Three findings from the branch security review:
1. HIGH — Privilege escalation via super-admin invite. POST
/api/v1/admin/invitations was gated only by manage_users (held by the
port-scoped director role). The body schema accepted isSuperAdmin
from the request, createCrmInvite persisted it verbatim, and
consumeCrmInvite copied it into userProfiles.isSuperAdmin — granting
the new account cross-tenant access. Now the route rejects
isSuperAdmin=true unless ctx.isSuperAdmin, and createCrmInvite
requires invitedBy.isSuperAdmin as defense-in-depth.
2. HIGH — Receipt-image exfiltration via OCR settings. The route
/api/v1/admin/ocr-settings (and the sibling /test) were wrapped only
in withAuth — any port role including viewer could PUT a swapped
provider apiKey + flip aiEnabled, redirecting every subsequent
receipt scan to attacker infrastructure. Both are now wrapped in
withPermission('admin','manage_settings',…) matching the sibling
admin routes (ai-budget, settings).
3. MEDIUM — Cross-tenant alert IDOR. dismissAlert / acknowledgeAlert
issued UPDATE … WHERE id=? with no portId predicate. Any
authenticated user with a foreign alert UUID could mutate it. Both
service functions now require portId and add it to the WHERE; the
route handlers pass ctx.portId.
The dev-trigger-crm-invite script passes a synthetic super-admin caller
identity since it runs out-of-band.
The two public-form tests randomize their IP prefix per run so a fresh
test process doesn't collide with leftover redis sliding-window entries
from a prior run (publicForm limiter pexpires after 1h).
Two new regression test files cover the fixes (6 tests).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
