feat(portal): replace magic-link with email/password + admin-initiated activation
The client portal no longer uses passwordless / magic-link sign-in. Each
client now has a `portal_users` row with a scrypt-hashed password,
created by an admin from the client detail page; the admin's invite
mails an activation link that the client uses to set their own password.
Forgot-password is wired through the same token mechanism.
Schema (migration `0009_outgoing_rumiko_fujikawa.sql`):
- `portal_users` — one per client account, separate from the CRM
`users` table (better-auth) so the auth realms stay isolated. Email
is globally unique, password is null until activation.
- `portal_auth_tokens` — single-use activation / reset tokens. Stores
only the SHA-256 hash so a DB compromise never leaks live tokens.
Services:
- `src/lib/portal/passwords.ts` — scrypt hash/verify (no new deps;
uses node:crypto), token mint+hash helpers.
- `src/lib/services/portal-auth.service.ts` — createPortalUser,
resendActivation, activateAccount, signIn (timing-safe),
requestPasswordReset, resetPassword. Auth failures throw the new
UnauthorizedError (401); enumeration-safe behaviour everywhere.
Routes:
- POST /api/portal/auth/sign-in — sets the existing portal JWT cookie.
- POST /api/portal/auth/forgot-password — always 200.
- POST /api/portal/auth/reset-password — token + new password.
- POST /api/portal/auth/activate — token + initial password.
- POST /api/v1/clients/:id/portal-user — admin invite (and `?action=resend`).
- Removed: /api/portal/auth/request, /api/portal/auth/verify (magic link).
UI:
- /portal/login — replaced email-only magic-link form with email +
password + "forgot password" link.
- /portal/forgot-password, /portal/reset-password, /portal/activate — new.
- New shared `PasswordSetForm` component used by activate + reset.
- New `PortalInviteButton` rendered on the client detail header.
Email send:
- `createTransporter` now wires SMTP auth when SMTP_USER+SMTP_PASS are
set (gmail app-password or marina-server creds, configured via env).
- `SMTP_FROM` env var lets the sender address be overridden without
pinning it to `noreply@${SMTP_HOST}`.
Tests:
- Smoke spec 17 (client-portal) updated to the new flow: 7/7 green.
- Smoke specs 02-crud-spine, 05-invoices, 20-critical-path updated to
match the post-refactor client + invoice forms (drop companyName,
use OwnerPicker + billingEmail).
- Vitest 652/652 still green; type-check clean.
Drops the dead `requestMagicLink` from portal.service.ts.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-04-26 15:34:02 +02:00
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import { pgTable, text, boolean, timestamp, index, uniqueIndex } from 'drizzle-orm/pg-core';
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import { ports } from './ports';
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import { clients } from './clients';
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/**
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2026-05-04 22:57:01 +02:00
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* Portal users - one per client account that's been invited to the client
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feat(portal): replace magic-link with email/password + admin-initiated activation
The client portal no longer uses passwordless / magic-link sign-in. Each
client now has a `portal_users` row with a scrypt-hashed password,
created by an admin from the client detail page; the admin's invite
mails an activation link that the client uses to set their own password.
Forgot-password is wired through the same token mechanism.
Schema (migration `0009_outgoing_rumiko_fujikawa.sql`):
- `portal_users` — one per client account, separate from the CRM
`users` table (better-auth) so the auth realms stay isolated. Email
is globally unique, password is null until activation.
- `portal_auth_tokens` — single-use activation / reset tokens. Stores
only the SHA-256 hash so a DB compromise never leaks live tokens.
Services:
- `src/lib/portal/passwords.ts` — scrypt hash/verify (no new deps;
uses node:crypto), token mint+hash helpers.
- `src/lib/services/portal-auth.service.ts` — createPortalUser,
resendActivation, activateAccount, signIn (timing-safe),
requestPasswordReset, resetPassword. Auth failures throw the new
UnauthorizedError (401); enumeration-safe behaviour everywhere.
Routes:
- POST /api/portal/auth/sign-in — sets the existing portal JWT cookie.
- POST /api/portal/auth/forgot-password — always 200.
- POST /api/portal/auth/reset-password — token + new password.
- POST /api/portal/auth/activate — token + initial password.
- POST /api/v1/clients/:id/portal-user — admin invite (and `?action=resend`).
- Removed: /api/portal/auth/request, /api/portal/auth/verify (magic link).
UI:
- /portal/login — replaced email-only magic-link form with email +
password + "forgot password" link.
- /portal/forgot-password, /portal/reset-password, /portal/activate — new.
- New shared `PasswordSetForm` component used by activate + reset.
- New `PortalInviteButton` rendered on the client detail header.
Email send:
- `createTransporter` now wires SMTP auth when SMTP_USER+SMTP_PASS are
set (gmail app-password or marina-server creds, configured via env).
- `SMTP_FROM` env var lets the sender address be overridden without
pinning it to `noreply@${SMTP_HOST}`.
Tests:
- Smoke spec 17 (client-portal) updated to the new flow: 7/7 green.
- Smoke specs 02-crud-spine, 05-invoices, 20-critical-path updated to
match the post-refactor client + invoice forms (drop companyName,
use OwnerPicker + billingEmail).
- Vitest 652/652 still green; type-check clean.
Drops the dead `requestMagicLink` from portal.service.ts.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-04-26 15:34:02 +02:00
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* portal. Separate from the CRM `users` table (managed by better-auth) so the
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* authentication realms stay isolated.
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*
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* Created by an admin from the client detail page; the admin's invite mails
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* an activation token that lets the client set their own password.
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*/
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export const portalUsers = pgTable(
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'portal_users',
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{
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id: text('id')
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.primaryKey()
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.$defaultFn(() => crypto.randomUUID()),
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portId: text('port_id')
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.notNull()
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.references(() => ports.id),
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clientId: text('client_id')
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.notNull()
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.references(() => clients.id, { onDelete: 'cascade' }),
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email: text('email').notNull(),
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/**
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* scrypt-hashed password. Format: `salt:keyHex` (both base64url). Null
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* until the user activates their account.
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*/
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passwordHash: text('password_hash'),
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name: text('name'),
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isActive: boolean('is_active').notNull().default(true),
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lastLoginAt: timestamp('last_login_at', { withTimezone: true }),
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createdBy: text('created_by').notNull(),
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createdAt: timestamp('created_at', { withTimezone: true }).notNull().defaultNow(),
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updatedAt: timestamp('updated_at', { withTimezone: true }).notNull().defaultNow(),
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},
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(table) => [
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uniqueIndex('idx_portal_users_email_unique').on(table.email),
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index('idx_portal_users_client').on(table.clientId),
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index('idx_portal_users_port').on(table.portId),
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],
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);
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/**
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* Single-use tokens for portal-account activation and password reset.
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*
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* `tokenHash` is a SHA-256 hash of the raw token sent in the email. Lookups
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* happen by hash so a DB compromise never leaks active tokens.
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*/
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export const portalAuthTokens = pgTable(
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'portal_auth_tokens',
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{
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id: text('id')
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.primaryKey()
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.$defaultFn(() => crypto.randomUUID()),
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portalUserId: text('portal_user_id')
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.notNull()
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.references(() => portalUsers.id, { onDelete: 'cascade' }),
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tokenHash: text('token_hash').notNull(),
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type: text('type').notNull(), // 'activation' | 'reset'
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expiresAt: timestamp('expires_at', { withTimezone: true }).notNull(),
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usedAt: timestamp('used_at', { withTimezone: true }),
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createdAt: timestamp('created_at', { withTimezone: true }).notNull().defaultNow(),
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},
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(table) => [
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uniqueIndex('idx_portal_tokens_hash_unique').on(table.tokenHash),
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index('idx_portal_tokens_user').on(table.portalUserId),
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],
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);
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export type PortalUser = typeof portalUsers.$inferSelect;
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export type NewPortalUser = typeof portalUsers.$inferInsert;
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export type PortalAuthToken = typeof portalAuthTokens.$inferSelect;
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export type NewPortalAuthToken = typeof portalAuthTokens.$inferInsert;
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