fix(audit): post-review hardening across phases 0-7

15 of 17 findings from the consolidated audit (3 reviewer agents on
the previously-shipped phase commits). Remaining two are nice-to-have
follow-ups deferred.

Critical (data integrity / security):
- Public berths API: closed-deal junction rows no longer flip a berth
  to "Under Offer" - filter on `interests.outcome IS NULL` so won/
  lost/cancelled don't pollute public-map status. Both list +
  single-mooring routes.
- Recommender heat: cancelled outcomes now count as fall-throughs
  (SQL was `LIKE 'lost%'` which silently dropped them, leaving
  cancelled-only berths stuck in tier A).
- Filesystem presignDownload returns an absolute URL (origin from
  APP_URL) so emailed download links resolve from external mail
  clients.
- Magic-byte verification on the presigned-PUT path: both per-berth
  PDFs and brochures stream the first 5 bytes via the storage backend
  and reject + delete on `%PDF-` mismatch (was only enforced when the
  server saw the buffer; presign-PUT was wide open).
- Replay-protection TTL aligned to the token's own expiry (was a
  fixed 30 min, but send-out tokens live 24 h). Floor 60 s, ceiling
  25 days.
- Brochures unique partial index on (port_id) WHERE is_default=true
  + 0032 migration. Closes the read-then-write race in the create/
  update transactions.

Important:
- Recommender SQL: defense-in-depth `i.port_id = $portId` filter on
  the aggregates CTE.
- berth-pdf service: per-berth pg_advisory_xact_lock around the
  version-number SELECT + insert. Storage key is now UUID-based so
  concurrent uploads can't collide on blob paths. Replaces
  `nextVersionNumber` with the tx-bound variant.
- berth-pdf apply: rejects with ConflictError when parse_results
  contain a mooring-mismatch warning unless the caller passes
  `confirmMooringMismatch: true` (force-reconfirm gate was UI-only).
- Send-out body: HTML-escape brochure filename in the download-link
  fallback (XSS guard).
- parseDecimalWithUnit rejects negative numbers.
- listClients DISTINCT ON for primary contact resolution: bounds
  contact-row count to ~2 per client.

Defensive:
- verifyProxyToken rejects NaN/Infinity expiries via Number.isFinite.
- Replaced sql ANY() with inArray() in interest-berths.

Tests: 1145 -> 1163 passing.

Deferred: bulk-send rate limit (no bulk endpoint today), markdown
italic regex breaking links with asterisks (cosmetic).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

src/lib/storage/filesystem.ts

@@ -126,7 +126,11 @@ export function verifyProxyToken(
     return { ok: false, reason: 'malformed-payload' };
   }
 
-  if (typeof payload.e !== 'number' || payload.e * 1000 < Date.now()) {
+  // `Number.isFinite` catches NaN / ±Infinity that a tampered token could
+  // otherwise smuggle past the `< Date.now()` comparison (NaN compares
+  // false against any number, which would treat the token as eternally
+  // valid). Reject non-finite expiries outright.
+  if (!Number.isFinite(payload.e) || payload.e * 1000 < Date.now()) {
     return { ok: false, reason: 'expired' };
   }
   try {
@@ -279,8 +283,12 @@ export class FilesystemBackend implements StorageBackend {
       { k: key, e: expiresAtSec, n: randomUUID(), f: opts.filename, c: opts.contentType },
       this.hmacSecret,
     );
+    // ABSOLUTE URL: send-out emails interpolate this verbatim into the
+    // recipient's inbox. A relative path is unreachable from a mail
+    // client. APP_URL strips any trailing slash to keep the join clean.
+    const origin = env.APP_URL.replace(/\/$/, '');
     return {
-      url: `/api/storage/${token}`,
+      url: `${origin}/api/storage/${token}`,
       expiresAt: new Date(expiresAtSec * 1000),
     };
   }