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pn-new-crm/src/lib/logger.ts

56 lines
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import pino from 'pino';
export const logger = pino({
level: process.env.LOG_LEVEL ?? 'info',
redact: {
paths: [
'password',
'token',
'secret',
'accessKey',
'secretKey',
'creditCard',
'*.password',
'*.token',
'*.secret',
'*.accessKey',
'*.secretKey',
fix(audit-v3): platform-wide deferred-list cleanup (rounds 1-4) Working through the audit-v2 deferred backlog. Each round was tested (typecheck + 1168/1168 vitest) before moving on. Round 1 — DB performance + AI cost visibility: - Add missing FK indexes Postgres doesn't auto-create on berth_reservations.{interest_id, contract_file_id}, documents.{file_id, signed_file_id}, document_events.signer_id, document_templates.source_file_id, form_submissions.{form_template_id, client_id}, document_sends.{brochure_id, brochure_version_id, sent_by_user_id}. Without these, RESTRICT-checks on parent delete + reverse-lookups walk the child tables fully. Migration 0037. - AI worker now writes one ai_usage_ledger row per OpenAI call so admins can audit spend per port/user/feature and future per-port budgets have history to read from. Failure to write is logged-not-thrown so the user-facing email draft is unaffected. Round 2 — Boot-time + transport hardening: - S3 backend verifies the bucket exists at startup (or auto-creates when MINIO_AUTO_CREATE_BUCKET=true). A typo'd bucket name now surfaces with a clear boot error instead of a vague Minio error inside the first user-facing request. - Documenso v1 placeFields: 3-attempt exponential-backoff retry on 5xx + network errors, fail-fast on 4xx. Stops one transient flake from leaving a document with a partial field set. - FilesystemBackend logs a structured warn-once at boot when the dev HMAC fallback is in effect, so two processes started with different BETTER_AUTH_SECRET values are observable (random 401s on file downloads otherwise). - Logger redact paths extended to cover *.headers.{authorization, cookie}, *.config.headers.authorization, encrypted-credential blobs (secretKeyEncrypted, smtpPassEncrypted, etc.), the Documenso X-Documenso-Secret header, and 2-level nested forms. Round 3 — UI feedback + permission gates: - Storage admin migrate dialog: success toast with row count + error toast on both dryRun and migrate mutations. - Invoice detail Send + Record-payment buttons wrapped in PermissionGate (invoices.send / invoices.record_payment); both mutations now toast on success/error. - Admin user list Edit button wrapped in PermissionGate(admin.manage_users). - Scan-receipt page surfaces an amber warning when OCR fails so reps know they can fill the form manually instead of staring at a stalled spinner; the editable form now also opens on scanMutation.isError / uploadedFile, not only on success. - Email threads list now renders skeleton rows during load + shared EmptyState for the empty case (was a single "Loading…" line). Round 4 — Service / route correctness: - documentSends.sent_by_user_id was a free-text NOT NULL column with no FK. Now nullable + FK to user(id) ON DELETE SET NULL so the audit row survives a user being hard-deleted. Migration 0038 with a defensive null-out for any orphan ids before attaching the constraint. - Saved-views route: documented why withAuth alone is correct (the service strictly filters by (portId, userId) — owner-only by design). - Public-interests audit log: replaced "userId: null as unknown as string" cast with userId: null; AuditLogParams already accepts null for system-generated events. - EOI in-app PDF fill: extracted setBerthRange() that, when the AcroForm field is missing AND the context has a non-empty range string, logs a structured warn so the deployment gap (live Documenso template needs the field) is observable instead of silently dropping the multi-berth range. Test status: 1168/1168 vitest. tsc clean. Two new migrations (0037/0038) need pnpm db:push (or migration apply) on the dev DB. Deferred-doc updated with the remaining open items (bigger refactors). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-05-05 12:49:53 +02:00
// Encrypted credential blobs surface in storage / smtp config logs
// unintentionally; redact them defensively even though they're
// already AES-encrypted at rest.
'*.secretKeyEncrypted',
'*.smtpPassEncrypted',
'*.imapPassEncrypted',
'*.proxyHmacSecretEncrypted',
// HTTP authorization headers (Bearer tokens, Basic creds) leak via
// err.config.headers on http-client error logs.
'*.headers.authorization',
'*.headers.Authorization',
'*.headers["x-documenso-secret"]',
'*.config.headers.Authorization',
'*.config.headers.authorization',
// Cookie headers can carry session tokens.
'*.headers.cookie',
'*.headers.Cookie',
// Two-level nesting for things like `req.headers.authorization` or
// `cfg.s3.secretKeyEncrypted`.
'*.*.password',
'*.*.token',
'*.*.secret',
'*.*.secretKeyEncrypted',
'*.*.headers.authorization',
'*.*.headers.Authorization',
],
censor: '[REDACTED]',
},
transport:
process.env.NODE_ENV !== 'production'
? { target: 'pino-pretty', options: { colorize: true } }
: undefined,
serializers: {
err: pino.stdSerializers.err,
req: pino.stdSerializers.req,
res: pino.stdSerializers.res,
},
});