chore(cleanup): Phase 1 — gap closure across audit, alerts, soft-delete, perms

Multi-area cleanup pass closing partial-implementation gaps surfaced by the
post-i18n audit. No behavior changes for happy-path users; closes real
correctness/security holes.

PR1a Public yacht-interest endpoint i18n. /api/public/interests now accepts
     phoneE164/phoneCountry, nationalityIso, address.{countryIso, subdivisionIso},
     and company.{incorporationCountryIso, incorporationSubdivisionIso}.
     Server-side parsePhone() fallback for legacy raw phone strings.

PR1b Alert rule registry trim. Two rule slots ('document.expiring_soon',
     'audit.suspicious_login') were registered but evaluators returned [].
     Both required schema/instrumentation that hadn't landed. Removed from
     the registry; comments record the dependencies needed to revive them.
     Effective rule count: 8 active.

PR1c vi.mock hoist + flake fix. Hoisted vi.mock calls to top-level in 5
     integration test files; webhook-delivery uses vi.hoisted for the
     queue-add ref. Vitest no longer warns about non-top-level mocks.
     Deflaked the 'short value' assertion in security-encryption.test.ts
     by switching plaintext from 'ab' to 'XY' (non-hex chars). 5/5 runs green.

PR1d Soft-delete reference audit. listClientOptions and listYachtsForOwner
     now filter by isNull(archivedAt). Berths use status (no archivedAt).

PR1e Permission-matrix audit script + report. scripts/audit-permissions.ts
     walks every src/app/api/v1/**/route.ts and reports handlers without a
     withPermission() wrapper. Initial run found 33 violations.
     - Allow-listed 17 with explicit reasons (self-data, admin, alerts,
       search, currency, ai, custom-fields — some marked TODO).
     - Wrapped 7 routes with concrete permissions: clients/options
       (clients:view), berths/options (berths:view), dashboard/*
       (reports:view_dashboard), analytics (reports:view_analytics).
     Audit report at docs/runbooks/permission-audit.md. Script exits
     non-zero on any unallow-listed violation so it can become a CI gate.

Vitest: 741 -> 741 (no new tests; existing suite covers the changes).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

tests/unit/security-encryption.test.ts

@@ -34,9 +34,12 @@ describe('AES-256-GCM — plaintext non-exposure', () => {
 
   it('encrypted output does not contain plaintext even for short values', async () => {
     const { encrypt } = await import('@/lib/utils/encryption');
-    const plaintext = 'ab';
+    // Pick a 2-char plaintext using *non-hex* characters so the assertion can't
+    // false-positive: random hex bytes routinely contain pairs like 'ab' or 'cd'
+    // by chance (~1 in 256 byte positions). Using 'XY' (neither is a hex digit)
+    // means a passing assertion actually proves the plaintext didn't leak.
+    const plaintext = 'XY';
     const encrypted = encrypt(plaintext);
-    // The JSON output contains hex-encoded bytes — plaintext chars must not appear raw
     expect(encrypted).not.toContain(plaintext);
   });