chore(autonomous-session): consolidate uncommitted work from prior session
Bundles the prior autonomous-session output that was sitting unstaged: - Em-dash sweep across src/ + tests/ (en-dash/em-dash to hyphen, ~2280 instances) - country-flag-icons rollout (CountryFlag component, replaces emoji glyphs that never rendered on Windows; lazy-loads the 3x2 SVG index as a single chunk after the per-subpath dynamic-import approach silently failed in webpack) - Admin IA Phase 1+2: 7-domain regroup, 41 to 38 pages, /admin/berths index, redirects (ocr to ai, reports to dashboard, invitations to users), docs/admin-ia-proposal.md - Per-template email tester (registry + endpoint + UI on Email admin page) - Cancel-document mode picker (delete-from-Documenso vs keep-for-audit) - Dashboard PDF report: 25 widgets, SVG charts, date-range picker, 11 resolvers - Customize-widgets per-region sortables at xl+ (charts/rails/feed); single flat sortable below xl when the layout stacks; per-viewport saved orders - Audit doc updates capturing each shipped item - Lint fixes: react-compiler immutability in DonutChart (reduce instead of let-reassign), set-state-in-effect disables in CountryFlag and UploadForSigning preview-bytes effect, unused 'confirm' destructures in interest contract + reservation tabs, unescaped apostrophe in test-template card copy
This commit is contained in:
@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
|
||||
/**
|
||||
* Portal JWT verification — locks in the audience/issuer hardening shipped
|
||||
* Portal JWT verification - locks in the audience/issuer hardening shipped
|
||||
* in fix(auth): a token without `aud: 'portal'` + `iss: 'pn-crm'` claims
|
||||
* must NOT verify, even if it's signed with the correct shared secret.
|
||||
*
|
||||
@@ -50,7 +50,7 @@ describe('portal JWT', () => {
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
it('rejects a token missing the `aud: portal` claim', async () => {
|
||||
// Issuer present, audience absent — exactly the shape an old (pre-fix)
|
||||
// Issuer present, audience absent - exactly the shape an old (pre-fix)
|
||||
// portal session would have.
|
||||
const token = await new SignJWT(SESSION as unknown as Record<string, unknown>)
|
||||
.setProtectedHeader({ alg: 'HS256' })
|
||||
@@ -74,7 +74,7 @@ describe('portal JWT', () => {
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
it('rejects a token with the wrong audience (CRM session replay shape)', async () => {
|
||||
// What a better-auth session token might roughly look like — same secret,
|
||||
// What a better-auth session token might roughly look like - same secret,
|
||||
// different audience. Must not verify against the portal path.
|
||||
const token = await new SignJWT(SESSION as unknown as Record<string, unknown>)
|
||||
.setProtectedHeader({ alg: 'HS256' })
|
||||
|
||||
Reference in New Issue
Block a user