fix(audit): post-review hardening across phases 0-7

15 of 17 findings from the consolidated audit (3 reviewer agents on
the previously-shipped phase commits). Remaining two are nice-to-have
follow-ups deferred.

Critical (data integrity / security):
- Public berths API: closed-deal junction rows no longer flip a berth
  to "Under Offer" - filter on `interests.outcome IS NULL` so won/
  lost/cancelled don't pollute public-map status. Both list +
  single-mooring routes.
- Recommender heat: cancelled outcomes now count as fall-throughs
  (SQL was `LIKE 'lost%'` which silently dropped them, leaving
  cancelled-only berths stuck in tier A).
- Filesystem presignDownload returns an absolute URL (origin from
  APP_URL) so emailed download links resolve from external mail
  clients.
- Magic-byte verification on the presigned-PUT path: both per-berth
  PDFs and brochures stream the first 5 bytes via the storage backend
  and reject + delete on `%PDF-` mismatch (was only enforced when the
  server saw the buffer; presign-PUT was wide open).
- Replay-protection TTL aligned to the token's own expiry (was a
  fixed 30 min, but send-out tokens live 24 h). Floor 60 s, ceiling
  25 days.
- Brochures unique partial index on (port_id) WHERE is_default=true
  + 0032 migration. Closes the read-then-write race in the create/
  update transactions.

Important:
- Recommender SQL: defense-in-depth `i.port_id = $portId` filter on
  the aggregates CTE.
- berth-pdf service: per-berth pg_advisory_xact_lock around the
  version-number SELECT + insert. Storage key is now UUID-based so
  concurrent uploads can't collide on blob paths. Replaces
  `nextVersionNumber` with the tx-bound variant.
- berth-pdf apply: rejects with ConflictError when parse_results
  contain a mooring-mismatch warning unless the caller passes
  `confirmMooringMismatch: true` (force-reconfirm gate was UI-only).
- Send-out body: HTML-escape brochure filename in the download-link
  fallback (XSS guard).
- parseDecimalWithUnit rejects negative numbers.
- listClients DISTINCT ON for primary contact resolution: bounds
  contact-row count to ~2 per client.

Defensive:
- verifyProxyToken rejects NaN/Infinity expiries via Number.isFinite.
- Replaced sql ANY() with inArray() in interest-berths.

Tests: 1145 -> 1163 passing.

Deferred: bulk-send rate limit (no bulk endpoint today), markdown
italic regex breaking links with asterisks (cosmetic).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

src/app/api/v1/admin/email/sales-config/route.ts

@@ -16,9 +16,16 @@ import { updateSalesEmailConfigSchema } from '@/lib/validators/sales-email-confi
  * GET /api/v1/admin/email/sales-config
  *
  * Returns the redacted view of the sales-email config. Per §14.10
- * "Permission escalation: who configures SMTP credentials?", reps cannot
- * see the decrypted password — the response only carries `*PassIsSet`
- * boolean markers.
+ * reps can't see the decrypted password — the response only carries
+ * `*PassIsSet` boolean markers via `redactSalesConfigForResponse`.
+ *
+ * Today this endpoint is admin-only because it's consumed only by the
+ * admin UI panel (`src/components/admin/sales-email-config-card.tsx`).
+ * A future rep-facing surface that needs the from-address or body
+ * templates can split into a separate `/email/sales-config/preview`
+ * endpoint scoped to `email.view` — keeping the admin endpoint locked
+ * to `manage_settings` avoids accidentally widening secret-adjacent
+ * surfaces (e.g. the SMTP host name itself can be a leak vector).
  */
 export const GET = withAuth(
   withPermission('admin', 'manage_settings', async (_req, ctx) => {