Bundles the prior autonomous-session output that was sitting unstaged:
- Em-dash sweep across src/ + tests/ (en-dash/em-dash to hyphen, ~2280 instances)
- country-flag-icons rollout (CountryFlag component, replaces emoji glyphs that
never rendered on Windows; lazy-loads the 3x2 SVG index as a single chunk
after the per-subpath dynamic-import approach silently failed in webpack)
- Admin IA Phase 1+2: 7-domain regroup, 41 to 38 pages, /admin/berths index,
redirects (ocr to ai, reports to dashboard, invitations to users),
docs/admin-ia-proposal.md
- Per-template email tester (registry + endpoint + UI on Email admin page)
- Cancel-document mode picker (delete-from-Documenso vs keep-for-audit)
- Dashboard PDF report: 25 widgets, SVG charts, date-range picker, 11 resolvers
- Customize-widgets per-region sortables at xl+ (charts/rails/feed); single
flat sortable below xl when the layout stacks; per-viewport saved orders
- Audit doc updates capturing each shipped item
- Lint fixes: react-compiler immutability in DonutChart (reduce instead of
let-reassign), set-state-in-effect disables in CountryFlag and
UploadForSigning preview-bytes effect, unused 'confirm' destructures in
interest contract + reservation tabs, unescaped apostrophe in test-template
card copy
The /set-password page is the landing target for two unrelated email
flows:
1. CRM admin invite → `crm_user_invites` row, consumed via
`consumeCrmInvite` (creates the better-auth user + profile).
2. Forgot-password → better-auth verification row, consumed via
`auth.api.resetPassword` (rotates the password on an existing
user).
The endpoint previously only handled (1). A user clicking a
reset-password link landed on the same page but hit a token-not-found
error because their token isn't in the invite table.
Try the invite path first (the historical behaviour); on NotFoundError
fall through to better-auth's resetPassword. Both stores rejecting
returns a single unified `INVITE_OR_RESET_INVALID` error matching the
page's existing error-rendering shape.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Three related cleanups while QA-testing on iPad:
1. Origin-forwarding bug on /api/auth/sign-in-by-identifier
- The custom identifier-sign-in route forwarded to better-auth's
/sign-in/email handler but did NOT preserve the inbound Origin +
Referer headers. Better-auth's CSRF check then 403'd every login
with MISSING_OR_NULL_ORIGIN — and the UI showed a generic
"Invalid credentials" toast even when the password was right.
- Fix: pass through req.headers.get('origin') and
req.headers.get('referer') when constructing forwardReq.
- Affects: every login attempt from any device (this isn't dev-
only); discovered testing from 192.168.1.17 → app on the same
LAN IP. Production users hit the same path.
2. Dark mode disabled
- Drop the Sun/Moon toggle from user-menu, the documentElement
class flip, darkMode from ui-store, darkMode from the user-
preferences validator. Hardcode sonner theme="light" (was
reading next-themes which isn't actually wired anywhere else).
- The 10 stray `dark:` Tailwind utilities are left alone — they're
inactive without the `dark` class on <html> so they don't ship
anything that renders, just dead CSS.
3. Center dialog animation
- Dialog content was sliding in from the top-right corner (slide-
in-from-left-1/2 + slide-in-from-top-[48%]) which felt jarring.
Drop the slide directions, keep just zoom-in-95 + the base
fade-in/out so dialogs appear in place with a subtle scale-up.
4. Login placeholder
- Removed the "you@example.com or yourname" placeholder so the
field reads as a clean empty input below the "Email or username"
label.
No tests added (the 1340 vitest suite passes); changes are surface-
level UI tweaks + the origin-header fix where a unit-test of the
custom route would mostly be testing better-auth's behaviour.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Address the CRITICAL + high-leverage HIGH items from the types-auditor:
**C1 — `tx: any` in client-restore.service**
Export a canonical `Tx` type from `lib/db/utils.ts` (derived from
Drizzle's `db.transaction` callback shape) and use it in
`applyReversal` so the 12+ downstream tx writes get full inference.
**C2 — berth-detail page stacked `useQuery<any>` escape hatches**
Export `BerthDetailData` from berth-detail-header and consume it
through useQuery + apiFetch. Removed three `any` escapes in the
highest-traffic detail page. Also collapsed the duplicate `BerthData`
in berth-tabs.tsx to import from berth-detail-header so the two
types can't drift.
**C3 — parseBody migration for portal/public routes**
Replace raw `await req.json() + schema.parse(body)` with the
project-standard `parseBody(req, schema)` helper across 7 routes:
- portal/auth/{change-password, activate, reset-password}
- auth/set-password
- public/{interests, residential-inquiries}
Skipped the three anti-enumeration routes (forgot-password, sign-in,
sign-in-by-identifier) where the manual validation gives opaque
errors on purpose. website-inquiries already wraps the parse in a
custom 400 — left as-is.
**HIGH #5 — `toAuditJson<T>` helper (21 → 0 inline casts)**
Introduce `toAuditJson<T extends object>(row: T): Record<string,
unknown>` in lib/audit.ts (mirrors gdpr-bundle-builder's `toJsonRow`
that already exists for the same reason). Codemod 21 `<row> as unknown
as Record<string, unknown>` sites across:
- invoices.ts × 6
- expenses.ts × 6
- berths.service × 2
- documents.service × 2
- ocr-config.service × 2
- ai-budget.service × 2
- yachts.service, companies.service, company-memberships.service × 1 each
document-templates' `payload as unknown as Record<...>` is a different
shape (Documenso form-values widening, not an audit log) — kept the
manual cast there. Tests stay 1315/1315.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Swap the one outlier (client-interests-tab.tsx) from Vaul Drawer to
Sheet side=right so every detail-preview surface uses the same
primitive. Document the doctrine: Sheet for side panels on both desktop
and mobile; Vaul Drawer reserved for mobile-only bottom-sheet UX
(currently just MoreSheet).
Closes ui/ux M11.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Resolved 65 type errors across the codebase via these v4 migration
patterns:
- `ZodError.errors` renamed to `ZodError.issues` (4 call sites in auth
routes + central error handler).
- `z.record(value)` now requires explicit key type: `z.record(z.string(),
value)`. Updated 7 sites across templates / forms / saved-views /
website-inquiries.
- `.refine(check, msgFn)` second-arg shape changed — now requires an
`{ error: (issue) => ... }` object form. Updated
`mergeFieldsSchema` in document-templates validator.
- `.transform(...).default(...)` chains: v4 enforces default value type
matches transform OUTPUT. Reordered to `.default(...).transform(...)`
in list-query / company-memberships handlers.
- `z.coerce.*()` INPUT type widened to `unknown` in v4. Service signatures
using `z.input<typeof schema>` (kept for caller flexibility around
defaults) now re-parse via `schema.parse(data)` to recover the
post-coercion shape Drizzle needs. Done in berth-reservations service.
Invoice service narrows `lineItems` locally with a typed cast since
re-parsing would double-validate.
- `.optional().transform(...)` no longer propagates the optional marker
through v4's new ZodPipe. Moved `.optional()` to the END of chain in
`optionalDesiredDimSchema` (interests) and documents list query
(folderId, signatureOnly).
- ZodIssue subtype shapes simplified: `received` removed from
invalid_type, `type` renamed to `origin` on too_small. Test fixtures
updated.
- @hookform/resolvers v5 splits Resolver into 3-generic form (Input,
Context, Output). useForm calls in 6 forms (client, yacht, berth,
interest, expense, invoices-new-page) now pass explicit generics:
`useForm<z.input<typeof schema>, unknown, z.infer<typeof schema>>`.
Verified: tsc clean (0 errors), vitest 1293/1293 pass.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Tier 0.2: src/lib/env.ts now refuses boot when NODE_ENV=production AND
EMAIL_REDIRECT_TO is set. Sendmail logs the rewrite at warn (was debug)
so dev/staging windows where someone forgets to unset are immediately
visible.
Tier 0.6: backup_jobs.storage_path added to TABLES_WITH_STORAGE_KEYS in
src/lib/storage/migrate.ts. Flipping the storage backend used to
silently orphan every pg_dump artefact — last-resort recovery path is
now actually portable.
Tier 1.7: createAuditLog now runs metadata through maskSensitiveFields
(was only applied to old/new value diffs). Portal-auth, crm-invite,
hard-delete and email-accounts services were writing raw emails into
this column unbounded.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
L3: failed-login audit's entityId could carry an unbounded
attempted-email value (the form lets you type anything). Truncate
to 256 chars before using as entityId; full original still in
metadata for forensic context.
L2: seed-data.ts (the realistic fixture) inserted interests with
berthId — that column was dropped in migration 0029 and the realistic
seed would fail at insert on a fresh DB. Now inserts via the
interestBerths junction (mirrors the synthetic seed's pattern).
L1 (no-op): next-in-line notification already gets the 5-min
cooldownMs default from createNotification, so retries are
idempotent without extra code. Verified.
L5 (no-op): import worker comment already explains the stub state
adequately; no code change.
1175/1175 vitest passing.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Audit log was previously silent on authentication and on background
work. This wires:
- Login (success + failed) and logout via a wrapper around better-auth's
[...all] handler. Failed logins are severity 'warning' and carry the
attempted email so brute-force attempts surface in the inspector.
- New severity (info|warning|error|critical) and source (user|auth|
system|webhook|cron|job) columns on audit_logs. permission_denied
defaults to 'warning', hard_delete to 'critical'.
- Webhook delivery success/failure/DLQ/retry now write audit rows
alongside the webhook_deliveries detail table.
- IP address is now visible as a column in the inspector (was already
captured at the helper level).
- Audit UI: severity badges per row, severity + source dropdowns, IP
column, expanded action filter covering hard-delete, webhook events,
job/cron events.
Migration 0044 adds the two columns + their port-scoped indexes.
1175/1175 vitest passing.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Final audit polish — closes the remaining LOW + MED items the previous
tiers didn't reach:
* Validation hardening: me.preferences uses .strict() + 8KB cap
instead of unbounded .passthrough(); files.uploadFile gains
magic-byte verification (jpeg/png/gif/webp/pdf/doc/xlsx); OCR scan
endpoint enforces 10MB cap + magic-byte check on receipt images;
port logoUrl + me.avatarUrl reject javascript:/data: schemes via
a shared httpUrl refinement.
* Permission gates: document-sends/{brochure,berth-pdf} now require
email.send (was withAuth-only); document-sends/{preview,list} on
email.view; ai/email-draft on email.send; documents/[id]/send
uses send_for_signing (was create); expenses/export/parent-company
flips from hard isSuperAdmin to expenses.export for parity;
admin/users/options gated on reminders.assign_others (was withAuth).
* Envelope hygiene: auth/set-password switches the third {message}
variant to errorResponse + {data: {email}}; ai/email-draft wraps
jobId in {data: {jobId}}.
* UI polish: reports-list.handleDownload surfaces failures via
toastError (was console-only).
* Ops/infra: pin pnpm@10.33.2 across all three Dockerfiles +
packageManager field in package.json; Dockerfile.worker re-orders
user creation BEFORE pnpm install so node_modules / .cache dirs
are worker-owned (fixes tesseract.js + sharp EACCES at first PDF
parse); add Redis-ping HEALTHCHECK to the worker container.
* Public health endpoint: returns full env+appUrl payload only when
the caller presents X-Intake-Secret, otherwise a minimal {status}
so generic uptime monitors still work but anonymous internet
doesn't get deployment fingerprints.
* Per-port Documenso webhook secret: new system_settings key
+ listDocumensoWebhookSecrets() helper. The webhook receiver
iterates every configured per-port secret with timing-safe
comparison + falls back to env, then forwards the resolved portId
into handleDocumentExpired so two ports sharing a documensoId
cannot cross-mutate.
Deferred (handled in dedicated follow-up PRs):
* Tier 5.1 — direct service tests for portal-auth / users /
email-accounts / document-sends / sales-email-config. MED, large
test-writing scope.
* The {ok: true} → {data: null} envelope migration across
alerts/expenses/admin-ocr-settings/storage routes. Mechanical but
needs coordinated client + test updates.
* CSP-nonce migration (drop unsafe-inline) — needs middleware-level
nonce generation that the Next 15 router has to thread through.
* Idempotency-Key header on Documenso createDocument. Requires
schema column on documents to persist the key; deferred so it
doesn't bundle a migration into this commit.
* The 16 better-auth user_id FKs — separate dedicated migration
with care (some columns are NOT NULL today and cascade decisions
matter).
* PermissionGate / Skeleton / EmptyState wraps across 5 admin lists
(auditor-H §§36–37) and the residential-clients filter bar.
Test status: 1175/1175 vitest, tsc clean.
Refs: docs/audit-comprehensive-2026-05-05.md MED §§28,29,30 + LOW §§32–43
+ HIGH §9 (Documenso secrets follow-up).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Closes the five highest-risk findings from
docs/audit-comprehensive-2026-05-05.md so the platform is not exposed
while the rest of the audit backlog (1 CRIT + 18 HIGH + 32 MED + 23 LOW)
is worked through:
* CVE-2025-29927 — bump next 15.1.0 → 15.2.9; nginx strips
X-Middleware-Subrequest at the edge as defense-in-depth.
* Cross-tenant role escalation — POST/PATCH/DELETE on /admin/roles now
require super-admin (was: any holder of admin.manage_users). Adds
shared `requireSuperAdmin(ctx)` helper.
* Silent-403 traps — `documents.edit` and `files.edit` keys added to
RolePermissions; seeded role values updated; migration 0041 backfills
the new keys on every existing roles+port_role_overrides JSONB. File
routes remap the dead `create` action to `upload` / `manage_folders`.
* Berth-PDF / brochure register endpoints — reject body.storageKey
unless it matches the namespace the matching presign endpoint issued
(prevents repointing a tenant's PDF at foreign-port bytes).
* Portal auth rate limits — sign-in 5/15min/(ip,email),
forgot-password 3/hr/IP, activate/reset/set-password 10/hr/IP. Adds
`enforcePublicRateLimit()` for non-`withAuth` routes.
Test status unchanged: 1168/1168 vitest, tsc clean.
Refs: docs/audit-comprehensive-2026-05-05.md (CRITICAL, HIGH §§1–4)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
