fix(audit-v3): platform-wide deferred-list cleanup (rounds 1-4)

Working through the audit-v2 deferred backlog. Each round was tested
(typecheck + 1168/1168 vitest) before moving on.

Round 1 — DB performance + AI cost visibility:
- Add missing FK indexes Postgres doesn't auto-create on
  berth_reservations.{interest_id, contract_file_id},
  documents.{file_id, signed_file_id}, document_events.signer_id,
  document_templates.source_file_id, form_submissions.{form_template_id,
  client_id}, document_sends.{brochure_id, brochure_version_id,
  sent_by_user_id}. Without these, RESTRICT-checks on parent delete +
  reverse-lookups walk the child tables fully. Migration 0037.
- AI worker now writes one ai_usage_ledger row per OpenAI call so admins
  can audit spend per port/user/feature and future per-port budgets have
  history to read from. Failure to write is logged-not-thrown so the
  user-facing email draft is unaffected.

Round 2 — Boot-time + transport hardening:
- S3 backend verifies the bucket exists at startup (or auto-creates
  when MINIO_AUTO_CREATE_BUCKET=true). A typo'd bucket name now
  surfaces with a clear boot error instead of a vague Minio error
  inside the first user-facing request.
- Documenso v1 placeFields: 3-attempt exponential-backoff retry on 5xx
  + network errors, fail-fast on 4xx. Stops one transient flake from
  leaving a document with a partial field set.
- FilesystemBackend logs a structured warn-once at boot when the dev
  HMAC fallback is in effect, so two processes started with different
  BETTER_AUTH_SECRET values are observable (random 401s on file
  downloads otherwise).
- Logger redact paths extended to cover *.headers.{authorization,
  cookie}, *.config.headers.authorization, encrypted-credential blobs
  (secretKeyEncrypted, smtpPassEncrypted, etc.), the Documenso
  X-Documenso-Secret header, and 2-level nested forms.

Round 3 — UI feedback + permission gates:
- Storage admin migrate dialog: success toast with row count + error
  toast on both dryRun and migrate mutations.
- Invoice detail Send + Record-payment buttons wrapped in
  PermissionGate (invoices.send / invoices.record_payment); both
  mutations now toast on success/error.
- Admin user list Edit button wrapped in PermissionGate(admin.manage_users).
- Scan-receipt page surfaces an amber warning when OCR fails so reps
  know they can fill the form manually instead of staring at a stalled
  spinner; the editable form now also opens on scanMutation.isError
  / uploadedFile, not only on success.
- Email threads list now renders skeleton rows during load + shared
  EmptyState for the empty case (was a single "Loading…" line).

Round 4 — Service / route correctness:
- documentSends.sent_by_user_id was a free-text NOT NULL column with no
  FK. Now nullable + FK to user(id) ON DELETE SET NULL so the audit row
  survives a user being hard-deleted. Migration 0038 with a defensive
  null-out for any orphan ids before attaching the constraint.
- Saved-views route: documented why withAuth alone is correct (the
  service strictly filters by (portId, userId) — owner-only by design).
- Public-interests audit log: replaced "userId: null as unknown as
  string" cast with userId: null; AuditLogParams already accepts null
  for system-generated events.
- EOI in-app PDF fill: extracted setBerthRange() that, when the
  AcroForm field is missing AND the context has a non-empty range
  string, logs a structured warn so the deployment gap (live Documenso
  template needs the field) is observable instead of silently dropping
  the multi-berth range.

Test status: 1168/1168 vitest. tsc clean. Two new migrations
(0037/0038) need pnpm db:push (or migration apply) on the dev DB.
Deferred-doc updated with the remaining open items (bigger refactors).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

src/lib/logger.ts

@@ -15,6 +15,31 @@ export const logger = pino({
       '*.secret',
       '*.accessKey',
       '*.secretKey',
+      // Encrypted credential blobs surface in storage / smtp config logs
+      // unintentionally; redact them defensively even though they're
+      // already AES-encrypted at rest.
+      '*.secretKeyEncrypted',
+      '*.smtpPassEncrypted',
+      '*.imapPassEncrypted',
+      '*.proxyHmacSecretEncrypted',
+      // HTTP authorization headers (Bearer tokens, Basic creds) leak via
+      // err.config.headers on http-client error logs.
+      '*.headers.authorization',
+      '*.headers.Authorization',
+      '*.headers["x-documenso-secret"]',
+      '*.config.headers.Authorization',
+      '*.config.headers.authorization',
+      // Cookie headers can carry session tokens.
+      '*.headers.cookie',
+      '*.headers.Cookie',
+      // Two-level nesting for things like `req.headers.authorization` or
+      // `cfg.s3.secretKeyEncrypted`.
+      '*.*.password',
+      '*.*.token',
+      '*.*.secret',
+      '*.*.secretKeyEncrypted',
+      '*.*.headers.authorization',
+      '*.*.headers.Authorization',
     ],
     censor: '[REDACTED]',
   },