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pn-new-crm/src/app/api/storage/[token]/route.ts

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feat(storage): pluggable s3-or-filesystem backend + migration CLI + admin UI Phase 6a from docs/berth-recommender-and-pdf-plan.md §4.7a + §14.9a. Lays the storage groundwork for Phase 6b/7 file-bearing schemas (per-berth PDFs, brochures) without touching those domains yet. New files: - src/lib/storage/index.ts StorageBackend interface + per-process factory keyed on system_settings. - src/lib/storage/s3.ts S3-compatible backend (MinIO/AWS/B2/R2/ Wasabi/Tigris) wrapping the existing minio JS client. Includes a healthCheck() used by the admin "Test connection" button. - src/lib/storage/filesystem.ts Local filesystem backend with all §14.9a mitigations baked in. - src/lib/storage/migrate.ts Shared migration core — pg_advisory_lock, per-row resumable progress markers, sha256 round-trip verification, atomic storage_backend flip on success. - scripts/migrate-storage.ts Thin CLI shim around runMigration(). - src/app/api/storage/[token]/route.ts Filesystem proxy GET. Verifies HMAC, enforces single-use replay protection via Redis SET NX, streams via NextResponse ReadableStream with explicit Content-Type + Content-Disposition. Node runtime only. - src/app/api/v1/admin/storage/route.ts GET status + POST connection test. - src/app/api/v1/admin/storage/migrate/route.ts Super-admin-only POST that runs the exact same runMigration() as the CLI. - src/app/(dashboard)/[portSlug]/admin/storage/page.tsx Super-admin admin UI (current backend, capacity stats, switch button with dry-run, test connection, backup hint). - src/components/admin/storage-admin-panel.tsx Client component for the page above. §14.9a critical mitigations implemented: - Path-traversal: storage keys validated against ^[a-zA-Z0-9/_.-]+$; `..`, `.`, `//`, leading `/`, and overlength keys rejected. - Realpath: storage root realpath'd at create time, every per-key resolution checked against the realpath'd prefix. - Storage root created (or chmod'd) to 0o700. - Multi-node refusal: FilesystemBackend.create() throws when MULTI_NODE_DEPLOYMENT=true. - HMAC token: sha256-HMAC over the (key, expiry, nonce, filename, content-type) payload. Verified with timingSafeEqual; bad sig, expired, or invalid-key payloads all return 403. - Single-use replay: token body cached in Redis SET NX EX 1800s. - sha256 round-trip: copyAndVerify() re-fetches from the target after put() and aborts the migration on any mismatch. - Free-disk pre-flight: when migrating to filesystem, sums byte counts via source.head() and aborts if free space < total * 1.2. - pg_advisory_lock(0xc7000a01) prevents concurrent migrations. - Resumable: per-row progress markers in _storage_migration_progress. system_settings keys read by the factory (jsonb, no schema change): storage_backend, storage_s3_endpoint, storage_s3_region, storage_s3_bucket, storage_s3_access_key, storage_s3_secret_key_encrypted, storage_s3_force_path_style, storage_filesystem_root, storage_proxy_hmac_secret_encrypted. Defaults: storage_backend=`s3`, storage_filesystem_root=`./storage` (./storage added to .gitignore). Tests added (34 tests, all green): - tests/unit/storage/filesystem-backend.test.ts — key validation allow/reject matrix, realpath escape, 0o700 perms, multi-node refusal, HMAC token sign/verify/tamper/expire/invalid-key. - tests/unit/storage/copy-and-verify.test.ts — sha256 mismatch on round-trip aborts the migration. - tests/integration/storage/proxy-route.test.ts — happy path, wrong HMAC secret, expired token, replay rejection. Phase 6a ships zero file-bearing tables — TABLES_WITH_STORAGE_KEYS is intentionally empty. berth_pdf_versions and brochure_versions land in Phase 6b and join the list there. Existing s3_key columns: only gdpr_export_jobs.storage_key, already named correctly — no rename needed. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-05-05 03:15:59 +02:00
/**
* Filesystem-backend download proxy.
*
* The `FilesystemBackend.presignDownload(...)` returns a CRM-internal URL of
* the form `/api/storage/<hmac-signed-token>`. This route verifies the HMAC,
* checks expiry, enforces single-use via a short Redis cache, then streams
* the file out with explicit `Content-Type` + `Content-Disposition`.
*
* §14.9a mitigations exercised here:
* - HMAC verification (timingSafeEqual via filesystem.verifyProxyToken)
* - expiry check (token includes `e` epoch seconds)
* - single-use replay protection via short Redis SET-NX
* - Node runtime only (no edge); explicit headers so Next.js doesn't try to
* process the bytes (no image optimization, no streaming transforms)
*/
import { createReadStream } from 'node:fs';
import * as fs from 'node:fs/promises';
import { Readable } from 'node:stream';
import { NextRequest, NextResponse } from 'next/server';
import { logger } from '@/lib/logger';
import { redis } from '@/lib/redis';
import { FilesystemBackend, getStorageBackend } from '@/lib/storage';
import { verifyProxyToken } from '@/lib/storage/filesystem';
export const runtime = 'nodejs';
export const dynamic = 'force-dynamic';
const REPLAY_TTL_SECONDS = 60 * 30; // 30min — longer than any presign expiry default.
export async function GET(
_req: NextRequest,
ctx: { params: Promise<{ token: string }> },
): Promise<NextResponse> {
const { token } = await ctx.params;
const backend = await getStorageBackend();
if (!(backend instanceof FilesystemBackend)) {
return NextResponse.json(
{ error: 'Storage proxy is only available in filesystem mode' },
{ status: 404 },
);
}
const result = verifyProxyToken(token, backend.getHmacSecret());
if (!result.ok) {
logger.warn({ reason: result.reason }, 'Storage proxy token rejected');
return NextResponse.json({ error: 'Invalid or expired token' }, { status: 403 });
}
const { payload } = result;
// Single-use enforcement. SET NX with a TTL longer than the token itself.
// Using the body half of the token as the dedup key (signature included
// would also work but body is enough — a reused token has the same body).
const replayKey = `storage:proxy:seen:${token.split('.')[0]}`;
const setOk = await redis.set(replayKey, '1', 'EX', REPLAY_TTL_SECONDS, 'NX');
if (setOk !== 'OK') {
logger.warn({ key: payload.k }, 'Storage proxy token replay rejected');
return NextResponse.json({ error: 'Token already used' }, { status: 403 });
}
let absolutePath: string;
try {
absolutePath = backend.resolveKeyForProxy(payload.k);
} catch (err) {
logger.warn({ err, key: payload.k }, 'Storage proxy key resolution failed');
return NextResponse.json({ error: 'Invalid key' }, { status: 400 });
}
let size: number;
try {
const stat = await fs.stat(absolutePath);
if (!stat.isFile()) {
return NextResponse.json({ error: 'Not found' }, { status: 404 });
}
size = stat.size;
} catch (err) {
const code = (err as NodeJS.ErrnoException).code;
if (code === 'ENOENT') {
return NextResponse.json({ error: 'Not found' }, { status: 404 });
}
throw err;
}
// Convert the Node Readable into a Web ReadableStream for NextResponse.
const nodeStream = createReadStream(absolutePath);
const webStream = Readable.toWeb(nodeStream) as unknown as ReadableStream<Uint8Array>;
const headers = new Headers();
headers.set('Content-Type', payload.c ?? 'application/octet-stream');
headers.set('Content-Length', String(size));
if (payload.f) {
// RFC 5987 — quote the filename and provide a UTF-8 fallback.
const safe = payload.f.replace(/"/g, '');
headers.set(
'Content-Disposition',
`attachment; filename="${safe}"; filename*=UTF-8''${encodeURIComponent(payload.f)}`,
);
}
headers.set('Cache-Control', 'private, no-store');
headers.set('X-Content-Type-Options', 'nosniff');
return new NextResponse(webStream, { status: 200, headers });
}