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pn-new-crm/src/app/api/v1/admin/ocr-settings/route.ts

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feat(phase-b): ship analytics dashboard, alerts, scanner PWA, dedup, audit view Phase B (Insights & Alerts) PR4-11 in one drop. Builds on the schema + service skeletons committed in PRs 1-3. PR4 Analytics dashboard — 4 chart types (funnel/timeline/breakdown/source), date-range picker (today/7d/30d/90d), CSV+PNG export per card. PR5 Alert rail UI + /alerts page — topbar bell w/ live count, dashboard right-rail, three-tab page (active/dismissed/resolved), socket-driven invalidation. Bell lazy-loads list on popover open to keep cold pages fast in non-dashboard routes. PR6 EOI queue tab on documents hub — filters to in-flight EOIs, count surfaces in tab label. PR7 Interests-by-berth tab on berth detail — replaces the stub. PR8 Expense duplicate detection — BullMQ job runs scan on create, yellow banner on detail w/ Merge / Not-a-duplicate, transactional merge consolidates receipts and archives the source. PR9 Receipt scanner PWA + multi-provider AI — port-scoped /scan route in its own (scanner) group with no dashboard chrome, dynamic per-port manifest, OpenAI + Claude provider abstraction, admin OCR settings page (port-level + super-admin global default w/ opt-in fallback), test-connection endpoint, manual-entry fallback when no key is configured. Verify form always shown before save — no ghost rows. PR10 Audit log read view — swap to tsvector full-text search on the existing GIN index, cursor pagination, filters for entity/action/user /date range, batched actor-email resolution. PR11 Real-API tests — opt-in receipt-ocr.spec (admin save+test, optional real-receipt parse via REALAPI_RECEIPT_FIXTURE) and alert-engine socket-fanout spec gated behind RUN_ALERT_ENGINE_REALAPI. Both skip cleanly without their gate envs so CI stays green. Test totals: vitest 690 -> 713, smoke 130 -> 138, realapi +2 opt-in. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-04-28 17:21:55 +02:00
import { NextResponse } from 'next/server';
import { z } from 'zod';
fix(audit-tier-2-routes): manual NextResponse.json error sweep + admin form banners Two final waves of error-surface hygiene closing the audit's MED §12 + HIGH §15 + HIGH §17 findings: * 50 route files swept (61 sites): manual NextResponse.json({error, status: 4xx|5xx}) early-returns replaced by typed throws + errorResponse(err) at the catch. - Super-admin gates (13 sites) use new requireSuperAdmin(ctx, action) helper from src/lib/api/helpers.ts so denials hit the audit log. - Path-param + body validation 400s become ValidationError throws. - 404s become NotFoundError or CodedError('NOT_FOUND') for AI feature-flag paths. - 11 manual 5xx returns now re-throw so error_events captures the request-id (the admin error inspector becomes usable from real incidents). - website-analytics 200-with-error anti-pattern flipped to 409 + UMAMI_NOT_CONFIGURED. 502 upstream paths use UMAMI_UPSTREAM_ERROR. - 11 sites intentionally preserved: storage/[token] anti-enumeration token-failure paths, webhook-secret 401, "Unknown port" 400 in public intake. * 7 admin forms (roles, users, ports, webhooks, custom-fields, document-templates, tags) gain a formatErrorBanner() helper from src/lib/api/toast-error.ts that builds a multi-line "Error code / Reference ID" banner — the rep can copy the request id when reporting a failed save. Banners get whitespace-pre-line so newlines render. Test status: 1168/1168 vitest, tsc clean. Refs: docs/audit-comprehensive-2026-05-05.md MED §12 (auditor-F Issue 1) + HIGH §15 (auditor-F Issue 2) + HIGH §17 (auditor-H Issue 2). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-05-05 20:36:59 +02:00
import { requireSuperAdmin, withAuth, withPermission } from '@/lib/api/helpers';
feat(phase-b): ship analytics dashboard, alerts, scanner PWA, dedup, audit view Phase B (Insights & Alerts) PR4-11 in one drop. Builds on the schema + service skeletons committed in PRs 1-3. PR4 Analytics dashboard — 4 chart types (funnel/timeline/breakdown/source), date-range picker (today/7d/30d/90d), CSV+PNG export per card. PR5 Alert rail UI + /alerts page — topbar bell w/ live count, dashboard right-rail, three-tab page (active/dismissed/resolved), socket-driven invalidation. Bell lazy-loads list on popover open to keep cold pages fast in non-dashboard routes. PR6 EOI queue tab on documents hub — filters to in-flight EOIs, count surfaces in tab label. PR7 Interests-by-berth tab on berth detail — replaces the stub. PR8 Expense duplicate detection — BullMQ job runs scan on create, yellow banner on detail w/ Merge / Not-a-duplicate, transactional merge consolidates receipts and archives the source. PR9 Receipt scanner PWA + multi-provider AI — port-scoped /scan route in its own (scanner) group with no dashboard chrome, dynamic per-port manifest, OpenAI + Claude provider abstraction, admin OCR settings page (port-level + super-admin global default w/ opt-in fallback), test-connection endpoint, manual-entry fallback when no key is configured. Verify form always shown before save — no ghost rows. PR10 Audit log read view — swap to tsvector full-text search on the existing GIN index, cursor pagination, filters for entity/action/user /date range, batched actor-email resolution. PR11 Real-API tests — opt-in receipt-ocr.spec (admin save+test, optional real-receipt parse via REALAPI_RECEIPT_FIXTURE) and alert-engine socket-fanout spec gated behind RUN_ALERT_ENGINE_REALAPI. Both skip cleanly without their gate envs so CI stays green. Test totals: vitest 690 -> 713, smoke 130 -> 138, realapi +2 opt-in. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-04-28 17:21:55 +02:00
import { parseBody } from '@/lib/api/route-helpers';
fix(audit-tier-2-routes): manual NextResponse.json error sweep + admin form banners Two final waves of error-surface hygiene closing the audit's MED §12 + HIGH §15 + HIGH §17 findings: * 50 route files swept (61 sites): manual NextResponse.json({error, status: 4xx|5xx}) early-returns replaced by typed throws + errorResponse(err) at the catch. - Super-admin gates (13 sites) use new requireSuperAdmin(ctx, action) helper from src/lib/api/helpers.ts so denials hit the audit log. - Path-param + body validation 400s become ValidationError throws. - 404s become NotFoundError or CodedError('NOT_FOUND') for AI feature-flag paths. - 11 manual 5xx returns now re-throw so error_events captures the request-id (the admin error inspector becomes usable from real incidents). - website-analytics 200-with-error anti-pattern flipped to 409 + UMAMI_NOT_CONFIGURED. 502 upstream paths use UMAMI_UPSTREAM_ERROR. - 11 sites intentionally preserved: storage/[token] anti-enumeration token-failure paths, webhook-secret 401, "Unknown port" 400 in public intake. * 7 admin forms (roles, users, ports, webhooks, custom-fields, document-templates, tags) gain a formatErrorBanner() helper from src/lib/api/toast-error.ts that builds a multi-line "Error code / Reference ID" banner — the rep can copy the request id when reporting a failed save. Banners get whitespace-pre-line so newlines render. Test status: 1168/1168 vitest, tsc clean. Refs: docs/audit-comprehensive-2026-05-05.md MED §12 (auditor-F Issue 1) + HIGH §15 (auditor-F Issue 2) + HIGH §17 (auditor-H Issue 2). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-05-05 20:36:59 +02:00
import { errorResponse, ValidationError } from '@/lib/errors';
feat(phase-b): ship analytics dashboard, alerts, scanner PWA, dedup, audit view Phase B (Insights & Alerts) PR4-11 in one drop. Builds on the schema + service skeletons committed in PRs 1-3. PR4 Analytics dashboard — 4 chart types (funnel/timeline/breakdown/source), date-range picker (today/7d/30d/90d), CSV+PNG export per card. PR5 Alert rail UI + /alerts page — topbar bell w/ live count, dashboard right-rail, three-tab page (active/dismissed/resolved), socket-driven invalidation. Bell lazy-loads list on popover open to keep cold pages fast in non-dashboard routes. PR6 EOI queue tab on documents hub — filters to in-flight EOIs, count surfaces in tab label. PR7 Interests-by-berth tab on berth detail — replaces the stub. PR8 Expense duplicate detection — BullMQ job runs scan on create, yellow banner on detail w/ Merge / Not-a-duplicate, transactional merge consolidates receipts and archives the source. PR9 Receipt scanner PWA + multi-provider AI — port-scoped /scan route in its own (scanner) group with no dashboard chrome, dynamic per-port manifest, OpenAI + Claude provider abstraction, admin OCR settings page (port-level + super-admin global default w/ opt-in fallback), test-connection endpoint, manual-entry fallback when no key is configured. Verify form always shown before save — no ghost rows. PR10 Audit log read view — swap to tsvector full-text search on the existing GIN index, cursor pagination, filters for entity/action/user /date range, batched actor-email resolution. PR11 Real-API tests — opt-in receipt-ocr.spec (admin save+test, optional real-receipt parse via REALAPI_RECEIPT_FIXTURE) and alert-engine socket-fanout spec gated behind RUN_ALERT_ENGINE_REALAPI. Both skip cleanly without their gate envs so CI stays green. Test totals: vitest 690 -> 713, smoke 130 -> 138, realapi +2 opt-in. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-04-28 17:21:55 +02:00
import { getPublicOcrConfig, saveOcrConfig, OCR_MODELS } from '@/lib/services/ocr-config.service';
const saveSchema = z.object({
/** When 'global', requires super_admin and stores at port_id=null. */
scope: z.enum(['port', 'global']),
provider: z.enum(['openai', 'claude']),
model: z.string().min(1),
apiKey: z.string().optional(),
clearApiKey: z.boolean().optional(),
useGlobal: z.boolean().optional(),
aiEnabled: z.boolean().optional(),
manualEntry: z.boolean().optional(),
feat(phase-b): ship analytics dashboard, alerts, scanner PWA, dedup, audit view Phase B (Insights & Alerts) PR4-11 in one drop. Builds on the schema + service skeletons committed in PRs 1-3. PR4 Analytics dashboard — 4 chart types (funnel/timeline/breakdown/source), date-range picker (today/7d/30d/90d), CSV+PNG export per card. PR5 Alert rail UI + /alerts page — topbar bell w/ live count, dashboard right-rail, three-tab page (active/dismissed/resolved), socket-driven invalidation. Bell lazy-loads list on popover open to keep cold pages fast in non-dashboard routes. PR6 EOI queue tab on documents hub — filters to in-flight EOIs, count surfaces in tab label. PR7 Interests-by-berth tab on berth detail — replaces the stub. PR8 Expense duplicate detection — BullMQ job runs scan on create, yellow banner on detail w/ Merge / Not-a-duplicate, transactional merge consolidates receipts and archives the source. PR9 Receipt scanner PWA + multi-provider AI — port-scoped /scan route in its own (scanner) group with no dashboard chrome, dynamic per-port manifest, OpenAI + Claude provider abstraction, admin OCR settings page (port-level + super-admin global default w/ opt-in fallback), test-connection endpoint, manual-entry fallback when no key is configured. Verify form always shown before save — no ghost rows. PR10 Audit log read view — swap to tsvector full-text search on the existing GIN index, cursor pagination, filters for entity/action/user /date range, batched actor-email resolution. PR11 Real-API tests — opt-in receipt-ocr.spec (admin save+test, optional real-receipt parse via REALAPI_RECEIPT_FIXTURE) and alert-engine socket-fanout spec gated behind RUN_ALERT_ENGINE_REALAPI. Both skip cleanly without their gate envs so CI stays green. Test totals: vitest 690 -> 713, smoke 130 -> 138, realapi +2 opt-in. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-04-28 17:21:55 +02:00
});
sec: gate super-admin invite minting, OCR settings, and alert mutations Three findings from the branch security review: 1. HIGH — Privilege escalation via super-admin invite. POST /api/v1/admin/invitations was gated only by manage_users (held by the port-scoped director role). The body schema accepted isSuperAdmin from the request, createCrmInvite persisted it verbatim, and consumeCrmInvite copied it into userProfiles.isSuperAdmin — granting the new account cross-tenant access. Now the route rejects isSuperAdmin=true unless ctx.isSuperAdmin, and createCrmInvite requires invitedBy.isSuperAdmin as defense-in-depth. 2. HIGH — Receipt-image exfiltration via OCR settings. The route /api/v1/admin/ocr-settings (and the sibling /test) were wrapped only in withAuth — any port role including viewer could PUT a swapped provider apiKey + flip aiEnabled, redirecting every subsequent receipt scan to attacker infrastructure. Both are now wrapped in withPermission('admin','manage_settings',…) matching the sibling admin routes (ai-budget, settings). 3. MEDIUM — Cross-tenant alert IDOR. dismissAlert / acknowledgeAlert issued UPDATE … WHERE id=? with no portId predicate. Any authenticated user with a foreign alert UUID could mutate it. Both service functions now require portId and add it to the WHERE; the route handlers pass ctx.portId. The dev-trigger-crm-invite script passes a synthetic super-admin caller identity since it runs out-of-band. The two public-form tests randomize their IP prefix per run so a fresh test process doesn't collide with leftover redis sliding-window entries from a prior run (publicForm limiter pexpires after 1h). Two new regression test files cover the fixes (6 tests). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-04-29 02:27:01 +02:00
// Only role tiers that hold `admin.manage_settings` (director / super_admin)
// may read or write the OCR config: the apiKey is stored encrypted but is
// passed straight into the receipt-scan handler, so a swapped key would
// exfiltrate every subsequent receipt image to whatever endpoint that key
// authenticates with.
export const GET = withAuth(
withPermission('admin', 'manage_settings', async (req, ctx) => {
try {
const url = new URL(req.url);
const scope = url.searchParams.get('scope') ?? 'port';
fix(audit-tier-2-routes): manual NextResponse.json error sweep + admin form banners Two final waves of error-surface hygiene closing the audit's MED §12 + HIGH §15 + HIGH §17 findings: * 50 route files swept (61 sites): manual NextResponse.json({error, status: 4xx|5xx}) early-returns replaced by typed throws + errorResponse(err) at the catch. - Super-admin gates (13 sites) use new requireSuperAdmin(ctx, action) helper from src/lib/api/helpers.ts so denials hit the audit log. - Path-param + body validation 400s become ValidationError throws. - 404s become NotFoundError or CodedError('NOT_FOUND') for AI feature-flag paths. - 11 manual 5xx returns now re-throw so error_events captures the request-id (the admin error inspector becomes usable from real incidents). - website-analytics 200-with-error anti-pattern flipped to 409 + UMAMI_NOT_CONFIGURED. 502 upstream paths use UMAMI_UPSTREAM_ERROR. - 11 sites intentionally preserved: storage/[token] anti-enumeration token-failure paths, webhook-secret 401, "Unknown port" 400 in public intake. * 7 admin forms (roles, users, ports, webhooks, custom-fields, document-templates, tags) gain a formatErrorBanner() helper from src/lib/api/toast-error.ts that builds a multi-line "Error code / Reference ID" banner — the rep can copy the request id when reporting a failed save. Banners get whitespace-pre-line so newlines render. Test status: 1168/1168 vitest, tsc clean. Refs: docs/audit-comprehensive-2026-05-05.md MED §12 (auditor-F Issue 1) + HIGH §15 (auditor-F Issue 2) + HIGH §17 (auditor-H Issue 2). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-05-05 20:36:59 +02:00
if (scope === 'global') {
requireSuperAdmin(ctx, 'admin.ocr-settings.read.global');
sec: gate super-admin invite minting, OCR settings, and alert mutations Three findings from the branch security review: 1. HIGH — Privilege escalation via super-admin invite. POST /api/v1/admin/invitations was gated only by manage_users (held by the port-scoped director role). The body schema accepted isSuperAdmin from the request, createCrmInvite persisted it verbatim, and consumeCrmInvite copied it into userProfiles.isSuperAdmin — granting the new account cross-tenant access. Now the route rejects isSuperAdmin=true unless ctx.isSuperAdmin, and createCrmInvite requires invitedBy.isSuperAdmin as defense-in-depth. 2. HIGH — Receipt-image exfiltration via OCR settings. The route /api/v1/admin/ocr-settings (and the sibling /test) were wrapped only in withAuth — any port role including viewer could PUT a swapped provider apiKey + flip aiEnabled, redirecting every subsequent receipt scan to attacker infrastructure. Both are now wrapped in withPermission('admin','manage_settings',…) matching the sibling admin routes (ai-budget, settings). 3. MEDIUM — Cross-tenant alert IDOR. dismissAlert / acknowledgeAlert issued UPDATE … WHERE id=? with no portId predicate. Any authenticated user with a foreign alert UUID could mutate it. Both service functions now require portId and add it to the WHERE; the route handlers pass ctx.portId. The dev-trigger-crm-invite script passes a synthetic super-admin caller identity since it runs out-of-band. The two public-form tests randomize their IP prefix per run so a fresh test process doesn't collide with leftover redis sliding-window entries from a prior run (publicForm limiter pexpires after 1h). Two new regression test files cover the fixes (6 tests). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-04-29 02:27:01 +02:00
}
const config = await getPublicOcrConfig(scope === 'global' ? null : ctx.portId);
return NextResponse.json({ data: config, models: OCR_MODELS });
} catch (error) {
return errorResponse(error);
feat(phase-b): ship analytics dashboard, alerts, scanner PWA, dedup, audit view Phase B (Insights & Alerts) PR4-11 in one drop. Builds on the schema + service skeletons committed in PRs 1-3. PR4 Analytics dashboard — 4 chart types (funnel/timeline/breakdown/source), date-range picker (today/7d/30d/90d), CSV+PNG export per card. PR5 Alert rail UI + /alerts page — topbar bell w/ live count, dashboard right-rail, three-tab page (active/dismissed/resolved), socket-driven invalidation. Bell lazy-loads list on popover open to keep cold pages fast in non-dashboard routes. PR6 EOI queue tab on documents hub — filters to in-flight EOIs, count surfaces in tab label. PR7 Interests-by-berth tab on berth detail — replaces the stub. PR8 Expense duplicate detection — BullMQ job runs scan on create, yellow banner on detail w/ Merge / Not-a-duplicate, transactional merge consolidates receipts and archives the source. PR9 Receipt scanner PWA + multi-provider AI — port-scoped /scan route in its own (scanner) group with no dashboard chrome, dynamic per-port manifest, OpenAI + Claude provider abstraction, admin OCR settings page (port-level + super-admin global default w/ opt-in fallback), test-connection endpoint, manual-entry fallback when no key is configured. Verify form always shown before save — no ghost rows. PR10 Audit log read view — swap to tsvector full-text search on the existing GIN index, cursor pagination, filters for entity/action/user /date range, batched actor-email resolution. PR11 Real-API tests — opt-in receipt-ocr.spec (admin save+test, optional real-receipt parse via REALAPI_RECEIPT_FIXTURE) and alert-engine socket-fanout spec gated behind RUN_ALERT_ENGINE_REALAPI. Both skip cleanly without their gate envs so CI stays green. Test totals: vitest 690 -> 713, smoke 130 -> 138, realapi +2 opt-in. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-04-28 17:21:55 +02:00
}
sec: gate super-admin invite minting, OCR settings, and alert mutations Three findings from the branch security review: 1. HIGH — Privilege escalation via super-admin invite. POST /api/v1/admin/invitations was gated only by manage_users (held by the port-scoped director role). The body schema accepted isSuperAdmin from the request, createCrmInvite persisted it verbatim, and consumeCrmInvite copied it into userProfiles.isSuperAdmin — granting the new account cross-tenant access. Now the route rejects isSuperAdmin=true unless ctx.isSuperAdmin, and createCrmInvite requires invitedBy.isSuperAdmin as defense-in-depth. 2. HIGH — Receipt-image exfiltration via OCR settings. The route /api/v1/admin/ocr-settings (and the sibling /test) were wrapped only in withAuth — any port role including viewer could PUT a swapped provider apiKey + flip aiEnabled, redirecting every subsequent receipt scan to attacker infrastructure. Both are now wrapped in withPermission('admin','manage_settings',…) matching the sibling admin routes (ai-budget, settings). 3. MEDIUM — Cross-tenant alert IDOR. dismissAlert / acknowledgeAlert issued UPDATE … WHERE id=? with no portId predicate. Any authenticated user with a foreign alert UUID could mutate it. Both service functions now require portId and add it to the WHERE; the route handlers pass ctx.portId. The dev-trigger-crm-invite script passes a synthetic super-admin caller identity since it runs out-of-band. The two public-form tests randomize their IP prefix per run so a fresh test process doesn't collide with leftover redis sliding-window entries from a prior run (publicForm limiter pexpires after 1h). Two new regression test files cover the fixes (6 tests). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-04-29 02:27:01 +02:00
}),
);
feat(phase-b): ship analytics dashboard, alerts, scanner PWA, dedup, audit view Phase B (Insights & Alerts) PR4-11 in one drop. Builds on the schema + service skeletons committed in PRs 1-3. PR4 Analytics dashboard — 4 chart types (funnel/timeline/breakdown/source), date-range picker (today/7d/30d/90d), CSV+PNG export per card. PR5 Alert rail UI + /alerts page — topbar bell w/ live count, dashboard right-rail, three-tab page (active/dismissed/resolved), socket-driven invalidation. Bell lazy-loads list on popover open to keep cold pages fast in non-dashboard routes. PR6 EOI queue tab on documents hub — filters to in-flight EOIs, count surfaces in tab label. PR7 Interests-by-berth tab on berth detail — replaces the stub. PR8 Expense duplicate detection — BullMQ job runs scan on create, yellow banner on detail w/ Merge / Not-a-duplicate, transactional merge consolidates receipts and archives the source. PR9 Receipt scanner PWA + multi-provider AI — port-scoped /scan route in its own (scanner) group with no dashboard chrome, dynamic per-port manifest, OpenAI + Claude provider abstraction, admin OCR settings page (port-level + super-admin global default w/ opt-in fallback), test-connection endpoint, manual-entry fallback when no key is configured. Verify form always shown before save — no ghost rows. PR10 Audit log read view — swap to tsvector full-text search on the existing GIN index, cursor pagination, filters for entity/action/user /date range, batched actor-email resolution. PR11 Real-API tests — opt-in receipt-ocr.spec (admin save+test, optional real-receipt parse via REALAPI_RECEIPT_FIXTURE) and alert-engine socket-fanout spec gated behind RUN_ALERT_ENGINE_REALAPI. Both skip cleanly without their gate envs so CI stays green. Test totals: vitest 690 -> 713, smoke 130 -> 138, realapi +2 opt-in. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-04-28 17:21:55 +02:00
sec: gate super-admin invite minting, OCR settings, and alert mutations Three findings from the branch security review: 1. HIGH — Privilege escalation via super-admin invite. POST /api/v1/admin/invitations was gated only by manage_users (held by the port-scoped director role). The body schema accepted isSuperAdmin from the request, createCrmInvite persisted it verbatim, and consumeCrmInvite copied it into userProfiles.isSuperAdmin — granting the new account cross-tenant access. Now the route rejects isSuperAdmin=true unless ctx.isSuperAdmin, and createCrmInvite requires invitedBy.isSuperAdmin as defense-in-depth. 2. HIGH — Receipt-image exfiltration via OCR settings. The route /api/v1/admin/ocr-settings (and the sibling /test) were wrapped only in withAuth — any port role including viewer could PUT a swapped provider apiKey + flip aiEnabled, redirecting every subsequent receipt scan to attacker infrastructure. Both are now wrapped in withPermission('admin','manage_settings',…) matching the sibling admin routes (ai-budget, settings). 3. MEDIUM — Cross-tenant alert IDOR. dismissAlert / acknowledgeAlert issued UPDATE … WHERE id=? with no portId predicate. Any authenticated user with a foreign alert UUID could mutate it. Both service functions now require portId and add it to the WHERE; the route handlers pass ctx.portId. The dev-trigger-crm-invite script passes a synthetic super-admin caller identity since it runs out-of-band. The two public-form tests randomize their IP prefix per run so a fresh test process doesn't collide with leftover redis sliding-window entries from a prior run (publicForm limiter pexpires after 1h). Two new regression test files cover the fixes (6 tests). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-04-29 02:27:01 +02:00
export const PUT = withAuth(
withPermission('admin', 'manage_settings', async (req, ctx) => {
try {
const body = await parseBody(req, saveSchema);
fix(audit-tier-2-routes): manual NextResponse.json error sweep + admin form banners Two final waves of error-surface hygiene closing the audit's MED §12 + HIGH §15 + HIGH §17 findings: * 50 route files swept (61 sites): manual NextResponse.json({error, status: 4xx|5xx}) early-returns replaced by typed throws + errorResponse(err) at the catch. - Super-admin gates (13 sites) use new requireSuperAdmin(ctx, action) helper from src/lib/api/helpers.ts so denials hit the audit log. - Path-param + body validation 400s become ValidationError throws. - 404s become NotFoundError or CodedError('NOT_FOUND') for AI feature-flag paths. - 11 manual 5xx returns now re-throw so error_events captures the request-id (the admin error inspector becomes usable from real incidents). - website-analytics 200-with-error anti-pattern flipped to 409 + UMAMI_NOT_CONFIGURED. 502 upstream paths use UMAMI_UPSTREAM_ERROR. - 11 sites intentionally preserved: storage/[token] anti-enumeration token-failure paths, webhook-secret 401, "Unknown port" 400 in public intake. * 7 admin forms (roles, users, ports, webhooks, custom-fields, document-templates, tags) gain a formatErrorBanner() helper from src/lib/api/toast-error.ts that builds a multi-line "Error code / Reference ID" banner — the rep can copy the request id when reporting a failed save. Banners get whitespace-pre-line so newlines render. Test status: 1168/1168 vitest, tsc clean. Refs: docs/audit-comprehensive-2026-05-05.md MED §12 (auditor-F Issue 1) + HIGH §15 (auditor-F Issue 2) + HIGH §17 (auditor-H Issue 2). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-05-05 20:36:59 +02:00
if (body.scope === 'global') {
requireSuperAdmin(ctx, 'admin.ocr-settings.write.global');
sec: gate super-admin invite minting, OCR settings, and alert mutations Three findings from the branch security review: 1. HIGH — Privilege escalation via super-admin invite. POST /api/v1/admin/invitations was gated only by manage_users (held by the port-scoped director role). The body schema accepted isSuperAdmin from the request, createCrmInvite persisted it verbatim, and consumeCrmInvite copied it into userProfiles.isSuperAdmin — granting the new account cross-tenant access. Now the route rejects isSuperAdmin=true unless ctx.isSuperAdmin, and createCrmInvite requires invitedBy.isSuperAdmin as defense-in-depth. 2. HIGH — Receipt-image exfiltration via OCR settings. The route /api/v1/admin/ocr-settings (and the sibling /test) were wrapped only in withAuth — any port role including viewer could PUT a swapped provider apiKey + flip aiEnabled, redirecting every subsequent receipt scan to attacker infrastructure. Both are now wrapped in withPermission('admin','manage_settings',…) matching the sibling admin routes (ai-budget, settings). 3. MEDIUM — Cross-tenant alert IDOR. dismissAlert / acknowledgeAlert issued UPDATE … WHERE id=? with no portId predicate. Any authenticated user with a foreign alert UUID could mutate it. Both service functions now require portId and add it to the WHERE; the route handlers pass ctx.portId. The dev-trigger-crm-invite script passes a synthetic super-admin caller identity since it runs out-of-band. The two public-form tests randomize their IP prefix per run so a fresh test process doesn't collide with leftover redis sliding-window entries from a prior run (publicForm limiter pexpires after 1h). Two new regression test files cover the fixes (6 tests). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-04-29 02:27:01 +02:00
}
const validModels = OCR_MODELS[body.provider];
if (!validModels.includes(body.model)) {
fix(audit-tier-2-routes): manual NextResponse.json error sweep + admin form banners Two final waves of error-surface hygiene closing the audit's MED §12 + HIGH §15 + HIGH §17 findings: * 50 route files swept (61 sites): manual NextResponse.json({error, status: 4xx|5xx}) early-returns replaced by typed throws + errorResponse(err) at the catch. - Super-admin gates (13 sites) use new requireSuperAdmin(ctx, action) helper from src/lib/api/helpers.ts so denials hit the audit log. - Path-param + body validation 400s become ValidationError throws. - 404s become NotFoundError or CodedError('NOT_FOUND') for AI feature-flag paths. - 11 manual 5xx returns now re-throw so error_events captures the request-id (the admin error inspector becomes usable from real incidents). - website-analytics 200-with-error anti-pattern flipped to 409 + UMAMI_NOT_CONFIGURED. 502 upstream paths use UMAMI_UPSTREAM_ERROR. - 11 sites intentionally preserved: storage/[token] anti-enumeration token-failure paths, webhook-secret 401, "Unknown port" 400 in public intake. * 7 admin forms (roles, users, ports, webhooks, custom-fields, document-templates, tags) gain a formatErrorBanner() helper from src/lib/api/toast-error.ts that builds a multi-line "Error code / Reference ID" banner — the rep can copy the request id when reporting a failed save. Banners get whitespace-pre-line so newlines render. Test status: 1168/1168 vitest, tsc clean. Refs: docs/audit-comprehensive-2026-05-05.md MED §12 (auditor-F Issue 1) + HIGH §15 (auditor-F Issue 2) + HIGH §17 (auditor-H Issue 2). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-05-05 20:36:59 +02:00
throw new ValidationError(`Invalid model for provider ${body.provider}`);
sec: gate super-admin invite minting, OCR settings, and alert mutations Three findings from the branch security review: 1. HIGH — Privilege escalation via super-admin invite. POST /api/v1/admin/invitations was gated only by manage_users (held by the port-scoped director role). The body schema accepted isSuperAdmin from the request, createCrmInvite persisted it verbatim, and consumeCrmInvite copied it into userProfiles.isSuperAdmin — granting the new account cross-tenant access. Now the route rejects isSuperAdmin=true unless ctx.isSuperAdmin, and createCrmInvite requires invitedBy.isSuperAdmin as defense-in-depth. 2. HIGH — Receipt-image exfiltration via OCR settings. The route /api/v1/admin/ocr-settings (and the sibling /test) were wrapped only in withAuth — any port role including viewer could PUT a swapped provider apiKey + flip aiEnabled, redirecting every subsequent receipt scan to attacker infrastructure. Both are now wrapped in withPermission('admin','manage_settings',…) matching the sibling admin routes (ai-budget, settings). 3. MEDIUM — Cross-tenant alert IDOR. dismissAlert / acknowledgeAlert issued UPDATE … WHERE id=? with no portId predicate. Any authenticated user with a foreign alert UUID could mutate it. Both service functions now require portId and add it to the WHERE; the route handlers pass ctx.portId. The dev-trigger-crm-invite script passes a synthetic super-admin caller identity since it runs out-of-band. The two public-form tests randomize their IP prefix per run so a fresh test process doesn't collide with leftover redis sliding-window entries from a prior run (publicForm limiter pexpires after 1h). Two new regression test files cover the fixes (6 tests). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-04-29 02:27:01 +02:00
}
await saveOcrConfig(
body.scope === 'global' ? null : ctx.portId,
{
provider: body.provider,
model: body.model,
apiKey: body.apiKey,
clearApiKey: body.clearApiKey,
useGlobal: body.useGlobal,
aiEnabled: body.aiEnabled,
manualEntry: body.manualEntry,
sec: gate super-admin invite minting, OCR settings, and alert mutations Three findings from the branch security review: 1. HIGH — Privilege escalation via super-admin invite. POST /api/v1/admin/invitations was gated only by manage_users (held by the port-scoped director role). The body schema accepted isSuperAdmin from the request, createCrmInvite persisted it verbatim, and consumeCrmInvite copied it into userProfiles.isSuperAdmin — granting the new account cross-tenant access. Now the route rejects isSuperAdmin=true unless ctx.isSuperAdmin, and createCrmInvite requires invitedBy.isSuperAdmin as defense-in-depth. 2. HIGH — Receipt-image exfiltration via OCR settings. The route /api/v1/admin/ocr-settings (and the sibling /test) were wrapped only in withAuth — any port role including viewer could PUT a swapped provider apiKey + flip aiEnabled, redirecting every subsequent receipt scan to attacker infrastructure. Both are now wrapped in withPermission('admin','manage_settings',…) matching the sibling admin routes (ai-budget, settings). 3. MEDIUM — Cross-tenant alert IDOR. dismissAlert / acknowledgeAlert issued UPDATE … WHERE id=? with no portId predicate. Any authenticated user with a foreign alert UUID could mutate it. Both service functions now require portId and add it to the WHERE; the route handlers pass ctx.portId. The dev-trigger-crm-invite script passes a synthetic super-admin caller identity since it runs out-of-band. The two public-form tests randomize their IP prefix per run so a fresh test process doesn't collide with leftover redis sliding-window entries from a prior run (publicForm limiter pexpires after 1h). Two new regression test files cover the fixes (6 tests). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-04-29 02:27:01 +02:00
},
ctx.userId,
feat(phase-b): ship analytics dashboard, alerts, scanner PWA, dedup, audit view Phase B (Insights & Alerts) PR4-11 in one drop. Builds on the schema + service skeletons committed in PRs 1-3. PR4 Analytics dashboard — 4 chart types (funnel/timeline/breakdown/source), date-range picker (today/7d/30d/90d), CSV+PNG export per card. PR5 Alert rail UI + /alerts page — topbar bell w/ live count, dashboard right-rail, three-tab page (active/dismissed/resolved), socket-driven invalidation. Bell lazy-loads list on popover open to keep cold pages fast in non-dashboard routes. PR6 EOI queue tab on documents hub — filters to in-flight EOIs, count surfaces in tab label. PR7 Interests-by-berth tab on berth detail — replaces the stub. PR8 Expense duplicate detection — BullMQ job runs scan on create, yellow banner on detail w/ Merge / Not-a-duplicate, transactional merge consolidates receipts and archives the source. PR9 Receipt scanner PWA + multi-provider AI — port-scoped /scan route in its own (scanner) group with no dashboard chrome, dynamic per-port manifest, OpenAI + Claude provider abstraction, admin OCR settings page (port-level + super-admin global default w/ opt-in fallback), test-connection endpoint, manual-entry fallback when no key is configured. Verify form always shown before save — no ghost rows. PR10 Audit log read view — swap to tsvector full-text search on the existing GIN index, cursor pagination, filters for entity/action/user /date range, batched actor-email resolution. PR11 Real-API tests — opt-in receipt-ocr.spec (admin save+test, optional real-receipt parse via REALAPI_RECEIPT_FIXTURE) and alert-engine socket-fanout spec gated behind RUN_ALERT_ENGINE_REALAPI. Both skip cleanly without their gate envs so CI stays green. Test totals: vitest 690 -> 713, smoke 130 -> 138, realapi +2 opt-in. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-04-28 17:21:55 +02:00
);
return new NextResponse(null, { status: 204 });
sec: gate super-admin invite minting, OCR settings, and alert mutations Three findings from the branch security review: 1. HIGH — Privilege escalation via super-admin invite. POST /api/v1/admin/invitations was gated only by manage_users (held by the port-scoped director role). The body schema accepted isSuperAdmin from the request, createCrmInvite persisted it verbatim, and consumeCrmInvite copied it into userProfiles.isSuperAdmin — granting the new account cross-tenant access. Now the route rejects isSuperAdmin=true unless ctx.isSuperAdmin, and createCrmInvite requires invitedBy.isSuperAdmin as defense-in-depth. 2. HIGH — Receipt-image exfiltration via OCR settings. The route /api/v1/admin/ocr-settings (and the sibling /test) were wrapped only in withAuth — any port role including viewer could PUT a swapped provider apiKey + flip aiEnabled, redirecting every subsequent receipt scan to attacker infrastructure. Both are now wrapped in withPermission('admin','manage_settings',…) matching the sibling admin routes (ai-budget, settings). 3. MEDIUM — Cross-tenant alert IDOR. dismissAlert / acknowledgeAlert issued UPDATE … WHERE id=? with no portId predicate. Any authenticated user with a foreign alert UUID could mutate it. Both service functions now require portId and add it to the WHERE; the route handlers pass ctx.portId. The dev-trigger-crm-invite script passes a synthetic super-admin caller identity since it runs out-of-band. The two public-form tests randomize their IP prefix per run so a fresh test process doesn't collide with leftover redis sliding-window entries from a prior run (publicForm limiter pexpires after 1h). Two new regression test files cover the fixes (6 tests). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-04-29 02:27:01 +02:00
} catch (error) {
return errorResponse(error);
feat(phase-b): ship analytics dashboard, alerts, scanner PWA, dedup, audit view Phase B (Insights & Alerts) PR4-11 in one drop. Builds on the schema + service skeletons committed in PRs 1-3. PR4 Analytics dashboard — 4 chart types (funnel/timeline/breakdown/source), date-range picker (today/7d/30d/90d), CSV+PNG export per card. PR5 Alert rail UI + /alerts page — topbar bell w/ live count, dashboard right-rail, three-tab page (active/dismissed/resolved), socket-driven invalidation. Bell lazy-loads list on popover open to keep cold pages fast in non-dashboard routes. PR6 EOI queue tab on documents hub — filters to in-flight EOIs, count surfaces in tab label. PR7 Interests-by-berth tab on berth detail — replaces the stub. PR8 Expense duplicate detection — BullMQ job runs scan on create, yellow banner on detail w/ Merge / Not-a-duplicate, transactional merge consolidates receipts and archives the source. PR9 Receipt scanner PWA + multi-provider AI — port-scoped /scan route in its own (scanner) group with no dashboard chrome, dynamic per-port manifest, OpenAI + Claude provider abstraction, admin OCR settings page (port-level + super-admin global default w/ opt-in fallback), test-connection endpoint, manual-entry fallback when no key is configured. Verify form always shown before save — no ghost rows. PR10 Audit log read view — swap to tsvector full-text search on the existing GIN index, cursor pagination, filters for entity/action/user /date range, batched actor-email resolution. PR11 Real-API tests — opt-in receipt-ocr.spec (admin save+test, optional real-receipt parse via REALAPI_RECEIPT_FIXTURE) and alert-engine socket-fanout spec gated behind RUN_ALERT_ENGINE_REALAPI. Both skip cleanly without their gate envs so CI stays green. Test totals: vitest 690 -> 713, smoke 130 -> 138, realapi +2 opt-in. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-04-28 17:21:55 +02:00
}
sec: gate super-admin invite minting, OCR settings, and alert mutations Three findings from the branch security review: 1. HIGH — Privilege escalation via super-admin invite. POST /api/v1/admin/invitations was gated only by manage_users (held by the port-scoped director role). The body schema accepted isSuperAdmin from the request, createCrmInvite persisted it verbatim, and consumeCrmInvite copied it into userProfiles.isSuperAdmin — granting the new account cross-tenant access. Now the route rejects isSuperAdmin=true unless ctx.isSuperAdmin, and createCrmInvite requires invitedBy.isSuperAdmin as defense-in-depth. 2. HIGH — Receipt-image exfiltration via OCR settings. The route /api/v1/admin/ocr-settings (and the sibling /test) were wrapped only in withAuth — any port role including viewer could PUT a swapped provider apiKey + flip aiEnabled, redirecting every subsequent receipt scan to attacker infrastructure. Both are now wrapped in withPermission('admin','manage_settings',…) matching the sibling admin routes (ai-budget, settings). 3. MEDIUM — Cross-tenant alert IDOR. dismissAlert / acknowledgeAlert issued UPDATE … WHERE id=? with no portId predicate. Any authenticated user with a foreign alert UUID could mutate it. Both service functions now require portId and add it to the WHERE; the route handlers pass ctx.portId. The dev-trigger-crm-invite script passes a synthetic super-admin caller identity since it runs out-of-band. The two public-form tests randomize their IP prefix per run so a fresh test process doesn't collide with leftover redis sliding-window entries from a prior run (publicForm limiter pexpires after 1h). Two new regression test files cover the fixes (6 tests). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-04-29 02:27:01 +02:00
}),
);