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if (!existing || existing.portId !== portId) {
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throw new NotFoundError('Webhook');
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}
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const plaintextSecret = generateSecret();
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const encryptedSecret = encrypt(plaintextSecret);
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await db
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.update(webhooks)
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.set({ secret: encryptedSecret, updatedAt: new Date() })
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.where(and(eq(webhooks.id, webhookId), eq(webhooks.portId, portId)));
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void createAuditLog({
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userId: meta.userId,
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portId,
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action: 'update',
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entityType: 'webhook',
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entityId: webhookId,
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metadata: { type: 'secret_regenerated' },
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ipAddress: meta.ipAddress,
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userAgent: meta.userAgent,
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severity: 'warning',
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});
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// Return new plaintext secret - shown ONCE
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return {
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webhookId,
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secret: plaintextSecret,
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secretMasked: maskSecret(plaintextSecret),
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};
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}
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// ─── List Deliveries ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
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export async function listDeliveries(
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portId: string,
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webhookId: string,
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query: ListDeliveriesInput,
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) {
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// Verify webhook belongs to port
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const webhook = await db.query.webhooks.findFirst({
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where: eq(webhooks.id, webhookId),
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});
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if (!webhook || webhook.portId !== portId) {
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throw new NotFoundError('Webhook');
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}
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const { page, limit, status } = query;
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const offset = (page - 1) * limit;
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const filters = [eq(webhookDeliveries.webhookId, webhookId)];
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if (status) {
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filters.push(eq(webhookDeliveries.status, status));
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}
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const [countRow] = await db
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.select({ total: count() })
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.from(webhookDeliveries)
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.where(and(...filters));
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const total = countRow?.total ?? 0;
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const data = await db
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.select()
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.from(webhookDeliveries)
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.where(and(...filters))
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.orderBy(desc(webhookDeliveries.createdAt))
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.limit(limit)
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.offset(offset);
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return { data, total };
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}
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// ─── Redeliver a previously failed / dead-letter delivery ───────────────────
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/**
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* Clones a failed or dead-letter delivery into a fresh `pending` row and
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* re-enqueues it. Multi-tenant safe: looks up the source delivery via
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* its webhook → port. Idempotency: each redeliver creates a new row so
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* the original record (and its failure response body) is preserved for
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* audit. The new delivery's payload includes a `retried_from` marker
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* that downstream receivers can use to recognise replays.
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*/
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export async function redeliverWebhookDelivery(
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portId: string,
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webhookId: string,
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deliveryId: string,
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meta: AuditMeta,
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) {
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const webhook = await db.query.webhooks.findFirst({
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where: eq(webhooks.id, webhookId),
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});
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if (!webhook || webhook.portId !== portId) {
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throw new NotFoundError('Webhook');
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}
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if (!webhook.isActive) {
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throw new NotFoundError('Webhook is inactive');
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}
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const [source] = await db
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.select()
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.from(webhookDeliveries)
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.where(and(eq(webhookDeliveries.id, deliveryId), eq(webhookDeliveries.webhookId, webhookId)))
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.limit(1);
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if (!source) throw new NotFoundError('Delivery');
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const replayPayload = {
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...(source.payload as Record<string, unknown>),
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retried_from: deliveryId,
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retried_at: new Date().toISOString(),
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};
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const [next] = await db
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.insert(webhookDeliveries)
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.values({
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webhookId,
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eventType: source.eventType,
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payload: replayPayload,
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status: 'pending',
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})
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.returning();
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const queue = getQueue('webhooks');
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await queue.add(
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'deliver',
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{
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webhookId,
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portId,
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event: source.eventType,
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deliveryId: next!.id,
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payload: replayPayload,
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},
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{ jobId: `deliver:${next!.id}` },
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);
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void createAuditLog({
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userId: meta.userId,
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portId,
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action: 'webhook_retried',
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entityType: 'webhook_delivery',
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entityId: next!.id,
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metadata: { redeliveredFrom: deliveryId, originalStatus: source.status },
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ipAddress: meta.ipAddress,
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userAgent: meta.userAgent,
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});
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return { deliveryId: next!.id, status: 'queued' };
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}
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// ─── Send Test Webhook ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
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export async function sendTestWebhook(portId: string, webhookId: string, eventType: WebhookEvent) {
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const webhook = await db.query.webhooks.findFirst({
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where: eq(webhooks.id, webhookId),
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});
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if (!webhook || webhook.portId !== portId) {
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throw new NotFoundError('Webhook');
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}
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// Create a pending delivery record
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const [delivery] = await db
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.insert(webhookDeliveries)
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.values({
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webhookId,
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eventType,
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payload: {
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test: true,
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event: eventType,
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port_id: portId,
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data: { message: 'This is a test webhook delivery' },
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},
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status: 'pending',
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})
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.returning();
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// Enqueue the job
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const queue = getQueue('webhooks');
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await queue.add(
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'deliver',
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{
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webhookId,
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portId,
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event: eventType,
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deliveryId: delivery!.id,
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payload: delivery!.payload,
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},
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{ jobId: `deliver:${delivery!.id}` },
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);
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return { deliveryId: delivery!.id, status: 'queued' };
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}
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