Replaces every em-dash and en-dash with regular ASCII hyphens
across comments, JSX strings, and dev-facing logs. Mostly cosmetic
but stops the inconsistent mix that crept in over the last few
months (some files used em-dashes in comments, others didn't,
some used both).
Bundles two small dashboard-layout tweaks that touch a couple of
already-modified files:
- (dashboard)/layout.tsx main padding goes from p-6 to pt-3 px-6
pb-6 so page content sits closer to the topbar.
- Sidebar now receives the ports list it needs for the footer
port switcher.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
1. HIGH — Socket.IO accepted client-supplied `auth.portId` in the
handshake without verifying the user actually held a role in that
port, then unconditionally joined the socket to `port:${portId}`.
The `join:entity` handler also skipped authorization. This let any
authenticated CRM user receive realtime events from any other
tenant: invoice numbers + totals + client names, document signer
emails, registration events with full client name + berth, file
uploads, etc. Auth middleware now resolves the user's
userPortRoles (or isSuperAdmin) before honouring portId, and
join:entity verifies the entity's port matches a port the user
has access to. Pre-existing pre-branch issue but fixed here given
the explicit "all data is extremely sensitive" directive.
2. MEDIUM — listCrmInvites issued a global SELECT with no port
scope. The crm_user_invites table has no portId column (invites
mint global better-auth users, then port roles are assigned
later). The previous gating on per-port admin.manage_users let
any director enumerate every other tenant's pending invitee
emails + isSuperAdmin flags — a phishing target list and a
super-admin onboarding timing oracle. Restrict GET (list),
DELETE (revoke), and POST resend to ctx.isSuperAdmin.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Three findings from the branch security review:
1. HIGH — Privilege escalation via super-admin invite. POST
/api/v1/admin/invitations was gated only by manage_users (held by the
port-scoped director role). The body schema accepted isSuperAdmin
from the request, createCrmInvite persisted it verbatim, and
consumeCrmInvite copied it into userProfiles.isSuperAdmin — granting
the new account cross-tenant access. Now the route rejects
isSuperAdmin=true unless ctx.isSuperAdmin, and createCrmInvite
requires invitedBy.isSuperAdmin as defense-in-depth.
2. HIGH — Receipt-image exfiltration via OCR settings. The route
/api/v1/admin/ocr-settings (and the sibling /test) were wrapped only
in withAuth — any port role including viewer could PUT a swapped
provider apiKey + flip aiEnabled, redirecting every subsequent
receipt scan to attacker infrastructure. Both are now wrapped in
withPermission('admin','manage_settings',…) matching the sibling
admin routes (ai-budget, settings).
3. MEDIUM — Cross-tenant alert IDOR. dismissAlert / acknowledgeAlert
issued UPDATE … WHERE id=? with no portId predicate. Any
authenticated user with a foreign alert UUID could mutate it. Both
service functions now require portId and add it to the WHERE; the
route handlers pass ctx.portId.
The dev-trigger-crm-invite script passes a synthetic super-admin caller
identity since it runs out-of-band.
The two public-form tests randomize their IP prefix per run so a fresh
test process doesn't collide with leftover redis sliding-window entries
from a prior run (publicForm limiter pexpires after 1h).
Two new regression test files cover the fixes (6 tests).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
