4c5334d471
Three findings from the branch security review:
1. HIGH — Privilege escalation via super-admin invite. POST
/api/v1/admin/invitations was gated only by manage_users (held by the
port-scoped director role). The body schema accepted isSuperAdmin
from the request, createCrmInvite persisted it verbatim, and
consumeCrmInvite copied it into userProfiles.isSuperAdmin — granting
the new account cross-tenant access. Now the route rejects
isSuperAdmin=true unless ctx.isSuperAdmin, and createCrmInvite
requires invitedBy.isSuperAdmin as defense-in-depth.
2. HIGH — Receipt-image exfiltration via OCR settings. The route
/api/v1/admin/ocr-settings (and the sibling /test) were wrapped only
in withAuth — any port role including viewer could PUT a swapped
provider apiKey + flip aiEnabled, redirecting every subsequent
receipt scan to attacker infrastructure. Both are now wrapped in
withPermission('admin','manage_settings',…) matching the sibling
admin routes (ai-budget, settings).
3. MEDIUM — Cross-tenant alert IDOR. dismissAlert / acknowledgeAlert
issued UPDATE … WHERE id=? with no portId predicate. Any
authenticated user with a foreign alert UUID could mutate it. Both
service functions now require portId and add it to the WHERE; the
route handlers pass ctx.portId.
The dev-trigger-crm-invite script passes a synthetic super-admin caller
identity since it runs out-of-band.
The two public-form tests randomize their IP prefix per run so a fresh
test process doesn't collide with leftover redis sliding-window entries
from a prior run (publicForm limiter pexpires after 1h).
Two new regression test files cover the fixes (6 tests).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
32 lines
1.1 KiB
TypeScript
32 lines
1.1 KiB
TypeScript
import { NextResponse } from 'next/server';
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import { z } from 'zod';
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import { withAuth, withPermission } from '@/lib/api/helpers';
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import { parseBody } from '@/lib/api/route-helpers';
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import { errorResponse } from '@/lib/errors';
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import { OCR_MODELS } from '@/lib/services/ocr-config.service';
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import { testProvider } from '@/lib/services/ocr-providers';
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const schema = z.object({
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provider: z.enum(['openai', 'claude']),
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model: z.string().min(1),
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apiKey: z.string().min(1),
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});
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// `manage_settings`-gated for parity with the parent OCR settings route —
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// triggers outbound AI provider auth requests using a caller-supplied key.
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export const POST = withAuth(
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withPermission('admin', 'manage_settings', async (req) => {
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try {
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const body = await parseBody(req, schema);
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if (!OCR_MODELS[body.provider].includes(body.model)) {
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return NextResponse.json({ error: 'Invalid model' }, { status: 400 });
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}
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const result = await testProvider(body.provider, body.apiKey, body.model);
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return NextResponse.json(result);
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} catch (error) {
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return errorResponse(error);
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}
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}),
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);
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