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pn-new-crm/tests/integration/crud-audit.test.ts

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/**
* CRUD audit log integration tests.
*
* For each entity type (clients, interests, berths):
* - Create verify audit log entry with action='create'
* - Update verify audit log with action='update' and old/new values
* - Archive verify audit log with action='archive'
* - Restore verify audit log with action='restore'
*
* Skips gracefully when TEST_DATABASE_URL is not reachable.
*/
import { describe, it, expect, beforeAll, afterAll, vi } from 'vitest';
chore(cleanup): Phase 1 — gap closure across audit, alerts, soft-delete, perms Multi-area cleanup pass closing partial-implementation gaps surfaced by the post-i18n audit. No behavior changes for happy-path users; closes real correctness/security holes. PR1a Public yacht-interest endpoint i18n. /api/public/interests now accepts phoneE164/phoneCountry, nationalityIso, address.{countryIso, subdivisionIso}, and company.{incorporationCountryIso, incorporationSubdivisionIso}. Server-side parsePhone() fallback for legacy raw phone strings. PR1b Alert rule registry trim. Two rule slots ('document.expiring_soon', 'audit.suspicious_login') were registered but evaluators returned []. Both required schema/instrumentation that hadn't landed. Removed from the registry; comments record the dependencies needed to revive them. Effective rule count: 8 active. PR1c vi.mock hoist + flake fix. Hoisted vi.mock calls to top-level in 5 integration test files; webhook-delivery uses vi.hoisted for the queue-add ref. Vitest no longer warns about non-top-level mocks. Deflaked the 'short value' assertion in security-encryption.test.ts by switching plaintext from 'ab' to 'XY' (non-hex chars). 5/5 runs green. PR1d Soft-delete reference audit. listClientOptions and listYachtsForOwner now filter by isNull(archivedAt). Berths use status (no archivedAt). PR1e Permission-matrix audit script + report. scripts/audit-permissions.ts walks every src/app/api/v1/**/route.ts and reports handlers without a withPermission() wrapper. Initial run found 33 violations. - Allow-listed 17 with explicit reasons (self-data, admin, alerts, search, currency, ai, custom-fields — some marked TODO). - Wrapped 7 routes with concrete permissions: clients/options (clients:view), berths/options (berths:view), dashboard/* (reports:view_dashboard), analytics (reports:view_analytics). Audit report at docs/runbooks/permission-audit.md. Script exits non-zero on any unallow-listed violation so it can become a CI gate. Vitest: 741 -> 741 (no new tests; existing suite covers the changes). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-04-28 18:48:22 +02:00
import {
makeAuditMeta,
makeCreateClientInput,
makeCreateInterestInput,
} from '../helpers/factories';
vi.mock('@/lib/socket/server', () => ({ emitToRoom: vi.fn() }));
vi.mock('@/lib/queue', () => ({
getQueue: () => ({ add: vi.fn().mockResolvedValue(undefined) }),
}));
const TEST_DB_URL =
process.env.TEST_DATABASE_URL || 'postgresql://test:test@localhost:5433/portnimara_test';
let dbAvailable = false;
beforeAll(async () => {
try {
const postgres = (await import('postgres')).default;
const sql = postgres(TEST_DB_URL, { max: 1, idle_timeout: 3, connect_timeout: 3 });
await sql`SELECT 1`;
await sql.end();
dbAvailable = true;
} catch {
console.warn('[crud-audit] Test database not available — skipping integration tests');
}
});
function itDb(name: string, fn: () => Promise<void>) {
it(name, async () => {
if (!dbAvailable) return;
await fn();
});
}
// ─── Helpers ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
async function seedPort(): Promise<string> {
const postgres = (await import('postgres')).default;
const sql = postgres(TEST_DB_URL, { max: 1 });
const portId = crypto.randomUUID();
await sql`
INSERT INTO ports (id, name, slug, country, currency, timezone)
VALUES (${portId}, 'Audit Test Port', ${'audit-' + portId.slice(0, 8)}, 'AU', 'AUD', 'UTC')
`;
await sql.end();
return portId;
}
async function cleanupPort(portId: string): Promise<void> {
const postgres = (await import('postgres')).default;
const sql = postgres(TEST_DB_URL, { max: 1 });
await sql`DELETE FROM ports WHERE id = ${portId}`;
await sql.end();
}
async function getAuditEntries(
portId: string,
entityId: string,
action?: string,
): Promise<Array<Record<string, unknown>>> {
const postgres = (await import('postgres')).default;
const sql = postgres(TEST_DB_URL, { max: 1 });
let rows: Array<Record<string, unknown>>;
if (action) {
rows = await sql<Array<Record<string, unknown>>>`
SELECT * FROM audit_logs
WHERE port_id = ${portId}
AND entity_id = ${entityId}
AND action = ${action}
ORDER BY created_at ASC
`;
} else {
rows = await sql<Array<Record<string, unknown>>>`
SELECT * FROM audit_logs
WHERE port_id = ${portId}
AND entity_id = ${entityId}
ORDER BY created_at ASC
`;
}
await sql.end();
return rows;
}
// ─── Client Audit Tests ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────
describe('CRUD Audit — Clients', () => {
let portId: string;
beforeAll(async () => {
if (!dbAvailable) return;
portId = await seedPort();
});
afterAll(async () => {
if (!dbAvailable) return;
await cleanupPort(portId);
});
itDb('create generates an audit log entry with action=create', async () => {
const { createClient } = await import('@/lib/services/clients.service');
const meta = makeAuditMeta({ portId });
chore(cleanup): Phase 1 — gap closure across audit, alerts, soft-delete, perms Multi-area cleanup pass closing partial-implementation gaps surfaced by the post-i18n audit. No behavior changes for happy-path users; closes real correctness/security holes. PR1a Public yacht-interest endpoint i18n. /api/public/interests now accepts phoneE164/phoneCountry, nationalityIso, address.{countryIso, subdivisionIso}, and company.{incorporationCountryIso, incorporationSubdivisionIso}. Server-side parsePhone() fallback for legacy raw phone strings. PR1b Alert rule registry trim. Two rule slots ('document.expiring_soon', 'audit.suspicious_login') were registered but evaluators returned []. Both required schema/instrumentation that hadn't landed. Removed from the registry; comments record the dependencies needed to revive them. Effective rule count: 8 active. PR1c vi.mock hoist + flake fix. Hoisted vi.mock calls to top-level in 5 integration test files; webhook-delivery uses vi.hoisted for the queue-add ref. Vitest no longer warns about non-top-level mocks. Deflaked the 'short value' assertion in security-encryption.test.ts by switching plaintext from 'ab' to 'XY' (non-hex chars). 5/5 runs green. PR1d Soft-delete reference audit. listClientOptions and listYachtsForOwner now filter by isNull(archivedAt). Berths use status (no archivedAt). PR1e Permission-matrix audit script + report. scripts/audit-permissions.ts walks every src/app/api/v1/**/route.ts and reports handlers without a withPermission() wrapper. Initial run found 33 violations. - Allow-listed 17 with explicit reasons (self-data, admin, alerts, search, currency, ai, custom-fields — some marked TODO). - Wrapped 7 routes with concrete permissions: clients/options (clients:view), berths/options (berths:view), dashboard/* (reports:view_dashboard), analytics (reports:view_analytics). Audit report at docs/runbooks/permission-audit.md. Script exits non-zero on any unallow-listed violation so it can become a CI gate. Vitest: 741 -> 741 (no new tests; existing suite covers the changes). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-04-28 18:48:22 +02:00
const client = await createClient(
portId,
makeCreateClientInput({ fullName: 'Audit Create Client' }),
meta,
);
await new Promise((r) => setTimeout(r, 100));
const logs = await getAuditEntries(portId, client.id, 'create');
expect(logs.length).toBeGreaterThanOrEqual(1);
const log = logs[0]!;
expect(log.entity_type).toBe('client');
expect(log.action).toBe('create');
const newVal = log.new_value as Record<string, unknown>;
expect(newVal.fullName).toBe('Audit Create Client');
});
itDb('update generates an audit log entry with action=update', async () => {
const { createClient, updateClient } = await import('@/lib/services/clients.service');
const meta = makeAuditMeta({ portId });
chore(cleanup): Phase 1 — gap closure across audit, alerts, soft-delete, perms Multi-area cleanup pass closing partial-implementation gaps surfaced by the post-i18n audit. No behavior changes for happy-path users; closes real correctness/security holes. PR1a Public yacht-interest endpoint i18n. /api/public/interests now accepts phoneE164/phoneCountry, nationalityIso, address.{countryIso, subdivisionIso}, and company.{incorporationCountryIso, incorporationSubdivisionIso}. Server-side parsePhone() fallback for legacy raw phone strings. PR1b Alert rule registry trim. Two rule slots ('document.expiring_soon', 'audit.suspicious_login') were registered but evaluators returned []. Both required schema/instrumentation that hadn't landed. Removed from the registry; comments record the dependencies needed to revive them. Effective rule count: 8 active. PR1c vi.mock hoist + flake fix. Hoisted vi.mock calls to top-level in 5 integration test files; webhook-delivery uses vi.hoisted for the queue-add ref. Vitest no longer warns about non-top-level mocks. Deflaked the 'short value' assertion in security-encryption.test.ts by switching plaintext from 'ab' to 'XY' (non-hex chars). 5/5 runs green. PR1d Soft-delete reference audit. listClientOptions and listYachtsForOwner now filter by isNull(archivedAt). Berths use status (no archivedAt). PR1e Permission-matrix audit script + report. scripts/audit-permissions.ts walks every src/app/api/v1/**/route.ts and reports handlers without a withPermission() wrapper. Initial run found 33 violations. - Allow-listed 17 with explicit reasons (self-data, admin, alerts, search, currency, ai, custom-fields — some marked TODO). - Wrapped 7 routes with concrete permissions: clients/options (clients:view), berths/options (berths:view), dashboard/* (reports:view_dashboard), analytics (reports:view_analytics). Audit report at docs/runbooks/permission-audit.md. Script exits non-zero on any unallow-listed violation so it can become a CI gate. Vitest: 741 -> 741 (no new tests; existing suite covers the changes). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-04-28 18:48:22 +02:00
const client = await createClient(
portId,
makeCreateClientInput({ fullName: 'Before Update' }),
meta,
);
await updateClient(client.id, portId, { fullName: 'After Update' }, meta);
await new Promise((r) => setTimeout(r, 100));
const logs = await getAuditEntries(portId, client.id, 'update');
expect(logs.length).toBeGreaterThanOrEqual(1);
const updateLog = logs[logs.length - 1]!;
expect(updateLog.action).toBe('update');
const newVal = updateLog.new_value as Record<string, unknown>;
expect(newVal.fullName).toBe('After Update');
});
itDb('archive generates an audit log entry with action=archive', async () => {
const { createClient, archiveClient } = await import('@/lib/services/clients.service');
const meta = makeAuditMeta({ portId });
chore(cleanup): Phase 1 — gap closure across audit, alerts, soft-delete, perms Multi-area cleanup pass closing partial-implementation gaps surfaced by the post-i18n audit. No behavior changes for happy-path users; closes real correctness/security holes. PR1a Public yacht-interest endpoint i18n. /api/public/interests now accepts phoneE164/phoneCountry, nationalityIso, address.{countryIso, subdivisionIso}, and company.{incorporationCountryIso, incorporationSubdivisionIso}. Server-side parsePhone() fallback for legacy raw phone strings. PR1b Alert rule registry trim. Two rule slots ('document.expiring_soon', 'audit.suspicious_login') were registered but evaluators returned []. Both required schema/instrumentation that hadn't landed. Removed from the registry; comments record the dependencies needed to revive them. Effective rule count: 8 active. PR1c vi.mock hoist + flake fix. Hoisted vi.mock calls to top-level in 5 integration test files; webhook-delivery uses vi.hoisted for the queue-add ref. Vitest no longer warns about non-top-level mocks. Deflaked the 'short value' assertion in security-encryption.test.ts by switching plaintext from 'ab' to 'XY' (non-hex chars). 5/5 runs green. PR1d Soft-delete reference audit. listClientOptions and listYachtsForOwner now filter by isNull(archivedAt). Berths use status (no archivedAt). PR1e Permission-matrix audit script + report. scripts/audit-permissions.ts walks every src/app/api/v1/**/route.ts and reports handlers without a withPermission() wrapper. Initial run found 33 violations. - Allow-listed 17 with explicit reasons (self-data, admin, alerts, search, currency, ai, custom-fields — some marked TODO). - Wrapped 7 routes with concrete permissions: clients/options (clients:view), berths/options (berths:view), dashboard/* (reports:view_dashboard), analytics (reports:view_analytics). Audit report at docs/runbooks/permission-audit.md. Script exits non-zero on any unallow-listed violation so it can become a CI gate. Vitest: 741 -> 741 (no new tests; existing suite covers the changes). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-04-28 18:48:22 +02:00
const client = await createClient(
portId,
makeCreateClientInput({ fullName: 'Audit Archive Client' }),
meta,
);
await archiveClient(client.id, portId, meta);
await new Promise((r) => setTimeout(r, 100));
const logs = await getAuditEntries(portId, client.id, 'archive');
expect(logs.length).toBeGreaterThanOrEqual(1);
expect(logs[0]!.action).toBe('archive');
});
itDb('restore generates an audit log entry with action=restore', async () => {
chore(cleanup): Phase 1 — gap closure across audit, alerts, soft-delete, perms Multi-area cleanup pass closing partial-implementation gaps surfaced by the post-i18n audit. No behavior changes for happy-path users; closes real correctness/security holes. PR1a Public yacht-interest endpoint i18n. /api/public/interests now accepts phoneE164/phoneCountry, nationalityIso, address.{countryIso, subdivisionIso}, and company.{incorporationCountryIso, incorporationSubdivisionIso}. Server-side parsePhone() fallback for legacy raw phone strings. PR1b Alert rule registry trim. Two rule slots ('document.expiring_soon', 'audit.suspicious_login') were registered but evaluators returned []. Both required schema/instrumentation that hadn't landed. Removed from the registry; comments record the dependencies needed to revive them. Effective rule count: 8 active. PR1c vi.mock hoist + flake fix. Hoisted vi.mock calls to top-level in 5 integration test files; webhook-delivery uses vi.hoisted for the queue-add ref. Vitest no longer warns about non-top-level mocks. Deflaked the 'short value' assertion in security-encryption.test.ts by switching plaintext from 'ab' to 'XY' (non-hex chars). 5/5 runs green. PR1d Soft-delete reference audit. listClientOptions and listYachtsForOwner now filter by isNull(archivedAt). Berths use status (no archivedAt). PR1e Permission-matrix audit script + report. scripts/audit-permissions.ts walks every src/app/api/v1/**/route.ts and reports handlers without a withPermission() wrapper. Initial run found 33 violations. - Allow-listed 17 with explicit reasons (self-data, admin, alerts, search, currency, ai, custom-fields — some marked TODO). - Wrapped 7 routes with concrete permissions: clients/options (clients:view), berths/options (berths:view), dashboard/* (reports:view_dashboard), analytics (reports:view_analytics). Audit report at docs/runbooks/permission-audit.md. Script exits non-zero on any unallow-listed violation so it can become a CI gate. Vitest: 741 -> 741 (no new tests; existing suite covers the changes). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-04-28 18:48:22 +02:00
const { createClient, archiveClient, restoreClient } =
await import('@/lib/services/clients.service');
const meta = makeAuditMeta({ portId });
chore(cleanup): Phase 1 — gap closure across audit, alerts, soft-delete, perms Multi-area cleanup pass closing partial-implementation gaps surfaced by the post-i18n audit. No behavior changes for happy-path users; closes real correctness/security holes. PR1a Public yacht-interest endpoint i18n. /api/public/interests now accepts phoneE164/phoneCountry, nationalityIso, address.{countryIso, subdivisionIso}, and company.{incorporationCountryIso, incorporationSubdivisionIso}. Server-side parsePhone() fallback for legacy raw phone strings. PR1b Alert rule registry trim. Two rule slots ('document.expiring_soon', 'audit.suspicious_login') were registered but evaluators returned []. Both required schema/instrumentation that hadn't landed. Removed from the registry; comments record the dependencies needed to revive them. Effective rule count: 8 active. PR1c vi.mock hoist + flake fix. Hoisted vi.mock calls to top-level in 5 integration test files; webhook-delivery uses vi.hoisted for the queue-add ref. Vitest no longer warns about non-top-level mocks. Deflaked the 'short value' assertion in security-encryption.test.ts by switching plaintext from 'ab' to 'XY' (non-hex chars). 5/5 runs green. PR1d Soft-delete reference audit. listClientOptions and listYachtsForOwner now filter by isNull(archivedAt). Berths use status (no archivedAt). PR1e Permission-matrix audit script + report. scripts/audit-permissions.ts walks every src/app/api/v1/**/route.ts and reports handlers without a withPermission() wrapper. Initial run found 33 violations. - Allow-listed 17 with explicit reasons (self-data, admin, alerts, search, currency, ai, custom-fields — some marked TODO). - Wrapped 7 routes with concrete permissions: clients/options (clients:view), berths/options (berths:view), dashboard/* (reports:view_dashboard), analytics (reports:view_analytics). Audit report at docs/runbooks/permission-audit.md. Script exits non-zero on any unallow-listed violation so it can become a CI gate. Vitest: 741 -> 741 (no new tests; existing suite covers the changes). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-04-28 18:48:22 +02:00
const client = await createClient(
portId,
makeCreateClientInput({ fullName: 'Audit Restore Client' }),
meta,
);
await archiveClient(client.id, portId, meta);
await restoreClient(client.id, portId, meta);
await new Promise((r) => setTimeout(r, 100));
const logs = await getAuditEntries(portId, client.id, 'restore');
expect(logs.length).toBeGreaterThanOrEqual(1);
expect(logs[0]!.action).toBe('restore');
});
});
// ─── Interest Audit Tests ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────
describe('CRUD Audit — Interests', () => {
let portId: string;
let clientId: string;
beforeAll(async () => {
if (!dbAvailable) return;
portId = await seedPort();
const { createClient } = await import('@/lib/services/clients.service');
chore(cleanup): Phase 1 — gap closure across audit, alerts, soft-delete, perms Multi-area cleanup pass closing partial-implementation gaps surfaced by the post-i18n audit. No behavior changes for happy-path users; closes real correctness/security holes. PR1a Public yacht-interest endpoint i18n. /api/public/interests now accepts phoneE164/phoneCountry, nationalityIso, address.{countryIso, subdivisionIso}, and company.{incorporationCountryIso, incorporationSubdivisionIso}. Server-side parsePhone() fallback for legacy raw phone strings. PR1b Alert rule registry trim. Two rule slots ('document.expiring_soon', 'audit.suspicious_login') were registered but evaluators returned []. Both required schema/instrumentation that hadn't landed. Removed from the registry; comments record the dependencies needed to revive them. Effective rule count: 8 active. PR1c vi.mock hoist + flake fix. Hoisted vi.mock calls to top-level in 5 integration test files; webhook-delivery uses vi.hoisted for the queue-add ref. Vitest no longer warns about non-top-level mocks. Deflaked the 'short value' assertion in security-encryption.test.ts by switching plaintext from 'ab' to 'XY' (non-hex chars). 5/5 runs green. PR1d Soft-delete reference audit. listClientOptions and listYachtsForOwner now filter by isNull(archivedAt). Berths use status (no archivedAt). PR1e Permission-matrix audit script + report. scripts/audit-permissions.ts walks every src/app/api/v1/**/route.ts and reports handlers without a withPermission() wrapper. Initial run found 33 violations. - Allow-listed 17 with explicit reasons (self-data, admin, alerts, search, currency, ai, custom-fields — some marked TODO). - Wrapped 7 routes with concrete permissions: clients/options (clients:view), berths/options (berths:view), dashboard/* (reports:view_dashboard), analytics (reports:view_analytics). Audit report at docs/runbooks/permission-audit.md. Script exits non-zero on any unallow-listed violation so it can become a CI gate. Vitest: 741 -> 741 (no new tests; existing suite covers the changes). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-04-28 18:48:22 +02:00
const client = await createClient(
portId,
makeCreateClientInput({ fullName: 'Interest Audit Client' }),
makeAuditMeta({ portId }),
);
clientId = client.id;
});
afterAll(async () => {
if (!dbAvailable) return;
await cleanupPort(portId);
});
itDb('create generates audit log with action=create', async () => {
const { createInterest } = await import('@/lib/services/interests.service');
const meta = makeAuditMeta({ portId });
const interest = await createInterest(portId, makeCreateInterestInput({ clientId }), meta);
await new Promise((r) => setTimeout(r, 100));
const logs = await getAuditEntries(portId, interest.id, 'create');
expect(logs.length).toBeGreaterThanOrEqual(1);
const log = logs[0]!;
expect(log.entity_type).toBe('interest');
const newVal = log.new_value as Record<string, unknown>;
expect(newVal.pipelineStage).toBe('open');
});
itDb('update generates audit log with action=update', async () => {
const { createInterest, updateInterest } = await import('@/lib/services/interests.service');
const meta = makeAuditMeta({ portId });
chore(cleanup): Phase 1 — gap closure across audit, alerts, soft-delete, perms Multi-area cleanup pass closing partial-implementation gaps surfaced by the post-i18n audit. No behavior changes for happy-path users; closes real correctness/security holes. PR1a Public yacht-interest endpoint i18n. /api/public/interests now accepts phoneE164/phoneCountry, nationalityIso, address.{countryIso, subdivisionIso}, and company.{incorporationCountryIso, incorporationSubdivisionIso}. Server-side parsePhone() fallback for legacy raw phone strings. PR1b Alert rule registry trim. Two rule slots ('document.expiring_soon', 'audit.suspicious_login') were registered but evaluators returned []. Both required schema/instrumentation that hadn't landed. Removed from the registry; comments record the dependencies needed to revive them. Effective rule count: 8 active. PR1c vi.mock hoist + flake fix. Hoisted vi.mock calls to top-level in 5 integration test files; webhook-delivery uses vi.hoisted for the queue-add ref. Vitest no longer warns about non-top-level mocks. Deflaked the 'short value' assertion in security-encryption.test.ts by switching plaintext from 'ab' to 'XY' (non-hex chars). 5/5 runs green. PR1d Soft-delete reference audit. listClientOptions and listYachtsForOwner now filter by isNull(archivedAt). Berths use status (no archivedAt). PR1e Permission-matrix audit script + report. scripts/audit-permissions.ts walks every src/app/api/v1/**/route.ts and reports handlers without a withPermission() wrapper. Initial run found 33 violations. - Allow-listed 17 with explicit reasons (self-data, admin, alerts, search, currency, ai, custom-fields — some marked TODO). - Wrapped 7 routes with concrete permissions: clients/options (clients:view), berths/options (berths:view), dashboard/* (reports:view_dashboard), analytics (reports:view_analytics). Audit report at docs/runbooks/permission-audit.md. Script exits non-zero on any unallow-listed violation so it can become a CI gate. Vitest: 741 -> 741 (no new tests; existing suite covers the changes). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-04-28 18:48:22 +02:00
const interest = await createInterest(
portId,
{ ...makeCreateInterestInput({ clientId }), notes: 'initial' },
meta,
);
await updateInterest(interest.id, portId, { notes: 'updated notes' }, meta);
await new Promise((r) => setTimeout(r, 100));
const logs = await getAuditEntries(portId, interest.id, 'update');
expect(logs.length).toBeGreaterThanOrEqual(1);
});
itDb('archive generates audit log with action=archive', async () => {
const { createInterest, archiveInterest } = await import('@/lib/services/interests.service');
const meta = makeAuditMeta({ portId });
const interest = await createInterest(portId, makeCreateInterestInput({ clientId }), meta);
await archiveInterest(interest.id, portId, meta);
await new Promise((r) => setTimeout(r, 100));
const logs = await getAuditEntries(portId, interest.id, 'archive');
expect(logs.length).toBeGreaterThanOrEqual(1);
expect(logs[0]!.action).toBe('archive');
});
itDb('restore generates audit log with action=restore', async () => {
chore(cleanup): Phase 1 — gap closure across audit, alerts, soft-delete, perms Multi-area cleanup pass closing partial-implementation gaps surfaced by the post-i18n audit. No behavior changes for happy-path users; closes real correctness/security holes. PR1a Public yacht-interest endpoint i18n. /api/public/interests now accepts phoneE164/phoneCountry, nationalityIso, address.{countryIso, subdivisionIso}, and company.{incorporationCountryIso, incorporationSubdivisionIso}. Server-side parsePhone() fallback for legacy raw phone strings. PR1b Alert rule registry trim. Two rule slots ('document.expiring_soon', 'audit.suspicious_login') were registered but evaluators returned []. Both required schema/instrumentation that hadn't landed. Removed from the registry; comments record the dependencies needed to revive them. Effective rule count: 8 active. PR1c vi.mock hoist + flake fix. Hoisted vi.mock calls to top-level in 5 integration test files; webhook-delivery uses vi.hoisted for the queue-add ref. Vitest no longer warns about non-top-level mocks. Deflaked the 'short value' assertion in security-encryption.test.ts by switching plaintext from 'ab' to 'XY' (non-hex chars). 5/5 runs green. PR1d Soft-delete reference audit. listClientOptions and listYachtsForOwner now filter by isNull(archivedAt). Berths use status (no archivedAt). PR1e Permission-matrix audit script + report. scripts/audit-permissions.ts walks every src/app/api/v1/**/route.ts and reports handlers without a withPermission() wrapper. Initial run found 33 violations. - Allow-listed 17 with explicit reasons (self-data, admin, alerts, search, currency, ai, custom-fields — some marked TODO). - Wrapped 7 routes with concrete permissions: clients/options (clients:view), berths/options (berths:view), dashboard/* (reports:view_dashboard), analytics (reports:view_analytics). Audit report at docs/runbooks/permission-audit.md. Script exits non-zero on any unallow-listed violation so it can become a CI gate. Vitest: 741 -> 741 (no new tests; existing suite covers the changes). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-04-28 18:48:22 +02:00
const { createInterest, archiveInterest, restoreInterest } =
await import('@/lib/services/interests.service');
const meta = makeAuditMeta({ portId });
const interest = await createInterest(portId, makeCreateInterestInput({ clientId }), meta);
await archiveInterest(interest.id, portId, meta);
await restoreInterest(interest.id, portId, meta);
await new Promise((r) => setTimeout(r, 100));
const logs = await getAuditEntries(portId, interest.id, 'restore');
expect(logs.length).toBeGreaterThanOrEqual(1);
});
});
// ─── Berth Audit Tests ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
describe('CRUD Audit — Berths', () => {
let portId: string;
let berthId: string;
beforeAll(async () => {
if (!dbAvailable) return;
portId = await seedPort();
const postgres = (await import('postgres')).default;
const sql = postgres(TEST_DB_URL, { max: 1 });
berthId = crypto.randomUUID();
await sql`
INSERT INTO berths (id, port_id, mooring_number, status)
VALUES (${berthId}, ${portId}, 'AUDIT-B1', 'available')
`;
await sql.end();
});
afterAll(async () => {
if (!dbAvailable) return;
await cleanupPort(portId);
});
itDb('updateBerth generates audit log with action=update', async () => {
const { updateBerth } = await import('@/lib/services/berths.service');
const meta = makeAuditMeta({ portId });
await updateBerth(berthId, portId, { area: 'North Pier', berthApproved: true }, meta);
await new Promise((r) => setTimeout(r, 100));
const logs = await getAuditEntries(portId, berthId, 'update');
expect(logs.length).toBeGreaterThanOrEqual(1);
expect(logs[0]!.entity_type).toBe('berth');
});
itDb('updateBerth on wrong portId throws NotFoundError', async () => {
const { updateBerth } = await import('@/lib/services/berths.service');
const { NotFoundError } = await import('@/lib/errors');
const wrongPortId = crypto.randomUUID();
const meta = makeAuditMeta({ portId: wrongPortId });
chore(cleanup): Phase 1 — gap closure across audit, alerts, soft-delete, perms Multi-area cleanup pass closing partial-implementation gaps surfaced by the post-i18n audit. No behavior changes for happy-path users; closes real correctness/security holes. PR1a Public yacht-interest endpoint i18n. /api/public/interests now accepts phoneE164/phoneCountry, nationalityIso, address.{countryIso, subdivisionIso}, and company.{incorporationCountryIso, incorporationSubdivisionIso}. Server-side parsePhone() fallback for legacy raw phone strings. PR1b Alert rule registry trim. Two rule slots ('document.expiring_soon', 'audit.suspicious_login') were registered but evaluators returned []. Both required schema/instrumentation that hadn't landed. Removed from the registry; comments record the dependencies needed to revive them. Effective rule count: 8 active. PR1c vi.mock hoist + flake fix. Hoisted vi.mock calls to top-level in 5 integration test files; webhook-delivery uses vi.hoisted for the queue-add ref. Vitest no longer warns about non-top-level mocks. Deflaked the 'short value' assertion in security-encryption.test.ts by switching plaintext from 'ab' to 'XY' (non-hex chars). 5/5 runs green. PR1d Soft-delete reference audit. listClientOptions and listYachtsForOwner now filter by isNull(archivedAt). Berths use status (no archivedAt). PR1e Permission-matrix audit script + report. scripts/audit-permissions.ts walks every src/app/api/v1/**/route.ts and reports handlers without a withPermission() wrapper. Initial run found 33 violations. - Allow-listed 17 with explicit reasons (self-data, admin, alerts, search, currency, ai, custom-fields — some marked TODO). - Wrapped 7 routes with concrete permissions: clients/options (clients:view), berths/options (berths:view), dashboard/* (reports:view_dashboard), analytics (reports:view_analytics). Audit report at docs/runbooks/permission-audit.md. Script exits non-zero on any unallow-listed violation so it can become a CI gate. Vitest: 741 -> 741 (no new tests; existing suite covers the changes). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-04-28 18:48:22 +02:00
await expect(updateBerth(berthId, wrongPortId, { area: 'Should fail' }, meta)).rejects.toThrow(
NotFoundError,
);
});
});