/**
* Shared HTML shell for transactional emails. Centralises the table-
* based layout + the per-port branding override surface so templates
* don't each inline a different copy of the boilerplate.
*
* Per-port branding (R2-H15):
* - logoUrl — replaces the default Port Nimara logo image
* - primaryColor — used for the page-title accent color
* - emailHeaderHtml / emailFooterHtml — admin-authored HTML that
* appears above / below the body content (e.g. legal footer,
* custom marketing strip). When unset, the existing minimal
* "Thank you, {{portName}} CRM" sign-off is rendered by callers.
*
* Senders resolve a `BrandingShell` via `resolveBrandingShell(portId)`
* (or pass `null` for no override) and forward it to the template
* function. Templates call `renderShell({ title, body, branding })`.
*/
const DEFAULT_LOGO_URL =
'https://s3.portnimara.com/images/Port%20Nimara%20New%20Logo-Circular%20Frame_250px.png';
const DEFAULT_BACKGROUND_URL = 'https://s3.portnimara.com/images/Overhead_1_blur.png';
const DEFAULT_PRIMARY_COLOR = '#0F4C81';
export interface BrandingShell {
logoUrl: string | null;
primaryColor: string | null;
emailHeaderHtml: string | null;
emailFooterHtml: string | null;
}
interface ShellOpts {
title: string;
body: string;
branding?: BrandingShell | null;
}
export function renderShell({ title, body, branding }: ShellOpts): string {
const logoUrl = branding?.logoUrl ?? DEFAULT_LOGO_URL;
const headerHtml = branding?.emailHeaderHtml ?? '';
const footerHtml = branding?.emailFooterHtml ?? '';
return `
${title}
${headerHtml ? `
${headerHtml}
` : ''}
${body}
${footerHtml ? `
${footerHtml}
` : ''}
`;
}
/** Surface the brand primary color to template bodies. */
export function brandingPrimaryColor(branding?: BrandingShell | null): string {
return branding?.primaryColor ?? DEFAULT_PRIMARY_COLOR;
}
/**
* URL-safe escaper for `href="..."` interpolations inside email
* templates. The email-deliverability audit flagged that every template
* inlined `${data.link}` directly into href + visible text without
* escaping — a `"` (or worse, a `javascript:` scheme) would break out
* of the attribute or trigger an XSS when the recipient opens the email
* in a webmail client that runs scripts.
*
* Two-step defense:
* 1. Scheme allow-list — only http(s), mailto, tel survive; everything
* else (javascript:, data:, vbscript:, file:, …) is rewritten to
* `about:blank`.
* 2. HTML-attribute escape on `"`, `<`, `>`, `&`, `'`, backtick.
*/
export function safeUrl(url: string | null | undefined): string {
if (!url) return 'about:blank';
const trimmed = String(url).trim();
// Block dangerous schemes. The allow-list is intentionally short.
const lower = trimmed.toLowerCase();
const ok =
lower.startsWith('http://') ||
lower.startsWith('https://') ||
lower.startsWith('mailto:') ||
lower.startsWith('tel:') ||
// Relative or root-relative paths are also acceptable — they
// resolve against the host the email links to (rare in transactional
// mail but used by tracking pixels and unsubscribe headers).
lower.startsWith('/') ||
lower.startsWith('#');
if (!ok) return 'about:blank';
return trimmed
.replace(/&/g, '&')
.replace(/"/g, '"')
.replace(/'/g, ''')
.replace(//g, '>')
.replace(/`/g, '`');
}