fix(audit): post-review hardening across phases 0-7

15 of 17 findings from the consolidated audit (3 reviewer agents on
the previously-shipped phase commits). Remaining two are nice-to-have
follow-ups deferred.

Critical (data integrity / security):
- Public berths API: closed-deal junction rows no longer flip a berth
  to "Under Offer" - filter on `interests.outcome IS NULL` so won/
  lost/cancelled don't pollute public-map status. Both list +
  single-mooring routes.
- Recommender heat: cancelled outcomes now count as fall-throughs
  (SQL was `LIKE 'lost%'` which silently dropped them, leaving
  cancelled-only berths stuck in tier A).
- Filesystem presignDownload returns an absolute URL (origin from
  APP_URL) so emailed download links resolve from external mail
  clients.
- Magic-byte verification on the presigned-PUT path: both per-berth
  PDFs and brochures stream the first 5 bytes via the storage backend
  and reject + delete on `%PDF-` mismatch (was only enforced when the
  server saw the buffer; presign-PUT was wide open).
- Replay-protection TTL aligned to the token's own expiry (was a
  fixed 30 min, but send-out tokens live 24 h). Floor 60 s, ceiling
  25 days.
- Brochures unique partial index on (port_id) WHERE is_default=true
  + 0032 migration. Closes the read-then-write race in the create/
  update transactions.

Important:
- Recommender SQL: defense-in-depth `i.port_id = $portId` filter on
  the aggregates CTE.
- berth-pdf service: per-berth pg_advisory_xact_lock around the
  version-number SELECT + insert. Storage key is now UUID-based so
  concurrent uploads can't collide on blob paths. Replaces
  `nextVersionNumber` with the tx-bound variant.
- berth-pdf apply: rejects with ConflictError when parse_results
  contain a mooring-mismatch warning unless the caller passes
  `confirmMooringMismatch: true` (force-reconfirm gate was UI-only).
- Send-out body: HTML-escape brochure filename in the download-link
  fallback (XSS guard).
- parseDecimalWithUnit rejects negative numbers.
- listClients DISTINCT ON for primary contact resolution: bounds
  contact-row count to ~2 per client.

Defensive:
- verifyProxyToken rejects NaN/Infinity expiries via Number.isFinite.
- Replaced sql ANY() with inArray() in interest-berths.

Tests: 1145 -> 1163 passing.

Deferred: bulk-send rate limit (no bulk endpoint today), markdown
italic regex breaking links with asterisks (cosmetic).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

src/app/api/storage/[token]/route.ts

@@ -28,7 +28,13 @@ import { verifyProxyToken } from '@/lib/storage/filesystem';
 export const runtime = 'nodejs';
 export const dynamic = 'force-dynamic';
 
-const REPLAY_TTL_SECONDS = 60 * 30; // 30min — longer than any presign expiry default.
+// Replay-protection TTL must outlive the token itself, otherwise the
+// dedup key expires and the same token can be redeemed twice. We pin it
+// to the token's own expiry (clamped to a 25-day ceiling so a forged
+// far-future token can't pollute Redis indefinitely). Send-out emails
+// mint 24-hour tokens so the typical TTL is 24h + a small buffer.
+const REPLAY_TTL_FLOOR_SECONDS = 60; // never below 60s (post-expiry tail).
+const REPLAY_TTL_CEILING_SECONDS = 25 * 24 * 60 * 60; // 25 days.
 
 export async function GET(
   _req: NextRequest,
@@ -51,11 +57,16 @@ export async function GET(
   }
   const { payload } = result;
 
-  // Single-use enforcement. SET NX with a TTL longer than the token itself.
-  // Using the body half of the token as the dedup key (signature included
+  // Single-use enforcement. SET NX with a TTL pinned to the token's own
+  // expiry so the dedup window never closes before the token does. Using
+  // the body half of the token as the dedup key (signature included
   // would also work but body is enough — a reused token has the same body).
   const replayKey = `storage:proxy:seen:${token.split('.')[0]}`;
-  const setOk = await redis.set(replayKey, '1', 'EX', REPLAY_TTL_SECONDS, 'NX');
+  const remainingSeconds = Math.max(
+    REPLAY_TTL_FLOOR_SECONDS,
+    Math.min(REPLAY_TTL_CEILING_SECONDS, payload.e - Math.floor(Date.now() / 1000) + 60),
+  );
+  const setOk = await redis.set(replayKey, '1', 'EX', remainingSeconds, 'NX');
   if (setOk !== 'OK') {
     logger.warn({ key: payload.k }, 'Storage proxy token replay rejected');
     return NextResponse.json({ error: 'Token already used' }, { status: 403 });