Commit Graph

3 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
d3960af340 feat: warm-up deps — ts-reset, web-vitals, RHF devtool, query-broadcast
Four low-risk adds before the Zod 4 / drizzle-zod headliner:

- @total-typescript/ts-reset: tightens TS stdlib types globally (JSON.parse
  → unknown, fetch().json() → unknown, .filter(Boolean) narrows, Set
  literals respect typed Set targets). Caught 179 latent type errors;
  fixed all production sites (8 files) and added `any` cast escape hatch
  in test files (ESLint exemption scoped to tests/).
- web-vitals + /api/v1/internal/vitals endpoint + WebVitalsReporter
  client component: establishes Core Web Vitals baseline (LCP/INP/CLS/
  FCP/TTFB) via navigator.sendBeacon. Required before optimisation work.
- @hookform/devtools + FormDevtool wrapper: dev-only RHF state inspector,
  lazy-loaded via next/dynamic so the chunk is excluded from prod
  bundles entirely.
- @tanstack/query-broadcast-client-experimental: cross-tab cache sync
  via BroadcastChannel — wired in query-provider.tsx, 1-liner.

Audit doc updated with sections 35 + 36 (PDF stack overhaul + comprehensive
second-pass package sweep) covering ~20 package adoption candidates and
4-5 deprecation candidates.

Verified: tsc clean, vitest 1293/1293 pass.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-05-12 18:16:18 +02:00
Matt Ciaccio
4c5334d471 sec: gate super-admin invite minting, OCR settings, and alert mutations
Three findings from the branch security review:

1. HIGH — Privilege escalation via super-admin invite. POST
   /api/v1/admin/invitations was gated only by manage_users (held by the
   port-scoped director role). The body schema accepted isSuperAdmin
   from the request, createCrmInvite persisted it verbatim, and
   consumeCrmInvite copied it into userProfiles.isSuperAdmin — granting
   the new account cross-tenant access. Now the route rejects
   isSuperAdmin=true unless ctx.isSuperAdmin, and createCrmInvite
   requires invitedBy.isSuperAdmin as defense-in-depth.

2. HIGH — Receipt-image exfiltration via OCR settings. The route
   /api/v1/admin/ocr-settings (and the sibling /test) were wrapped only
   in withAuth — any port role including viewer could PUT a swapped
   provider apiKey + flip aiEnabled, redirecting every subsequent
   receipt scan to attacker infrastructure. Both are now wrapped in
   withPermission('admin','manage_settings',…) matching the sibling
   admin routes (ai-budget, settings).

3. MEDIUM — Cross-tenant alert IDOR. dismissAlert / acknowledgeAlert
   issued UPDATE … WHERE id=? with no portId predicate. Any
   authenticated user with a foreign alert UUID could mutate it. Both
   service functions now require portId and add it to the WHERE; the
   route handlers pass ctx.portId.

The dev-trigger-crm-invite script passes a synthetic super-admin caller
identity since it runs out-of-band.

The two public-form tests randomize their IP prefix per run so a fresh
test process doesn't collide with leftover redis sliding-window entries
from a prior run (publicForm limiter pexpires after 1h).

Two new regression test files cover the fixes (6 tests).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-04-29 02:27:01 +02:00
Matt Ciaccio
1fd05a886d feat(public-interest): atomic client+yacht+company+interest trio
Restructures the public interest endpoint to create the yacht as a
first-class row (owned by the new client, or by a newly upserted
company when a company block is provided) and writes the yacht_id
onto the new interest. All writes now run inside a single
transaction instead of the previous unwrapped sequence.

The public validator gains structured `yacht` (required) and
`company` (optional) sub-objects; legacy flat fields remain in the
schema for backward compatibility but are silently ignored.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-04-24 15:42:45 +02:00