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pn-new-crm/src/lib/portal/passwords.ts

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feat(portal): replace magic-link with email/password + admin-initiated activation The client portal no longer uses passwordless / magic-link sign-in. Each client now has a `portal_users` row with a scrypt-hashed password, created by an admin from the client detail page; the admin's invite mails an activation link that the client uses to set their own password. Forgot-password is wired through the same token mechanism. Schema (migration `0009_outgoing_rumiko_fujikawa.sql`): - `portal_users` — one per client account, separate from the CRM `users` table (better-auth) so the auth realms stay isolated. Email is globally unique, password is null until activation. - `portal_auth_tokens` — single-use activation / reset tokens. Stores only the SHA-256 hash so a DB compromise never leaks live tokens. Services: - `src/lib/portal/passwords.ts` — scrypt hash/verify (no new deps; uses node:crypto), token mint+hash helpers. - `src/lib/services/portal-auth.service.ts` — createPortalUser, resendActivation, activateAccount, signIn (timing-safe), requestPasswordReset, resetPassword. Auth failures throw the new UnauthorizedError (401); enumeration-safe behaviour everywhere. Routes: - POST /api/portal/auth/sign-in — sets the existing portal JWT cookie. - POST /api/portal/auth/forgot-password — always 200. - POST /api/portal/auth/reset-password — token + new password. - POST /api/portal/auth/activate — token + initial password. - POST /api/v1/clients/:id/portal-user — admin invite (and `?action=resend`). - Removed: /api/portal/auth/request, /api/portal/auth/verify (magic link). UI: - /portal/login — replaced email-only magic-link form with email + password + "forgot password" link. - /portal/forgot-password, /portal/reset-password, /portal/activate — new. - New shared `PasswordSetForm` component used by activate + reset. - New `PortalInviteButton` rendered on the client detail header. Email send: - `createTransporter` now wires SMTP auth when SMTP_USER+SMTP_PASS are set (gmail app-password or marina-server creds, configured via env). - `SMTP_FROM` env var lets the sender address be overridden without pinning it to `noreply@${SMTP_HOST}`. Tests: - Smoke spec 17 (client-portal) updated to the new flow: 7/7 green. - Smoke specs 02-crud-spine, 05-invoices, 20-critical-path updated to match the post-refactor client + invoice forms (drop companyName, use OwnerPicker + billingEmail). - Vitest 652/652 still green; type-check clean. Drops the dead `requestMagicLink` from portal.service.ts. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-04-26 15:34:02 +02:00
import { randomBytes, scrypt as scryptCb, timingSafeEqual, createHash } from 'node:crypto';
import { promisify } from 'node:util';
const scrypt = promisify(scryptCb) as (
password: string,
salt: Buffer,
keyLen: number,
) => Promise<Buffer>;
const KEY_LENGTH = 64;
const SALT_LENGTH = 16;
/**
* Hash a password with a fresh random salt. Stored format is
* `salt:keyHex` (both as hex strings) so verification can re-derive without
* a separate salt column.
*/
export async function hashPassword(password: string): Promise<string> {
const salt = randomBytes(SALT_LENGTH);
const key = await scrypt(password, salt, KEY_LENGTH);
return `${salt.toString('hex')}:${key.toString('hex')}`;
}
/**
* Constant-time check of a candidate password against a stored
* `salt:keyHex` hash. Returns false on any malformed input rather than
* throwing callers should treat false uniformly.
*/
export async function verifyPassword(password: string, stored: string): Promise<boolean> {
const parts = stored.split(':');
if (parts.length !== 2) return false;
const [saltHex, keyHex] = parts;
if (!saltHex || !keyHex) return false;
let salt: Buffer;
let expected: Buffer;
try {
salt = Buffer.from(saltHex, 'hex');
expected = Buffer.from(keyHex, 'hex');
} catch {
return false;
}
if (expected.length !== KEY_LENGTH) return false;
const candidate = await scrypt(password, salt, KEY_LENGTH);
return timingSafeEqual(candidate, expected);
}
/**
* Mint a fresh raw token (returned to the caller) and its SHA-256 hash
* (stored in the DB). The raw token is meant to be embedded in a one-shot
* URL; only the hash persists.
*/
export function mintToken(byteLength = 32): { raw: string; hash: string } {
const raw = randomBytes(byteLength).toString('base64url');
const hash = createHash('sha256').update(raw).digest('hex');
return { raw, hash };
}
export function hashToken(raw: string): string {
return createHash('sha256').update(raw).digest('hex');
}