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pn-new-crm/src/lib/services/documenso-webhook.ts

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import { timingSafeEqual } from 'crypto';
// Documenso (v1.13 + 2.x) authenticates outbound webhooks by sending the
// configured secret in plaintext via the `X-Documenso-Secret` header.
// There is no HMAC. Compare the provided value timing-safely to the env secret.
fix(audit-verification): regressions found in post-Tier-6 review Two parallel reviews of the Tier 0–6 work surfaced one CRITICAL regression and a handful of remaining cross-tenant gaps that the original audit didn't enumerate. All fixed here: CRITICAL * document-reminders.processReminderQueue — the new bulk-fetch leftJoin to documentTemplates was scoped on `templateType` alone. Templates of the same type exist in every port; the cartesian explosion would have fired one Documenso reminder PER matching template-row per cron tick (a 5-port deploy = 5 reminders to the same signer per cycle). Added eq(documentTemplates.portId, portId) to the join. * All five remaining Documenso webhook handlers (RecipientSigned / Completed / Opened / Rejected / Cancelled) accept and require an optional portId now, with a shared resolveWebhookDocument() helper that refuses to mutate when the lookup is ambiguous across tenants without a resolved port. Tier 5's port-scoping was applied only to Expired; the route now forwards the matched portId to every handler. Tightens the WHERE clauses on subsequent UPDATEs to (id, portId) for defense-in-depth. HIGH * verifyDocumensoSecret rejects when `expected` is empty — timingSafeEqual(0-bytes, 0-bytes) was returning true, so a dev env with a blank DOCUMENSO_WEBHOOK_SECRET would accept a request whose X-Documenso-Secret header was also missing/empty. listDocumensoWebhookSecrets skips the env entry when blank. * /api/public/health — the website-intake-secret comparison was a string `===` (not constant-time). Switched to timingSafeEqual via Buffer.from(). MEDIUM * server.ts SIGTERM ordering — Socket.io closes BEFORE the HTTP drain so long-poll websockets stop holding the server open past the compose stop_grace_period. * /api/v1/me PATCH preferences merge — allow-list filter on the merged JSONB so legacy rows from the old .passthrough() era stop silently re-shipping their bloat to disk. Migration fixes (deploy-blocking) * 0041 referenced `port_role_overrides.permissions` (column is `permission_overrides`) — overrides are partial JSONB and don't need backfilling at all (deepMerge resolves edit from the base role). Removed the override UPDATEs entirely. * 0042 switched all FK + CHECK adds to NOT VALID + VALIDATE so the brief table-lock phase is decoupled from the row-scan validation, giving a cleaner abort-and-restart story if a constraint catches dirty production data. Added a pre-cleanup UPDATE for invoices.billing_entity_id = '' rows (backfills from clientName, falls back to the row id) so the new non-empty CHECK passes on a dirty table. Test status: 1175/1175 vitest, tsc clean. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-05-05 21:19:39 +02:00
//
// An empty `expected` MUST always reject - without this guard,
fix(audit-verification): regressions found in post-Tier-6 review Two parallel reviews of the Tier 0–6 work surfaced one CRITICAL regression and a handful of remaining cross-tenant gaps that the original audit didn't enumerate. All fixed here: CRITICAL * document-reminders.processReminderQueue — the new bulk-fetch leftJoin to documentTemplates was scoped on `templateType` alone. Templates of the same type exist in every port; the cartesian explosion would have fired one Documenso reminder PER matching template-row per cron tick (a 5-port deploy = 5 reminders to the same signer per cycle). Added eq(documentTemplates.portId, portId) to the join. * All five remaining Documenso webhook handlers (RecipientSigned / Completed / Opened / Rejected / Cancelled) accept and require an optional portId now, with a shared resolveWebhookDocument() helper that refuses to mutate when the lookup is ambiguous across tenants without a resolved port. Tier 5's port-scoping was applied only to Expired; the route now forwards the matched portId to every handler. Tightens the WHERE clauses on subsequent UPDATEs to (id, portId) for defense-in-depth. HIGH * verifyDocumensoSecret rejects when `expected` is empty — timingSafeEqual(0-bytes, 0-bytes) was returning true, so a dev env with a blank DOCUMENSO_WEBHOOK_SECRET would accept a request whose X-Documenso-Secret header was also missing/empty. listDocumensoWebhookSecrets skips the env entry when blank. * /api/public/health — the website-intake-secret comparison was a string `===` (not constant-time). Switched to timingSafeEqual via Buffer.from(). MEDIUM * server.ts SIGTERM ordering — Socket.io closes BEFORE the HTTP drain so long-poll websockets stop holding the server open past the compose stop_grace_period. * /api/v1/me PATCH preferences merge — allow-list filter on the merged JSONB so legacy rows from the old .passthrough() era stop silently re-shipping their bloat to disk. Migration fixes (deploy-blocking) * 0041 referenced `port_role_overrides.permissions` (column is `permission_overrides`) — overrides are partial JSONB and don't need backfilling at all (deepMerge resolves edit from the base role). Removed the override UPDATEs entirely. * 0042 switched all FK + CHECK adds to NOT VALID + VALIDATE so the brief table-lock phase is decoupled from the row-scan validation, giving a cleaner abort-and-restart story if a constraint catches dirty production data. Added a pre-cleanup UPDATE for invoices.billing_entity_id = '' rows (backfills from clientName, falls back to the row id) so the new non-empty CHECK passes on a dirty table. Test status: 1175/1175 vitest, tsc clean. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-05-05 21:19:39 +02:00
// timingSafeEqual(0-bytes, 0-bytes) returns true, so a dev environment
// with a blank DOCUMENSO_WEBHOOK_SECRET would accept any request whose
// `X-Documenso-Secret` was also empty/missing. Same for blank per-port
// secret rows in `system_settings` (the per-port writer should never
// store an empty string but defense-in-depth here is cheap).
export function verifyDocumensoSecret(provided: string, expected: string): boolean {
fix(audit-verification): regressions found in post-Tier-6 review Two parallel reviews of the Tier 0–6 work surfaced one CRITICAL regression and a handful of remaining cross-tenant gaps that the original audit didn't enumerate. All fixed here: CRITICAL * document-reminders.processReminderQueue — the new bulk-fetch leftJoin to documentTemplates was scoped on `templateType` alone. Templates of the same type exist in every port; the cartesian explosion would have fired one Documenso reminder PER matching template-row per cron tick (a 5-port deploy = 5 reminders to the same signer per cycle). Added eq(documentTemplates.portId, portId) to the join. * All five remaining Documenso webhook handlers (RecipientSigned / Completed / Opened / Rejected / Cancelled) accept and require an optional portId now, with a shared resolveWebhookDocument() helper that refuses to mutate when the lookup is ambiguous across tenants without a resolved port. Tier 5's port-scoping was applied only to Expired; the route now forwards the matched portId to every handler. Tightens the WHERE clauses on subsequent UPDATEs to (id, portId) for defense-in-depth. HIGH * verifyDocumensoSecret rejects when `expected` is empty — timingSafeEqual(0-bytes, 0-bytes) was returning true, so a dev env with a blank DOCUMENSO_WEBHOOK_SECRET would accept a request whose X-Documenso-Secret header was also missing/empty. listDocumensoWebhookSecrets skips the env entry when blank. * /api/public/health — the website-intake-secret comparison was a string `===` (not constant-time). Switched to timingSafeEqual via Buffer.from(). MEDIUM * server.ts SIGTERM ordering — Socket.io closes BEFORE the HTTP drain so long-poll websockets stop holding the server open past the compose stop_grace_period. * /api/v1/me PATCH preferences merge — allow-list filter on the merged JSONB so legacy rows from the old .passthrough() era stop silently re-shipping their bloat to disk. Migration fixes (deploy-blocking) * 0041 referenced `port_role_overrides.permissions` (column is `permission_overrides`) — overrides are partial JSONB and don't need backfilling at all (deepMerge resolves edit from the base role). Removed the override UPDATEs entirely. * 0042 switched all FK + CHECK adds to NOT VALID + VALIDATE so the brief table-lock phase is decoupled from the row-scan validation, giving a cleaner abort-and-restart story if a constraint catches dirty production data. Added a pre-cleanup UPDATE for invoices.billing_entity_id = '' rows (backfills from clientName, falls back to the row id) so the new non-empty CHECK passes on a dirty table. Test status: 1175/1175 vitest, tsc clean. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-05-05 21:19:39 +02:00
if (!provided || !expected) return false;
if (provided.length !== expected.length) return false;
try {
return timingSafeEqual(Buffer.from(provided), Buffer.from(expected));
} catch {
return false;
}
}