fix(audit-v2): platform-wide post-merge hardening across 5 domains
Five-domain audit (security, routes, DB, integrations, UI/UX) ran after
the cf37d09 merge. Critical + high-impact items landed here; deferred
medium/low items indexed in docs/audit-final-deferred.md (now organised
into a "Audit-final v2" section).
Security:
- Storage proxy tokens now bind to op (`'get'` vs `'put'`). A long-lived
download URL minted by `presignDownload` for an emailed brochure can no
longer be replayed against the proxy PUT to overwrite the original
storage object. `verifyProxyToken` requires `expectedOp` and rejects
mismatches; legacy tokens missing `op` fail-closed. Regression tests
added.
- Markdown email merge values are now markdown-escaped (`[`, `]`, `(`,
`)`, `*`, `_`, `\`, backticks, braces) before substitution into the
rep-authored body. A malicious value like `[click here](https://evil)`
stored in `client.fullName` no longer survives `escapeHtml` to render
as a real `<a href>` in the outbound email. Phishing-via-merge-field
closed; regression tests added.
- Middleware now performs an Origin/Referer check on
POST/PUT/PATCH/DELETE to `/api/v1/**`. Defense-in-depth on top of
better-auth's SameSite=Lax cookie. Webhooks/public/auth/portal routes
exempt as they don't carry the session cookie.
Routes:
- Template management routes were calling `withPermission('documents',
'manage', ...)` — but `documents` doesn't have a `manage` action. The
registry has `document_templates.manage`. Every non-superadmin was
getting 403'd on the seven template endpoints. Fixed across the
/admin/templates surface.
- Custom-fields permission resource is hardcoded to `clients` regardless
of which entity (yacht/company/etc.) the values belong to. Documented
as deferred (requires per-entity routes).
DB:
- documentSends: every parent FK (client_id, interest_id, berth_id,
brochure_id, brochure_version_id) now uses ON DELETE SET NULL so the
audit trail outlasts hard-deletes. The denormalized columns
(recipient_email, document_kind, body_markdown, from_address) were
added precisely for this. Migration 0035.
- Polymorphic discriminators on yachts.current_owner_type and
invoices.billing_entity_type now have CHECK constraints — typos like
`'clients'` vs `'client'` were silently inserting unreachable rows
before. Migration 0036.
Integrations:
- Email attachment resolution (`src/lib/email/index.ts`) was importing
MinIO directly instead of `getStorageBackend()`. Filesystem-backend
deployments would have broken every email-with-attachment send. Now
routes through the pluggable abstraction per CLAUDE.md.
- Documenso DOCUMENT_OPENED webhook filter relaxed: v2 may omit
`readStatus` or send lowercase, so an event that was the SIGNAL of an
open was being silently dropped. Now treats any recipient on a
DOCUMENT_OPENED event as opened.
UI/UX:
- Expense detail used to render `receiptFileIds` as opaque UUID badges —
reps couldn't view the receipt they uploaded. Now renders an image
thumbnail (via `/api/v1/files/[id]/preview`) plus a Download link for
PDFs. Closed the "where's my receipt?" loop in the expense flow.
- Expense detail Edit + Archive buttons now `<PermissionGate>` and the
archive mutation surfaces success/error toasts instead of silent 403s.
- Brochures admin: setDefault/archive/create mutations now have onError
toasts (only onSuccess existed before).
- Removed broken bulk-upload link in scan/page (route doesn't exist;
used a raw `<a>` triggering a full reload to a 404).
Test status: 1168/1168 vitest passing. tsc clean.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
This commit is contained in:
@@ -70,6 +70,17 @@ export function validateStorageKey(key: string): void {
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// ─── HMAC token helpers ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────
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/**
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* Token op binding. `'get'` tokens are issued by `presignDownload` and only
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* accepted by the proxy GET handler. `'put'` tokens are issued by
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* `presignUpload` and only accepted by the proxy PUT handler. Without this
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* binding a long-lived 24h download URL emailed to a customer could be
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* replayed against the PUT handler to overwrite the original storage object
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* (since both routes share an HMAC and key — the magic-byte check is also
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* skipped when `c` is unset).
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*/
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export type ProxyTokenOp = 'get' | 'put';
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interface ProxyTokenPayload {
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/** Storage key (validated). */
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k: string;
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@@ -77,6 +88,11 @@ interface ProxyTokenPayload {
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e: number;
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/** Random nonce so two URLs for the same (key, expiry) differ. */
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n: string;
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/**
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* Bound operation. Tokens minted before this field was added (legacy)
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* fail-closed: the proxy handlers require the field's exact value.
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*/
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op: ProxyTokenOp;
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/** Optional download filename. */
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f?: string;
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/** Optional content-type override. */
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@@ -102,6 +118,12 @@ export function signProxyToken(payload: ProxyTokenPayload, secret: string): stri
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export function verifyProxyToken(
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token: string,
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secret: string,
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/**
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* Required: the operation the verifier is allowed to perform. The token
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* must have been minted with the same `op`. Without this argument an
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* upload token could be replayed as a download (and vice versa).
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*/
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expectedOp: ProxyTokenOp,
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): { ok: true; payload: ProxyTokenPayload } | { ok: false; reason: string } {
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if (typeof token !== 'string' || !token.includes('.')) {
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return { ok: false, reason: 'malformed' };
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@@ -138,6 +160,11 @@ export function verifyProxyToken(
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} catch {
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return { ok: false, reason: 'invalid-key' };
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}
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// Op-binding: tokens minted before this field was added have no `op`
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// and are now rejected. Fresh tokens must match `expectedOp` exactly.
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if (payload.op !== expectedOp) {
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return { ok: false, reason: 'op-mismatch' };
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}
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return { ok: true, payload };
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}
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@@ -269,7 +296,7 @@ export class FilesystemBackend implements StorageBackend {
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validateStorageKey(key);
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const expiresAt = Math.floor(Date.now() / 1000) + (opts.expirySeconds ?? 900);
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const token = signProxyToken(
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{ k: key, e: expiresAt, n: randomUUID(), c: opts.contentType },
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{ k: key, e: expiresAt, n: randomUUID(), op: 'put', c: opts.contentType },
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this.hmacSecret,
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);
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return { url: `/api/storage/${token}`, method: 'PUT' };
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@@ -280,7 +307,14 @@ export class FilesystemBackend implements StorageBackend {
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const expirySec = opts.expirySeconds ?? 900;
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const expiresAtSec = Math.floor(Date.now() / 1000) + expirySec;
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const token = signProxyToken(
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{ k: key, e: expiresAtSec, n: randomUUID(), f: opts.filename, c: opts.contentType },
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{
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k: key,
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e: expiresAtSec,
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n: randomUUID(),
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op: 'get',
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f: opts.filename,
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c: opts.contentType,
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},
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this.hmacSecret,
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);
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// ABSOLUTE URL: send-out emails interpolate this verbatim into the
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