audit: Tier 0 quick wins — EMAIL_REDIRECT_TO prod guard + storage routing + metadata masking
Tier 0.2: src/lib/env.ts now refuses boot when NODE_ENV=production AND EMAIL_REDIRECT_TO is set. Sendmail logs the rewrite at warn (was debug) so dev/staging windows where someone forgets to unset are immediately visible. Tier 0.6: backup_jobs.storage_path added to TABLES_WITH_STORAGE_KEYS in src/lib/storage/migrate.ts. Flipping the storage backend used to silently orphan every pg_dump artefact — last-resort recovery path is now actually portable. Tier 1.7: createAuditLog now runs metadata through maskSensitiveFields (was only applied to old/new value diffs). Portal-auth, crm-invite, hard-delete and email-accounts services were writing raw emails into this column unbounded. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
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@@ -143,7 +143,10 @@ export async function createAuditLog(params: AuditLogParams): Promise<void> {
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fieldChanged: params.fieldChanged ?? null,
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oldValue: maskSensitiveFields(params.oldValue) ?? null,
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newValue: maskSensitiveFields(params.newValue) ?? null,
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metadata: params.metadata ?? null,
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// Mask metadata too — the audit found portal-auth, crm-invite,
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// hard-delete, and email-accounts services were writing raw emails
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// into this column.
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metadata: maskSensitiveFields(params.metadata) ?? null,
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ipAddress: params.ipAddress ?? null,
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userAgent: params.userAgent ?? null,
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severity,
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@@ -151,10 +151,21 @@ export async function sendEmail(
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...(resolvedAttachments.length > 0 ? { attachments: resolvedAttachments } : {}),
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});
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logger.debug(
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{ messageId: info.messageId, to: effectiveTo, originalTo: requestedTo, subject, portId },
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env.EMAIL_REDIRECT_TO ? 'Email sent (redirected)' : 'Email sent',
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);
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// When EMAIL_REDIRECT_TO is set we elevate to `warn` so the dev-only
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// safety net is visible in any logger config. Prod boot already refuses
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// when both are set (see env.ts superRefine) — this catches the dev /
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// staging window where someone left it in a .env by mistake.
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if (env.EMAIL_REDIRECT_TO) {
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logger.warn(
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{ messageId: info.messageId, to: effectiveTo, originalTo: requestedTo, subject, portId },
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'Email sent (REDIRECTED via EMAIL_REDIRECT_TO — recipient overridden)',
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);
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} else {
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logger.debug(
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{ messageId: info.messageId, to: effectiveTo, originalTo: requestedTo, subject, portId },
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'Email sent',
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);
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}
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return info;
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}
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@@ -81,6 +81,21 @@ const envSchema = z.object({
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.enum(['true', 'false'])
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.default('false')
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.transform((v) => v === 'true'),
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}).superRefine((env, ctx) => {
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// CRITICAL safety net: EMAIL_REDIRECT_TO is a dev/test feature that
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// silently rewrites every outbound recipient. Leaving it set in prod
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// funnels every customer email (invites, EOIs, portal magic links,
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// contracts) to a single inbox. The audit caught this had only a
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// `logger.debug` line as forensic trail. Refuse boot when both are
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// simultaneously set in production.
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if (env.NODE_ENV === 'production' && env.EMAIL_REDIRECT_TO) {
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ctx.addIssue({
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code: z.ZodIssueCode.custom,
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path: ['EMAIL_REDIRECT_TO'],
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message:
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'EMAIL_REDIRECT_TO must NOT be set in production — it silently rewrites every outbound email recipient. Unset it before deploying.',
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});
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}
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});
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export type Env = z.infer<typeof envSchema>;
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@@ -57,6 +57,10 @@ export const TABLES_WITH_STORAGE_KEYS: StorageKeyTable[] = [
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{ table: 'berth_pdf_versions', keyColumn: 'storage_key', pkColumn: 'id' },
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{ table: 'brochure_versions', keyColumn: 'storage_key', pkColumn: 'id' },
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{ table: 'gdpr_exports', keyColumn: 'storage_key', pkColumn: 'id' },
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// Last-resort recovery: pg_dump artefacts from the BackupService. The
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// audit caught these were missing — flipping the storage backend used
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// to silently orphan every backup, dark-blacking the recovery path.
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{ table: 'backup_jobs', keyColumn: 'storage_path', pkColumn: 'id' },
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];
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const ADVISORY_LOCK_KEY = 0xc7000a01;
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