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pn-new-crm/src/lib/db/schema/portal.ts

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feat(portal): replace magic-link with email/password + admin-initiated activation The client portal no longer uses passwordless / magic-link sign-in. Each client now has a `portal_users` row with a scrypt-hashed password, created by an admin from the client detail page; the admin's invite mails an activation link that the client uses to set their own password. Forgot-password is wired through the same token mechanism. Schema (migration `0009_outgoing_rumiko_fujikawa.sql`): - `portal_users` — one per client account, separate from the CRM `users` table (better-auth) so the auth realms stay isolated. Email is globally unique, password is null until activation. - `portal_auth_tokens` — single-use activation / reset tokens. Stores only the SHA-256 hash so a DB compromise never leaks live tokens. Services: - `src/lib/portal/passwords.ts` — scrypt hash/verify (no new deps; uses node:crypto), token mint+hash helpers. - `src/lib/services/portal-auth.service.ts` — createPortalUser, resendActivation, activateAccount, signIn (timing-safe), requestPasswordReset, resetPassword. Auth failures throw the new UnauthorizedError (401); enumeration-safe behaviour everywhere. Routes: - POST /api/portal/auth/sign-in — sets the existing portal JWT cookie. - POST /api/portal/auth/forgot-password — always 200. - POST /api/portal/auth/reset-password — token + new password. - POST /api/portal/auth/activate — token + initial password. - POST /api/v1/clients/:id/portal-user — admin invite (and `?action=resend`). - Removed: /api/portal/auth/request, /api/portal/auth/verify (magic link). UI: - /portal/login — replaced email-only magic-link form with email + password + "forgot password" link. - /portal/forgot-password, /portal/reset-password, /portal/activate — new. - New shared `PasswordSetForm` component used by activate + reset. - New `PortalInviteButton` rendered on the client detail header. Email send: - `createTransporter` now wires SMTP auth when SMTP_USER+SMTP_PASS are set (gmail app-password or marina-server creds, configured via env). - `SMTP_FROM` env var lets the sender address be overridden without pinning it to `noreply@${SMTP_HOST}`. Tests: - Smoke spec 17 (client-portal) updated to the new flow: 7/7 green. - Smoke specs 02-crud-spine, 05-invoices, 20-critical-path updated to match the post-refactor client + invoice forms (drop companyName, use OwnerPicker + billingEmail). - Vitest 652/652 still green; type-check clean. Drops the dead `requestMagicLink` from portal.service.ts. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-04-26 15:34:02 +02:00
import { pgTable, text, boolean, timestamp, index, uniqueIndex } from 'drizzle-orm/pg-core';
import { ports } from './ports';
import { clients } from './clients';
/**
* Portal users - one per client account that's been invited to the client
feat(portal): replace magic-link with email/password + admin-initiated activation The client portal no longer uses passwordless / magic-link sign-in. Each client now has a `portal_users` row with a scrypt-hashed password, created by an admin from the client detail page; the admin's invite mails an activation link that the client uses to set their own password. Forgot-password is wired through the same token mechanism. Schema (migration `0009_outgoing_rumiko_fujikawa.sql`): - `portal_users` — one per client account, separate from the CRM `users` table (better-auth) so the auth realms stay isolated. Email is globally unique, password is null until activation. - `portal_auth_tokens` — single-use activation / reset tokens. Stores only the SHA-256 hash so a DB compromise never leaks live tokens. Services: - `src/lib/portal/passwords.ts` — scrypt hash/verify (no new deps; uses node:crypto), token mint+hash helpers. - `src/lib/services/portal-auth.service.ts` — createPortalUser, resendActivation, activateAccount, signIn (timing-safe), requestPasswordReset, resetPassword. Auth failures throw the new UnauthorizedError (401); enumeration-safe behaviour everywhere. Routes: - POST /api/portal/auth/sign-in — sets the existing portal JWT cookie. - POST /api/portal/auth/forgot-password — always 200. - POST /api/portal/auth/reset-password — token + new password. - POST /api/portal/auth/activate — token + initial password. - POST /api/v1/clients/:id/portal-user — admin invite (and `?action=resend`). - Removed: /api/portal/auth/request, /api/portal/auth/verify (magic link). UI: - /portal/login — replaced email-only magic-link form with email + password + "forgot password" link. - /portal/forgot-password, /portal/reset-password, /portal/activate — new. - New shared `PasswordSetForm` component used by activate + reset. - New `PortalInviteButton` rendered on the client detail header. Email send: - `createTransporter` now wires SMTP auth when SMTP_USER+SMTP_PASS are set (gmail app-password or marina-server creds, configured via env). - `SMTP_FROM` env var lets the sender address be overridden without pinning it to `noreply@${SMTP_HOST}`. Tests: - Smoke spec 17 (client-portal) updated to the new flow: 7/7 green. - Smoke specs 02-crud-spine, 05-invoices, 20-critical-path updated to match the post-refactor client + invoice forms (drop companyName, use OwnerPicker + billingEmail). - Vitest 652/652 still green; type-check clean. Drops the dead `requestMagicLink` from portal.service.ts. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-04-26 15:34:02 +02:00
* portal. Separate from the CRM `users` table (managed by better-auth) so the
* authentication realms stay isolated.
*
* Created by an admin from the client detail page; the admin's invite mails
* an activation token that lets the client set their own password.
*/
export const portalUsers = pgTable(
'portal_users',
{
id: text('id')
.primaryKey()
.$defaultFn(() => crypto.randomUUID()),
portId: text('port_id')
.notNull()
.references(() => ports.id),
clientId: text('client_id')
.notNull()
.references(() => clients.id, { onDelete: 'cascade' }),
email: text('email').notNull(),
/**
* scrypt-hashed password. Format: `salt:keyHex` (both base64url). Null
* until the user activates their account.
*/
passwordHash: text('password_hash'),
name: text('name'),
isActive: boolean('is_active').notNull().default(true),
lastLoginAt: timestamp('last_login_at', { withTimezone: true }),
createdBy: text('created_by').notNull(),
createdAt: timestamp('created_at', { withTimezone: true }).notNull().defaultNow(),
updatedAt: timestamp('updated_at', { withTimezone: true }).notNull().defaultNow(),
},
(table) => [
uniqueIndex('idx_portal_users_email_unique').on(table.email),
index('idx_portal_users_client').on(table.clientId),
index('idx_portal_users_port').on(table.portId),
],
);
/**
* Single-use tokens for portal-account activation and password reset.
*
* `tokenHash` is a SHA-256 hash of the raw token sent in the email. Lookups
* happen by hash so a DB compromise never leaks active tokens.
*/
export const portalAuthTokens = pgTable(
'portal_auth_tokens',
{
id: text('id')
.primaryKey()
.$defaultFn(() => crypto.randomUUID()),
portalUserId: text('portal_user_id')
.notNull()
.references(() => portalUsers.id, { onDelete: 'cascade' }),
tokenHash: text('token_hash').notNull(),
type: text('type').notNull(), // 'activation' | 'reset'
expiresAt: timestamp('expires_at', { withTimezone: true }).notNull(),
usedAt: timestamp('used_at', { withTimezone: true }),
createdAt: timestamp('created_at', { withTimezone: true }).notNull().defaultNow(),
},
(table) => [
uniqueIndex('idx_portal_tokens_hash_unique').on(table.tokenHash),
index('idx_portal_tokens_user').on(table.portalUserId),
],
);
export type PortalUser = typeof portalUsers.$inferSelect;
export type NewPortalUser = typeof portalUsers.$inferInsert;
export type PortalAuthToken = typeof portalAuthTokens.$inferSelect;
export type NewPortalAuthToken = typeof portalAuthTokens.$inferInsert;