feat(platform): residential module + admin UI + reliability fixes
All checks were successful
Build & Push Docker Images / lint (pull_request) Successful in 1m2s
Build & Push Docker Images / build-and-push (pull_request) Has been skipped

Residential platform
- New schema: residentialClients, residentialInterests (separate from
  marina/yacht clients) with migration 0010
- Service layer with CRUD + audit + sockets + per-port portal toggle
- v1 + public API routes (/api/v1/residential/*, /api/public/residential-inquiries)
- List + detail pages with inline editing for clients and interests
- Per-user residentialAccess toggle on userPortRoles (migration 0011)
- Permission keys: residential_clients, residential_interests
- Sidebar nav + role form integration
- Smoke spec covering page loads, UI create flow, public endpoint

Admin & shared UI
- Admin → Forms (form templates CRUD) with validators + service
- Notification preferences page (in-app + email per type)
- Email composition + accounts list + threads view
- Branded auth shell shared across CRM + portal auth surfaces
- Inline editing extended to yacht/company/interest detail pages
- InlineTagEditor + per-entity tags endpoints (yachts, companies)
- Notes service polymorphic across clients/interests/yachts/companies
- Client list columns: yachtCount + companyCount badges
- Reservation file-download via presigned URL (replaces stale <a href>)

Route handler refactor
- Extracted yachts/companies/berths reservation handlers to sibling
  handlers.ts files (Next.js 15 route.ts only allows specific exports)

Reliability fixes
- apiFetch double-stringify bug fixed across 13 components
  (apiFetch already JSON.stringifies its body; passing a stringified
  body produced double-encoded JSON which failed zod validation)
- SocketProvider gated behind useSyncExternalStore-based mount check
  to avoid useSession() SSR crashes under React 19 + Next 15
- apiFetch falls back to URL-pathname → port-id resolution when the
  Zustand store hasn't hydrated yet (fresh contexts, e2e tests)
- CRM invite flow (schema, service, route, email, dev script)
- Dashboard route → [portSlug]/dashboard/page.tsx + redirect
- Document the dev-server restart-after-migration gotcha in CLAUDE.md

Tests
- 5-case residential smoke spec
- Integration test updates for new service signatures

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
This commit is contained in:
Matt Ciaccio
2026-04-27 21:54:32 +02:00
parent fac8021156
commit e8d61c91c4
121 changed files with 34105 additions and 1016 deletions

View File

@@ -4,6 +4,7 @@ import { db } from '@/lib/db';
import { clients } from '@/lib/db/schema/clients';
import { ports } from '@/lib/db/schema/ports';
import { portalAuthTokens, portalUsers } from '@/lib/db/schema/portal';
import { systemSettings } from '@/lib/db/schema/system';
import { env } from '@/lib/env';
import { sendEmail } from '@/lib/email';
import { activationEmail, resetEmail } from '@/lib/email/templates/portal-auth';
@@ -15,6 +16,19 @@ import { hashPassword, hashToken, mintToken, verifyPassword } from '@/lib/portal
const ACTIVATION_TOKEN_TTL_HOURS = 72;
const RESET_TOKEN_TTL_MINUTES = 30;
const MIN_PASSWORD_LENGTH = 9;
const PORTAL_ENABLED_KEY = 'client_portal_enabled';
/**
* Per-port toggle for the client portal feature. Default-on so existing
* deployments behave the way they did before this setting existed.
*/
export async function isPortalEnabledForPort(portId: string): Promise<boolean> {
const row = await db.query.systemSettings.findFirst({
where: and(eq(systemSettings.key, PORTAL_ENABLED_KEY), eq(systemSettings.portId, portId)),
});
if (!row) return true;
return row.value === true || row.value === 'true';
}
// ─── Admin-side: invite a client to the portal ───────────────────────────────
@@ -32,6 +46,10 @@ export async function createPortalUser(args: {
});
if (!client) throw new NotFoundError('Client');
if (!(await isPortalEnabledForPort(args.portId))) {
throw new ConflictError('Client portal is disabled for this port');
}
// Email uniqueness check is enforced at the DB level too, but we do a
// friendlier preflight so the admin sees a clear conflict error.
const existing = await db.query.portalUsers.findFirst({
@@ -96,6 +114,9 @@ async function issueActivationToken(
}
export async function resendActivation(portalUserId: string, portId: string): Promise<void> {
if (!(await isPortalEnabledForPort(portId))) {
throw new ConflictError('Client portal is disabled for this port');
}
const user = await db.query.portalUsers.findFirst({
where: and(eq(portalUsers.id, portalUserId), eq(portalUsers.portId, portId)),
});
@@ -113,6 +134,13 @@ export async function activateAccount(rawToken: string, password: string): Promi
throw new ValidationError(`Password must be at least ${MIN_PASSWORD_LENGTH} characters`);
}
const tokenRow = await consumeToken(rawToken, 'activation');
const portalUser = await db.query.portalUsers.findFirst({
where: eq(portalUsers.id, tokenRow.portalUserId),
});
if (!portalUser) throw new ValidationError('Invalid or expired token');
if (!(await isPortalEnabledForPort(portalUser.portId))) {
throw new ValidationError('Client portal is disabled for this port');
}
const passwordHash = await hashPassword(password);
await db
.update(portalUsers)
@@ -147,6 +175,13 @@ export async function signIn(args: {
throw new UnauthorizedError('Invalid email or password');
}
// Disabled-port check happens AFTER the credential check so that a wrong
// password on a disabled-port account still surfaces "invalid email or
// password" — we never leak which ports have the portal turned off.
if (!(await isPortalEnabledForPort(user.portId))) {
throw new UnauthorizedError('Invalid email or password');
}
const token = await createPortalToken({
clientId: user.clientId,
portId: user.portId,
@@ -174,6 +209,13 @@ export async function requestPasswordReset(email: string): Promise<void> {
return;
}
// Same silent no-op when the port has the portal disabled — keeps the
// disabled-state from leaking through the public reset endpoint.
if (!(await isPortalEnabledForPort(user.portId))) {
logger.debug({ portId: user.portId }, 'Password reset on disabled-portal port');
return;
}
const { raw, hash } = mintToken();
const expiresAt = new Date(Date.now() + RESET_TOKEN_TTL_MINUTES * 60 * 1000);
@@ -206,6 +248,13 @@ export async function resetPassword(rawToken: string, password: string): Promise
throw new ValidationError(`Password must be at least ${MIN_PASSWORD_LENGTH} characters`);
}
const tokenRow = await consumeToken(rawToken, 'reset');
const portalUser = await db.query.portalUsers.findFirst({
where: eq(portalUsers.id, tokenRow.portalUserId),
});
if (!portalUser) throw new ValidationError('Invalid or expired token');
if (!(await isPortalEnabledForPort(portalUser.portId))) {
throw new ValidationError('Client portal is disabled for this port');
}
const passwordHash = await hashPassword(password);
await db
.update(portalUsers)