Audit cleanup completion plan, all tiers shipped:
Tier 1 (security + data integrity)
- A.7 RTBF true wipe: redact email_messages body/subject/addresses for
threads owned by deleted client; redact document_sends.recipient_email;
collect file storage keys + delete blobs post-commit.
- A.8 user_permission_overrides FK: documented inline why cascade is
correct (not set-null as audit suggested) — overrides have no value
without their user.
- W2.14 PII redaction: camelCase normalization in audit.ts +
error-events.service.ts isSensitiveKey; added city/postal/country/
birth fragments. firstName/lastName/dateOfBirth/postalCode etc. now
caught in BOTH masker paths. 12 new test cases lock the coverage.
Tier 2 (Documenso completion + refactor)
- C.2: documentEvents.recipient_email column + partial unique index for
per-recipient webhook dedup (migration 0075). handleDocumentSigned
now sets recipient_email on insert.
- Phase 2: completion_cc_emails distribution. handleDocumentCompleted
reads documents.completionCcEmails, filters out signer-duplicates
case-insensitively, fans signed PDF out to non-signer recipients.
- C.4: extracted createPublicInterest() service from the 346-line
api/public/interests route. Route becomes a thin shell (rate-limit,
port resolution, audit log, email fan-out). The trio creation logic
is now unit-testable without an HTTP fixture.
- Phase 4: POST /api/v1/document-templates/[id]/detect-fields wired
to document-field-detector.detectFields(). Sparkles "Auto-detect"
button added to template-editor.tsx — maps DetectedField → marker
with best-guess merge token (DATE / NAME / EMAIL); user retags.
Tier 3 (reporting + recommender snapshot lockfiles)
- W7.reports: extracted rollupStageRevenue / rollupStageCounts /
computeTotalForecast / computeOccupancyRate / rollupBerthStatusCounts
into src/lib/services/report-math.ts (pure functions). 16 new tests
including an inline-snapshot lockfile on a representative 7-stage
forecast. report-generators.ts now delegates.
- W7.recommender: 18 new toMatchSnapshot tripwires on classifyTier
boundaries + computeHeat at canonical input points.
Tier 4 (rolling)
- W6.attach: fixed outdated CLAUDE.md claim — threshold banner is
informational and never depended on IMAP; bounce monitoring (the
IMAP poller) is separate.
- D.1 + D.2: documented deferral inline with full why-not-build-it
reasoning so a future engineer sees the rationale.
- G.1: representative formatDate sweep (audit-log-list, user-list,
document-templates merge tokens, document-signing email). Rest of
the ~100 sites stay rolling.
Quality gates: 1420/1420 vitest (46 new tests above baseline of 1374),
tsc clean, 0 lint errors.
Plan: docs/superpowers/plans/2026-05-18-audit-cleanup-completion.md
Migration: 0075_c2_document_events_recipient_email.sql (applied to dev DB).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Swap the one outlier (client-interests-tab.tsx) from Vaul Drawer to
Sheet side=right so every detail-preview surface uses the same
primitive. Document the doctrine: Sheet for side panels on both desktop
and mobile; Vaul Drawer reserved for mobile-only bottom-sheet UX
(currently just MoreSheet).
Closes ui/ux M11.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
R2-H6: webhook-delivery-log Replay column was rendered for any user
who could load the page; the route gates on admin.manage_webhooks.
Now the entire Replay column is hidden when the user lacks the perm.
R2-H7: Bulk Archive action was visible to sales_agent + viewer
(clients.delete:false). Now wrapped in canBulkArchive (clients.delete).
R2-H8: Bulk Add tag / Remove tag were visible to viewer (clients.edit:
false). Now wrapped in canBulkTag (clients.edit).
R2-H9: bulk-hard-delete silently dropped clients that became
unarchived between preflight and execute. The service now returns
{deletedCount, skipped[]} and the dialog stays open on partial
success showing the per-row reason table — operators can see exactly
which IDs were skipped and why.
R2-M9: bulk-archive-preflight catch block was leaking dossier-loader
error messages, letting an attacker enumerate "not found" vs "exists
in another port". Replaced with a generic 'Could not load dossier —
client may have been removed' blocker.
1175/1175 vitest passing.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
H1: hard-delete-request and bulk-hard-delete-request endpoints had no
rate limit; an admin's compromised account could email-bomb the
operator's inbox or use the endpoints as a client-id oracle. Added a
new `hardDeleteCode` limiter (5 per hour per user).
H3: hard-delete error messages distinguished "no code requested" from
"wrong code", letting an attacker brute-force the 4-digit space with
~5k attempts (vs the full 10k). Both single + bulk paths now return
the same 'Invalid or expired confirmation code' message.
H5: invalid Documenso webhook secret submissions are now rate-limited
per-IP (10 per 15min) and only audit-logged inside the cap, so a slow
enumeration can't fill the audit log silently. Real Documenso traffic
won't fail the secret check, so any traffic beyond the cap is
brute-force.
1175/1175 vitest passing.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Permanent client deletion is now reachable from:
- archived single-client detail page (icon button, gated by new
admin.permanently_delete_clients perm)
- archived clients list bulk action
Both flows are 2-stage: request a 4-digit code (sent to operator's
account email, 10min Redis TTL), then enter both code AND a typed
confirmation (client name single, "DELETE N CLIENTS" bulk). Cascade
strategy preserves audit trails: signed documents, email threads,
files and reminders are detached but retained; addresses, contacts,
notes, portal user, GDPR records, interests and reservations are
deleted via FK cascade or explicit tx delete.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
