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pn-new-crm/src/lib/storage/filesystem.ts

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feat(storage): pluggable s3-or-filesystem backend + migration CLI + admin UI Phase 6a from docs/berth-recommender-and-pdf-plan.md §4.7a + §14.9a. Lays the storage groundwork for Phase 6b/7 file-bearing schemas (per-berth PDFs, brochures) without touching those domains yet. New files: - src/lib/storage/index.ts StorageBackend interface + per-process factory keyed on system_settings. - src/lib/storage/s3.ts S3-compatible backend (MinIO/AWS/B2/R2/ Wasabi/Tigris) wrapping the existing minio JS client. Includes a healthCheck() used by the admin "Test connection" button. - src/lib/storage/filesystem.ts Local filesystem backend with all §14.9a mitigations baked in. - src/lib/storage/migrate.ts Shared migration core — pg_advisory_lock, per-row resumable progress markers, sha256 round-trip verification, atomic storage_backend flip on success. - scripts/migrate-storage.ts Thin CLI shim around runMigration(). - src/app/api/storage/[token]/route.ts Filesystem proxy GET. Verifies HMAC, enforces single-use replay protection via Redis SET NX, streams via NextResponse ReadableStream with explicit Content-Type + Content-Disposition. Node runtime only. - src/app/api/v1/admin/storage/route.ts GET status + POST connection test. - src/app/api/v1/admin/storage/migrate/route.ts Super-admin-only POST that runs the exact same runMigration() as the CLI. - src/app/(dashboard)/[portSlug]/admin/storage/page.tsx Super-admin admin UI (current backend, capacity stats, switch button with dry-run, test connection, backup hint). - src/components/admin/storage-admin-panel.tsx Client component for the page above. §14.9a critical mitigations implemented: - Path-traversal: storage keys validated against ^[a-zA-Z0-9/_.-]+$; `..`, `.`, `//`, leading `/`, and overlength keys rejected. - Realpath: storage root realpath'd at create time, every per-key resolution checked against the realpath'd prefix. - Storage root created (or chmod'd) to 0o700. - Multi-node refusal: FilesystemBackend.create() throws when MULTI_NODE_DEPLOYMENT=true. - HMAC token: sha256-HMAC over the (key, expiry, nonce, filename, content-type) payload. Verified with timingSafeEqual; bad sig, expired, or invalid-key payloads all return 403. - Single-use replay: token body cached in Redis SET NX EX 1800s. - sha256 round-trip: copyAndVerify() re-fetches from the target after put() and aborts the migration on any mismatch. - Free-disk pre-flight: when migrating to filesystem, sums byte counts via source.head() and aborts if free space < total * 1.2. - pg_advisory_lock(0xc7000a01) prevents concurrent migrations. - Resumable: per-row progress markers in _storage_migration_progress. system_settings keys read by the factory (jsonb, no schema change): storage_backend, storage_s3_endpoint, storage_s3_region, storage_s3_bucket, storage_s3_access_key, storage_s3_secret_key_encrypted, storage_s3_force_path_style, storage_filesystem_root, storage_proxy_hmac_secret_encrypted. Defaults: storage_backend=`s3`, storage_filesystem_root=`./storage` (./storage added to .gitignore). Tests added (34 tests, all green): - tests/unit/storage/filesystem-backend.test.ts — key validation allow/reject matrix, realpath escape, 0o700 perms, multi-node refusal, HMAC token sign/verify/tamper/expire/invalid-key. - tests/unit/storage/copy-and-verify.test.ts — sha256 mismatch on round-trip aborts the migration. - tests/integration/storage/proxy-route.test.ts — happy path, wrong HMAC secret, expired token, replay rejection. Phase 6a ships zero file-bearing tables — TABLES_WITH_STORAGE_KEYS is intentionally empty. berth_pdf_versions and brochure_versions land in Phase 6b and join the list there. Existing s3_key columns: only gdpr_export_jobs.storage_key, already named correctly — no rename needed. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-05-05 03:15:59 +02:00
/**
* Local filesystem backend. Stores files at `${root}/<key>` on disk and serves
* downloads via a CRM-internal proxy route (`/api/storage/[token]`) that
* verifies an HMAC token before streaming the bytes. Used for single-VPS
* deployments where running MinIO is overkill.
*
* §14.9a critical mitigations:
*
* - Storage keys are validated against `^[a-zA-Z0-9/_.-]+$`. Anything containing
* `..` or that resolves to an absolute path is rejected.
* - The resolved path is checked with `path.resolve` against the resolved
* storage root (realpath form) symlink escapes are blocked.
* - The storage root is created with mode `0o700` (owner only).
* - Refuses to start when `MULTI_NODE_DEPLOYMENT === 'true'` multi-node
* deployments must use an S3-compatible store.
* - Proxy download URLs carry an HMAC-signed payload (key + expiry); the
* route refuses to stream a key whose token doesn't verify.
*/
import { createHash, createHmac, randomUUID, timingSafeEqual } from 'node:crypto';
import { createReadStream } from 'node:fs';
import * as fs from 'node:fs/promises';
import * as path from 'node:path';
import { Readable } from 'node:stream';
import { env } from '@/lib/env';
import { NotFoundError, ValidationError } from '@/lib/errors';
import { logger } from '@/lib/logger';
import { decrypt } from '@/lib/utils/encryption';
import type { PresignOpts, PutOpts, StorageBackend } from './index';
// ─── key validation ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
const VALID_KEY_RE = /^[a-zA-Z0-9/_.-]+$/;
/**
* Validate a storage key. Rejects:
* - empty / whitespace
* - characters outside `[a-zA-Z0-9/_.-]`
* - traversal segments (`..`, `/..`, `../`)
* - absolute paths (leading `/`)
* - segments starting with `.` (hidden files / dotfiles other than the
* intentional dot-extension at the end)
*
* Use this both at write time AND at read time a key fed back from the DB
* could in theory have been tampered with at rest.
*/
export function validateStorageKey(key: string): void {
if (typeof key !== 'string' || key.length === 0) {
throw new ValidationError('Storage key must be a non-empty string');
}
if (key.length > 1024) {
throw new ValidationError('Storage key exceeds 1024 chars');
}
if (key.startsWith('/') || key.startsWith('\\')) {
throw new ValidationError('Storage key must not be absolute');
}
if (!VALID_KEY_RE.test(key)) {
throw new ValidationError('Storage key contains forbidden characters');
}
// Reject any traversal segment in any normalized form.
const segments = key.split('/');
for (const seg of segments) {
if (seg === '..' || seg === '.' || seg === '') {
throw new ValidationError('Storage key has empty or traversal segment');
}
}
}
// ─── HMAC token helpers ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────
interface ProxyTokenPayload {
/** Storage key (validated). */
k: string;
/** Expiry epoch seconds. */
e: number;
/** Random nonce so two URLs for the same (key, expiry) differ. */
n: string;
/** Optional download filename. */
f?: string;
/** Optional content-type override. */
c?: string;
}
function b64urlEncode(buf: Buffer): string {
return buf.toString('base64').replace(/\+/g, '-').replace(/\//g, '_').replace(/=+$/, '');
}
function b64urlDecode(s: string): Buffer {
const pad = s.length % 4 === 0 ? '' : '='.repeat(4 - (s.length % 4));
return Buffer.from(s.replace(/-/g, '+').replace(/_/g, '/') + pad, 'base64');
}
export function signProxyToken(payload: ProxyTokenPayload, secret: string): string {
const json = JSON.stringify(payload);
const body = b64urlEncode(Buffer.from(json, 'utf8'));
const sig = createHmac('sha256', secret).update(body).digest();
return `${body}.${b64urlEncode(sig)}`;
}
export function verifyProxyToken(
token: string,
secret: string,
): { ok: true; payload: ProxyTokenPayload } | { ok: false; reason: string } {
if (typeof token !== 'string' || !token.includes('.')) {
return { ok: false, reason: 'malformed' };
}
const [body, sigB64] = token.split('.', 2);
if (!body || !sigB64) return { ok: false, reason: 'malformed' };
const expected = createHmac('sha256', secret).update(body).digest();
let provided: Buffer;
try {
provided = b64urlDecode(sigB64);
} catch {
return { ok: false, reason: 'malformed' };
}
if (provided.length !== expected.length) return { ok: false, reason: 'sig-mismatch' };
if (!timingSafeEqual(provided, expected)) return { ok: false, reason: 'sig-mismatch' };
let payload: ProxyTokenPayload;
try {
payload = JSON.parse(b64urlDecode(body).toString('utf8')) as ProxyTokenPayload;
} catch {
return { ok: false, reason: 'malformed-payload' };
}
if (typeof payload.e !== 'number' || payload.e * 1000 < Date.now()) {
return { ok: false, reason: 'expired' };
}
try {
validateStorageKey(payload.k);
} catch {
return { ok: false, reason: 'invalid-key' };
}
return { ok: true, payload };
}
// ─── backend ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
interface FilesystemConfig {
root: string;
/** AES-GCM-encrypted HMAC secret. When absent, falls back to a derived secret. */
proxyHmacSecretEncrypted: string | null;
}
export class FilesystemBackend implements StorageBackend {
readonly name = 'filesystem' as const;
private rootResolved: string;
private hmacSecret: string;
private constructor(rootResolved: string, hmacSecret: string) {
this.rootResolved = rootResolved;
this.hmacSecret = hmacSecret;
}
/** Throws if multi-node mode is set or the root isn't writable. */
static async create(cfg: FilesystemConfig): Promise<FilesystemBackend> {
if (process.env.MULTI_NODE_DEPLOYMENT === 'true') {
throw new Error(
'FilesystemBackend cannot start when MULTI_NODE_DEPLOYMENT=true. ' +
'Use an S3-compatible backend for multi-node deployments.',
);
}
const rootInput = cfg.root || './storage';
const rootAbs = path.isAbsolute(rootInput) ? rootInput : path.resolve(process.cwd(), rootInput);
await fs.mkdir(rootAbs, { recursive: true, mode: 0o700 });
// Defensive: re-chmod even if it already existed.
await fs.chmod(rootAbs, 0o700).catch(() => undefined);
// Use realpath so symlinked roots are flattened to their actual location;
// we then compare every per-key resolution against this exact prefix.
const rootResolved = await fs.realpath(rootAbs);
const hmacSecret = resolveHmacSecret(cfg.proxyHmacSecretEncrypted);
logger.info({ root: rootResolved }, 'FilesystemBackend ready');
return new FilesystemBackend(rootResolved, hmacSecret);
}
/**
* Resolve a (validated) storage key to an absolute path under the root.
* Throws if the resolved path escapes the storage root via symlink/.. tricks.
*/
private resolveKey(key: string): string {
validateStorageKey(key);
const joined = path.join(this.rootResolved, key);
const resolved = path.resolve(joined);
if (resolved !== this.rootResolved && !resolved.startsWith(this.rootResolved + path.sep)) {
throw new ValidationError('Storage key escapes storage root');
}
return resolved;
}
async put(
key: string,
body: Buffer | NodeJS.ReadableStream,
opts: PutOpts,
): Promise<{ key: string; sizeBytes: number; sha256: string }> {
const target = this.resolveKey(key);
await fs.mkdir(path.dirname(target), { recursive: true, mode: 0o700 });
const buffer = Buffer.isBuffer(body) ? body : await streamToBuffer(body);
const sha256 = opts.sha256 ?? createHash('sha256').update(buffer).digest('hex');
// Atomic write via temp + rename so partial writes don't leave half-files.
const tmp = `${target}.${randomUUID()}.tmp`;
await fs.writeFile(tmp, buffer, { mode: 0o600 });
// realpath the temp to make sure the final-rename target resolves correctly
// even if some segment of the path is a symlink we just created.
await fs.rename(tmp, target);
return { key, sizeBytes: buffer.length, sha256 };
}
async get(key: string): Promise<NodeJS.ReadableStream> {
const target = this.resolveKey(key);
try {
const stat = await fs.stat(target);
if (!stat.isFile()) throw new NotFoundError(`Storage object ${key}`);
} catch (err) {
const code = (err as NodeJS.ErrnoException).code;
if (code === 'ENOENT') throw new NotFoundError(`Storage object ${key}`);
throw err;
}
return createReadStream(target);
}
async head(key: string): Promise<{ sizeBytes: number; contentType: string } | null> {
const target = this.resolveKey(key);
try {
const stat = await fs.stat(target);
if (!stat.isFile()) return null;
// Filesystem doesn't track content-type. Caller should consult the DB
// (or sniff via ext) — we return application/octet-stream as a default.
return { sizeBytes: stat.size, contentType: extToContentType(target) };
} catch (err) {
const code = (err as NodeJS.ErrnoException).code;
if (code === 'ENOENT') return null;
throw err;
}
}
async delete(key: string): Promise<void> {
const target = this.resolveKey(key);
try {
await fs.unlink(target);
} catch (err) {
const code = (err as NodeJS.ErrnoException).code;
if (code === 'ENOENT') return;
throw err;
}
}
/**
* Filesystem mode never exposes a direct upload URL. The CRM-internal proxy
* accepts uploads via the regular API surface (multipart POST to /api/v1/...
* or PUT to /api/storage/[token]). We return a placeholder PUT URL pointing
* at the proxy so the contract stays uniform.
*/
async presignUpload(
key: string,
opts: PresignOpts,
): Promise<{ url: string; method: 'PUT' | 'POST' }> {
validateStorageKey(key);
const expiresAt = Math.floor(Date.now() / 1000) + (opts.expirySeconds ?? 900);
const token = signProxyToken(
{ k: key, e: expiresAt, n: randomUUID(), c: opts.contentType },
this.hmacSecret,
);
return { url: `/api/storage/${token}`, method: 'PUT' };
}
async presignDownload(key: string, opts: PresignOpts): Promise<{ url: string; expiresAt: Date }> {
validateStorageKey(key);
const expirySec = opts.expirySeconds ?? 900;
const expiresAtSec = Math.floor(Date.now() / 1000) + expirySec;
const token = signProxyToken(
{ k: key, e: expiresAtSec, n: randomUUID(), f: opts.filename, c: opts.contentType },
this.hmacSecret,
);
return {
url: `/api/storage/${token}`,
expiresAt: new Date(expiresAtSec * 1000),
};
}
/** Used by the proxy route — returns the validated absolute path. */
resolveKeyForProxy(key: string): string {
return this.resolveKey(key);
}
/** Used by the proxy route — same HMAC secret as presignDownload. */
getHmacSecret(): string {
return this.hmacSecret;
}
}
// ─── helpers ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
function resolveHmacSecret(encryptedSecret: string | null): string {
if (encryptedSecret) {
try {
return decrypt(encryptedSecret);
} catch (err) {
logger.error({ err }, 'Failed to decrypt storage_proxy_hmac_secret_encrypted');
}
}
// Derive a stable per-process secret from BETTER_AUTH_SECRET so dev mode
// works without explicit configuration. In production the admin UI writes
// an encrypted random secret.
const seed = process.env.BETTER_AUTH_SECRET ?? env.BETTER_AUTH_SECRET ?? 'storage-default';
return createHash('sha256').update(`storage-proxy:${seed}`).digest('hex');
}
async function streamToBuffer(stream: NodeJS.ReadableStream): Promise<Buffer> {
const chunks: Buffer[] = [];
for await (const chunk of stream as Readable) {
chunks.push(Buffer.isBuffer(chunk) ? chunk : Buffer.from(chunk as string));
}
return Buffer.concat(chunks);
}
function extToContentType(filename: string): string {
const ext = path.extname(filename).toLowerCase();
switch (ext) {
case '.pdf':
return 'application/pdf';
case '.png':
return 'image/png';
case '.jpg':
case '.jpeg':
return 'image/jpeg';
case '.json':
return 'application/json';
case '.txt':
return 'text/plain';
case '.csv':
return 'text/csv';
case '.zip':
return 'application/zip';
default:
return 'application/octet-stream';
}
}